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FOREWORD
The workshop “Enhancing International Law Enforcement Co-operation, including
Extradition Measures” was held at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok, Thailand (18-25 April 2005) as one of
the six workshops of the Congress. One day was allocated for this event which
brought together both practitioners and academics from all around the world to share
both problems and good practice. This publication includes the prepared
presentations, as received from the authors, given during the workshop as well as a
short evaluation report regarding the workshops and the Congress.
The suggestion to hold the six workshops was made by the United Nations
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its twelfth session in 2003.
The workshop items were: Enhancing International Law Enforcement Co-operation,
including Extradition Measures; Enhancing Criminal Justice Reform, including
Restorative Justice; Strategies and Best Practices for Crime Prevention, in particular
in relation to Urban Crime and Youth at Risk; Measures to Combat Terrorism, with
reference to the Relevant International Conventions and Protocols; Measures to
Combat Economic Crime, including Money-Laundering ; and Measures to Combat
Computer-related Crime. The General Assembly of the United Nations approved the
agenda for the Eleventh Congress and decided upon the workshop issues in its
resolution 58/138 of 22 December 2003.
The responsibility of organizing the workshops was again placed on the Institutes
comprising the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme
Network (PNI), in close co-operation with the Member States and the Office for
Drugs and Crime of the United Nations. - Workshop 1 on enhancing international
law enforcement co-operation including extradition measures was organized by the
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United
Nations (HEUNI), assisted by the International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences (ISISC). A preparatory meeting was held in Helsinki on 21-22
October 2004.
For practical reasons, the workshop was divided into two segments, one dealing
with law enforcement co-operation and the other with extradition measures. Both
were well attended and the presentations were followed by vivid discussion.
HEUNI wishes to thank all the speakers as well as colleagues from the PNI who
contributed to the success of the workshop. We wish to express our special
appreciation to the overall moderator of the workshop, Mr Klas Bergenstrand of
Sweden and to the Chairman of Committee I, Dr Matti Joutsen of Finland for their
eloquent guidance of the proceedings and discussions. Our sincere thanks also go to
Mr Kaarle J. Lehmus of the Finnish Ministry of the Interior for his assistance in the
preparations of the workshop and finally to Ms Aili Pääkkönen and Mr Sami Nevala
of their efforts related to the finalization of the publication. – We also gratefully
acknowledge the financial contribution of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Helsinki 30 August 2005
Kauko Aromaa                                   Terhi Viljanen
Director                                               Senior Programme Officer
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1Report from the Rapporteur
International Law Enforcement Co-operation:
Past Experience, Present Practices, and Future Directions
Jay Albanese
Chief, International Center
National Institute of Justice
United States
Eleven presenters from five continents presented their experiences, current practices,
and recommendations for international law enforcement cooperation, including
extradition, at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice in Bangkok, Thailand.1 The presentations were supported by a
background paper for the workshop and a number of interventions from the floor
from participating Member States of the United Nations. This document organizes
these multiple perspectives and experiences in order to summarize their content and
point to useful directions for the future.
Topics and their importance
Many methods of international cooperation were discussed, including information
exchange, memoranda of understanding, mutual legal assistance, and extradition,
transfer of proceedings and disposition of the proceeds of crime. Each of these
criminal justice procedures has grown in importance, corresponding to the
development of new democracies, growth of international travel, communication,
migration, and technology. Criminals have been shown to exploit these global
changes to pursue illegal ends. The workshop’s keynote speaker, Kunihiro Horiuchi,
Director and Secretary-General of the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, noted that
criminals have historically ignored international borders both in committing crimes
and in fleeing from authorities. Exploitation of new sources of human victims and
illegal property often result in evidence, profits, witnesses, and victims located in
different countries, portending a growing problem that will require greater
international cooperation in order to respond effectively.
Figure 1 illustrates the connections among transnational crime, international
agreements, and the need for cooperative efforts in their enforcement. Over the
years, Member States of the United Nations have recognized the growth of
transnational crime problems, especially involving drugs, organized crime,
corruption, and terrorism.
                                                     
1 United Nations. Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_congress_11/index.html
(April 2005).
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3Mutual concern and discussion has resulted in a number of formal international
agreements, including conventions, treaties, memoranda of understanding, mutual
legal assistance and related efforts. It is clear, however, that these agreements are not
self-enforcing. Without law enforcement and judicial cooperation that results in
investigation, prosecutions, and crime prevention, international agreements lack
meaning in practice. Therefore, it is the implementation of the agreements that is the
real measure of success of international cooperation. The representative of the
United States indicated that criminals operating transnationally can only be
controlled when there are no safe havens. Bilateral and multilateral agreements must
be ratified and translated into effective cooperation in order to control transnational
crime.
Successes identified
The participants identified many successes in the effort toward international law
enforcement cooperation. Four major areas of success were highlighted:
• Formal versus informal agreements
• Multilateral versus bilateral agreements
• Ongoing face-to-face meetings, training and technical assistance
• Using economic and development associations as a platform for crime-related
agreements
These successes are summarized in Figure 2.
Successful prosecutions involving two or more States require information sharing,
appropriate legal framework, and resources to act on these. Formal agreements were
found to be superior to informal arrangements because they offer consistency over
time, and make obligations and responsibilities clear to all parties. Many countries
offered interventions pointing to their successful efforts to negotiate formal
agreements within their various regions in the areas of mutual legal assistance and
extradition. Negotiating these agreements can also deepen each country’s
understanding and appreciation of the other’s legal practices.2 Agreements must be
kept updated to keep pace with changes in law and legal procedures in all parties to
the agreement, a process facilitated by the understandings promoted during the
negotiation process.3
Most extradition agreements to date have been of a bilateral by nature. This can be a
limitation in cases involving three or more States. Increasingly, there have been
multilateral conventions, often under the auspices of the United Nations.4
Multilateral conventions are superior in that they offer common definitions of
                                                     
2 Mark K. Gyandoh, “Foreign Evidence-Gathering: What Obstacles Stand in the Way of
Justice?,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 15 (Spring 2001), p.
81.
3 Juan Pablo Glasinovic, “International Criminal Cooperation or Mutual Assistance,”
Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok,
Thailand, April 21, 2005.
4 Andreas Schloenhardt, “Extradition Measures,” Workshop 1: Enhancing International
Law Enforcement Cooperation, including Extradition. Eleventh United Nations Congress
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, Thailand, April 21, 2005.
4offenses and procedures for States that often have different legal traditions and
procedures.5 The recent development of a draft model law on extradition should
speed the development of national legislation around the world.6 Interventions by
China, Egypt, and Indonesia also saw a need to strengthen cooperation in the area of
recovery of proceeds from crime, which would both be a cause and a result of
increased international law enforcement cooperation.
Once agreements are in place, ongoing face-to-face meetings, training and technical
assistance among States breeds trust and cooperation among individuals, agencies,
and governments. Numerous examples offered by UNAFEI, Australia, the United
States, and other participants demonstrated practical, ongoing efforts to enhance
training and provide technical assistance. These examples include Australia’s Joint
People Smuggling Investigation Team with the Royal Thai Police, Interpol’s DNA
database which recorded its first “hits” linking a DNA profile to known suspects in
other countries, and the International Law Enforcement Academies, sponsored by
the U.S. State Department on three continents.7
Differences in legal systems, law enforcement, and judicial practice can be a barrier
to law enforcement cooperation, but good results have been achieved using
economic and development associations as a platform for crime-related agreements
(ex: EU, ASEAN, SADC, MERCOSUL). MERCOSUL, an association of seven
countries in South America since 1991, provides mutual assistance to promote
political and economic cooperation. Workshop speaker Edmundo Oliveira (Brazil)
made specific recommendations for how MERCOSUL’s scope should be expanded
to include cooperation on problems of organized crime and corruption shared by
participating nations.8 Existing relationships are used to address crime issues that
affect economic development. The Australian Institute of Criminology presentation
noted that “effective law enforcement also requires the solution of long-term, often
endemic, economic, social, and governance issues. Only by addressing such issues
will consolidation of the initial law enforcement efforts be realized.”9
                                                     
5 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Reforming International Extradition: Lessons of the Past for a
Radical New Approach,” Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law
Review, vol. 25 (Summer 2003), p. 389.
6 United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, “Draft Model
Law on Extradition,” E/CN.15/2004/CRP.10 May 10, 2004.
7 See Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005; Leslie E. King and Judson M. Ray,
“Developing Transnational Law Enforcement Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary
Criminal Justice, vol. 16 (November 2000), pp. 386-408.
8 Edmundo Oliveira, Cooperation and Law Enforcement to Counter Organized Crime in
the Common Market Countries of South America – Mercosul. “11th UN Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangoki, April 21, 2005”.
9 Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
5Areas requiring improvement
The workshop participants also reported on matters of international law enforcement
cooperation that require improvement. Six major needed improvements included:
• Need to better utilize available information and databases.
• Methods to make the extradition process more efficient.
• Support to developing countries needed to improve their capacity for law
enforcement cooperation.
• Tracking and reporting instances of international cooperation is essential to
measure progress.
• Wider ratification of existing instruments is required to facilitate the pace of
international law enforcement cooperation.
The areas that require attention are summarized in Figure 3.
Figure 3
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Addressing the problems:
In some cases multinational cooperation exists that has resulted in databases and
analysis capacity (e.g., Interpol, Europol). For example, Interpol offers a global
police communications system, several comprehensive databases, and operational
support to all of its 182 members. As their workshop presentation indicated, “the
Organization’s (Interpol’s) databases are today under-used by the international
community.” 10 There is a clear need to better utilize information that exists. State
                                                     
10 Interpol, “Enhancing International Law Enforcement Cooperation: A Global Overview by
Interpol,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April
21, 2005.
6liaisons and contact persons in each country with 24-hour availability is one
mechanism to maximize usage of existing resources by increasing the number of
timely information exchanges.
Requests for MLA and extradition can be large. Delays can occur. For example,
representatives from Algeria and Turkey noted that arrest warrants issued from their
countries often not are acted upon by recipient countries in timely fashion.11
Bureaucratic procedures should be minimized to the extent possible, and law
enforcement and crime priorities need to be set, so that countries receiving large
numbers of requests can respond in predictable ways. New software developed by
UNODC for drafting extradition requests in uniform fashion should also help in
standardizing requests, thereby making responses easier.12
Anti-crime and judicial resources and infrastructure in developing countries requires
additional support in order to support requests for assistance. Developing nations are
often called upon in the pursuit of crime suspects and criminal evidence. Additional
infrastructure support, training, and technical assistance are required in order to
make cooperation possible and timely.13 Several examples were reported at the
workshop of concrete financial and training assistance to build counter-terrorism,
forensic, and intelligence sharing capacity, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.14
The importance of these efforts cannot be understated, “A key challenge in the short
to medium term is the capacity of law and order institutions to maintain their
impartiality and effectiveness, particularly during periods of crisis and unrest. Over
the longer term, strong police, legal and judicial systems in large part determine the
capacity of countries to combat corruption, achieve growth, and attract foreign
investment.”15
The ultimate value of any agreement lies in the results it produces. Successful
investigations, prosecutions, and crime prevention that results from international
cooperation should be tracked and reported on to insure accountability.
Joint investigation units may become more common in the future as it is likely that
more crimes will be investigated simultaneously in multiple countries as they
involve the illegal manufacture and transport of persons and goods by criminal
                                                     
11 “Workshop Identifies Challenges to International Law Enforcement Cooperation in
Countering Organized Crime,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005. BKK/CP/15, p. 2.
12 Andrew Wells, Activities of the UN in the field of extradition “Enhancing Law
Enforcement Cooperation, including Extradition,” Eleventh United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, Thailand, April 21, 2005.
13 N. Masamba Sita, Global Crime Report on Crime and Justice,” 11th UN Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
14 Takafumi Sato, (UNAFEI) “Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in the Asian and
Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok,
April 21, 2005; Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
15 Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
7networks.16 Joint investigations have occurred thus far on an ad hoc basis, but
memoranda of understanding between law enforcement agencies can facilitate
interagency communication and investigations on an ongoing basis. Several
successful multinational investigations were reported among African nations, and
also between Australia and other nations in that region. These investigations
involved stolen motor vehicles, drugs, and stolen firearms.17
Wider ratification of existing instruments is needed, as are measures toward their
implementation. There is also potential for more global application of existing
regional measures (e.g., European arrest warrant), if differences in legal systems can
be overcome and standardization achieved. It should be kept in mind, however, that
too many global instruments might become burdensome or difficult to implement.
Therefore, an approach to working agreements based on mutual interest by type of
crime, or by region, appears to be the best approach.
Summary
Workshop 1 at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, Enhancing International Law Enforcement Cooperation, including
Extradition Measures, pointed to the strengths and weaknesses of existing
infrastructure, agreements, and activities among nations in the prevention of
transnational crime and pursuit of justice on an international level. The negotiation
of binding international Conventions in recent years, and many successful bilateral
and multilateral agreements on extradition and related law enforcement matters,
have shown us what is possible through patient and committed mutual support in
confronting transnational crime.
Successes included the global trend toward formal versus informal cooperation
agreements, and more multilateral versus bilateral agreements, which encourage
wider participation in cooperation efforts (thereby shrinking the number of places for
criminals and their assets to hide). Ongoing face-to-face meetings for training and
technical assistance were shown to be a most valuable way to promote trust and
post-training cooperation after the negotiation of agreements. The use of economic
and development associations as a platform for crime-related agreements has been
demonstrated to be an effective way to address shared crime-related issues in
Europe, South America, and Asia.
Areas found to be in need of improvement included the need to better utilize
available information and databases, development of procedures to make the
extradition process more efficient, and greater support to developing countries to
improve their capacity for law enforcement cooperation. Tracking and reporting
instances of international cooperation is essential to measure progress. The
                                                     
16 Mevyn Levitsky, Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security,” Syracuse
Journal of International Law and Commerce, vol. 30 (Summer 2003), p. 227.
17 Mukelabai Mukelabai, “International Law Enforcement Cooperation: An Overview of
Initiatives in Southern Africa,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005; Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11 UN Congress on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
8documentation by the Australian Institute of Criminology and UNAFEI (United
Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders) provide examples of ways to track changes in law, training efforts, and
impacts in practice.18 As a representative from Ukraine stated during the interactive
discussion, the effective fight against transnational organized crime is only possible
with international cooperation among law enforcement agencies.19 Similar comments
were made by representatives from Thailand, Finland, France, Sweden, China,
Philippines, and the United States. Wider ratification of existing instruments, such as
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Convention Against Corruption, is needed to facilitate the pace of international law
enforcement training, technical assistance, and cooperation in investigations.
                                                     
18 Takafumi Sato, (UNAFEI) “Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in the Asian and
Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Bangkok,
April 21, 2005; Australian Institute of Criminology, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005.
19 “Workshop Identifies Challenges to International Law Enforcement Cooperation in
Countering Organized Crime,” 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice. Bangkok, April 21, 2005. BKK/CP/15, p. 9.
9Keynote Address
Kunihiro Horiuchi
Secretary General,
Asia Crime Prevention Foundation
Japan
It is a great honor for me to have the opportunity to make the keynote speech at this
Workshop, "Enhancing International Law Enforcement Cooperation, including
Extradition Measures".
As I was introduced, I hold the post of Secretary General of the Asia Crime
Prevention Foundation (ACPF), one of the NGOs supporting the activities of the
United Nations.
I served for about 29 years as a public prosecutor, and during those 29 years I was
very fortunate to work at UNAFEI, the United Nations Far East Institute for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, as the deputy director and the
director for 5 and a half years in total.
I am now working as a lawyer in private practice, mainly engaged in the work of a
court appointed defense counsel for poor defendants who cannot afford a lawyer,
and at the same time, I am studying and teaching criminal law at a law school as a
professor.
Reflecting on my career, so far, I have been studying and actively engaged in
international law enforcement cooperation, including extradition measures, from
various aspect.
When I was a public prosecutor at the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office, I was
at the position of handling extradition cases for the government. And, recently I have
been engaged in several extradition cases as a defense counsel for fugitives,
including the first case between Japan and Korea which took place last year.
The background paper of this workshop takes the United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna,1988) and the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo, 2000)
as representative examples of multilateral instruments at the international level.
In fact, in Japan, after the ratification of the 1988 Convention, new methods of
investigation, such as controlled delivery were introduced in the field of
investigation of drug related crimes and they brought fruitful results.
Today, even ordinary citizens are required to identify themselves at the bank when
they transfer a large amount of money or when they cash a high value cheque in
order to prevent money laundering.
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In the field of extradition, not only bilateral treaties but also multilateral conventions
have been promoted in recent years. (Annex 2) This tendency is highly appreciated
to facilitate effective extradition practice.
We, ACPF (the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation) are also much concerned in
facilitating effective extradition practice. At the 6th ACPF World Conference in
1997, we discussed this matter and recommended simplified extradition procedures.
In practice, some fugitives do not wish to have a formal judicial procedure such as
an open court hearing, but wish to be sent to the requesting country to have a speedy
trial. In such cases, a simplified procedure such as an abbreviated hearing can be
recommended.
In fact, in the first extradition case from Japan to Korea, which I myself was engaged
in as a court assigned attorney for the fugitive, the procedure of the hearing by the
court was abbreviated. The fugitive (Korean with Chinese nationality) wished to be
sent to Korea as soon as possible, and I wrote in my report that we did not contest
extradition. He was soon extradited after the decision of the court based on my
report.
In this context, we can appreciate the recent promotion of international law
enforcement cooperation. However, there is still much to do and we should not be
satisfied yet.
We must recognize that throughout history criminals do not regard the international
borders as obstacles to commit crimes or to flee from law enforcement authorities.
International borders are becoming easier to cross by criminals with expertly faked
passports and other sophisticated measures.
For example, although Japan is an isolated country composed of four main islands
apart from the peninsula and the continent, it is very easy for criminals to fly to
Japan and commit serious crimes in the evening and fly back to their own countries
the next morning with a large amount of profit.
On the other hand, international law enforcement cooperation is cooperation
between countries, each of which has its own sovereignty.
We must re-examine the meaning of terms, such as, reciprocity, double criminality,
one's own nationals, political offenses and prima facie evidence of guilt, not only in
the context of extradition but also in international law enforcement cooperation in
general, in the direction of the enhancement of timely and wide-ranging international
cooperation.
I am very interested in the mutual recognition of arrest warrants such as European
Arrest Warrants which have been utilized since 2004. (Annex 2) I wish to know how
effectively those warrants are exploited in EU countries.
It seems that such instruments could be promoted not only in EU countries but also
in other areas and all over the world.
11
Here, at this workshop, many of these issues will be discussed and I hope we will
find some solutions on how to cope with those criminals who move from country to
country committing crimes.
12
Global Crime Report on Crime and Justice
Masamba Sita
Director, UNAFRI (United Nations African Institute
for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders)
Uganda
Introduction
A presentation by UNICRI on crime trends revealed that the level of organized
crime in a country is strongly and inversely related to:
• Performance of police;
• Quality of the rule of law;
• Level of human development.
It reveals that high perceived prevalence of organized crime is relative to:
1. Low performance of police;
2. Low quality of the rule of law;
3. Low human development.
This is characteristic of the majority of African countries.
Police statistics from the 3 selected countries – Botswana, South Africa and Uganda
are reorganized in 3 categories:
• Offences against the person;
• Offences against the property; and
• Transnational organized related crimes.
Emphasis is focused more on the third category – Transnational Organized Related
Crimes, as we are very concerned with organized crime. We have selected the
following:
• Immigration Act;
• Theft of motor vehicles;
• Firearms Act
• Terrorism
• Murder (in the case of trafficking in human organs)
This led us to consider policy development purposely to acknowledge that there is
“national” and “transnational” organized crime, and to show how the 2 categories
are related.  This is in order to put in place effective measures to combat organized
crime both at National and Transnational levels.
When we speak of law enforcement cooperation, we should look, inter-alia at:
• Exchange of good practices that lead member States to do so; i.e decrease in
respective countries as indicated in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
• Incorporation of international instruments in the local legislation; and
• UNAFRI’s role in assisting its member States to do so.
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Criminal Statistics
NB: Comparisons are somehow biased due, inter-alia, to differences of definitions of
offences and years (periods) under consideration.
UNAFRI appeals to African countries to harmonize their legislations with the
international Instruments in order to solve, among others, the problem of definition.
A. NATIONAL LEVEL
1. General Trends
1. A general progressive increase in crimes against the person and
property in:
• Botswana;
• South Africa; and
• Uganda
2. But violent social fabric and property related crimes considered
separately are in general on the decrease in South Africa.
Table 1: BOTSWANA
TYPE OF CRIME/YEAR 2001 2002 DECREASE/
INCREASE
A. AGAINST THE PERSON
1 Threat to kill     136     101      -25%
2 Murder     212     254       19%
3 Assault common 10515 11008         4%
4 A.O.A. bodily harm   5648   6220       10%
B. AGAINST PROPERTY
5 Bburglary & theft   5050   5585       10%
6 Housebreaking & theft   6043   6306         4%
7 Store breaking & theft   5626   5120        -8%
8 Robbery   1465   2046        39%
9 Theft common 13075 13485          3%
10 Stock theft   1103   1168          5%
C. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED
RELATED CRIME
11 Immigration act   6839 12192        78%
12 Motor vehicle theft act     738     657       -10%
13 Drugs & related substances     948     825       -12%
14 Arms & ammunition act   1002     433       -56%
15 Terrorism      -       -           -
14
Table 2: SOUTH AFRICA
TYPE OF CRIME/YEAR 2000-2001 2001-2002 DECREASE/
INCREASE
A. AGAINST THE PERSON
1 Threat to kill      63.7     69.3         8%
2 Murder      49.3     47.4        -3%
3 Assault common    564.0   580.0         2%
4 Assault gbh (serious)    623.9   584.9        -6%
5 A.O.A. bodily harm    5648 6220       10%
B. AGAINST THE PROPERTY
6 Burglary & theft
7 Housebreaking & theft (Residential)   687.0   670.3         -2%
8 Store breaking & theft (Business)   207.2   258.5         -6%
9 Robbery(with aggravating circumstances)   257.7   258.5          0.08%
10 Theft common
11 Stock theft     94.1     92.2         -0.31%
C. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED
RELATED CRIME
12 Immigration act   226.7   214.5        -5%
13 Motor vehicle theft act   454.4   441.3        -2%
14 Drug & related substances   101.8   117.2       12%
15 Arms & ammunition act     33.5    34.3         2%
16 Terrorism       -      -            -
15
Table 3: UGANDA
B. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
We consider that National Organized Crime (N.O.C) forms tentacles of
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and any of the selected crimes may be only a
tip of the iceberg in the transnational organized crime scenario.
Diagram 1:
TYPE OF CRIME/YEAR 2003 2004 DECREASE/
INCREASE
A. AGAINST THE PERSON
1 Murder other than shooting    1951     1856        -4%
2 Att. murder other than shooting      276       304       10%
3 Murder by shooting      303       348        14%
4 Att. of murdr by shooting      104       135        29%
5 Aggravated assaults    4226     5664        34%
6 Common assaults  13211   16635        25%
7 Assaults gbh (serious)    4532     4593          1%
B. AGAINST THE PROPERTY
8 Burglary & theft    2612   3368        28%
9 Housebreaking & theft    1082   1397        29%
10 Shop breaking & theft      820     824        -0.5%
C. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED
RELATED CRIME
11 Immigration act      146     151          3%
12 Theft of vehicles      874   1099        25%
13 National drugs policy & authority    1043   1219        16%
14 Firearms act      226     186       -18%
15 Terrorism        38     186      389%
Transnational
Organized
Crime (TOC)
National Organized
Crime (NOC)
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Diagram 2:
Some Initiatives
The following initiatives aiming at reducing transnational organized crime have been
undertaken. The 2nd AU Ministerial Meeting on Drug Control and Crime (Port
Louis, Mauritius, 2004) committed itself to:
• Individually and collectively, among other things, formulate time-bound,
measurable programmes of action and targets in order to reduce the incidents
and impact of organized crime;
• Develop and strengthen international cooperation and law enforcement including
extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance measures.
a) Regional Initiatives:
• AU Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption;
• Nairobi Declaration on Firearms Management Programme 2002;
• UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (Togo, Lome);
b) Sub-regional Initiatives:
• ECOWAS Moratorium, 1998
c) UNAFRI Initiatives:
• UNAFRI Survey on Trafficking in Firearms in Africa, 2001;
• UNAFRI Project on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance;
Money
Laundering
Counter-
feiting Cyber
Crime
Drug
Trafficking
Terrorism
Corruption &
Economic
Crime
Arms
Smuggling
N.O.C
Trafficking in
Women and
Children
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d) International Initiatives:
• UN Convention on Corruption
• UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols thereto;
Patterns of cooperation have started to emerge in the region:
• Bilateral
• Multilateral arrangements between countries
• Among SARPCO for Southern  Africa countries
• Among EAPCO for Eastern Africa countries.
• Among WAPCCO for Western African countries
• Among African States of Interpol Sub-regional Bureau, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire.
There is need to encourage and reinforce these initiatives with relevant substantive
technical assistance from UNODC and other stakeholders.
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Overview
The level of law enforcement cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region, and
especially that which exists between Australia and its immediate neighbours, is high.
Cooperation between regional organizations, and between Australian Government
agencies and departments with their regional counterparts, is evidenced strongly by
the range and combination of dedicated regional meetings, consultations, exchanges
of intelligence and information, memoranda of understanding, treaties, and the
provision of funding and personnel. In essence, law enforcement cooperation
between law enforcement agencies is facilitated and enhanced by the activities of
non-law enforcement agencies.
A number of Australian Government Departments and agencies, and regional bodies,
are involved in addressing transnational crimes in general, and terrorism in
particular, within the Asia-Pacific region, and this report details their respective
contributions to law enforcement cooperation in that region. For the most part, the
report details activities and achievements reported by those departments and
agencies in 2003-2004.
There will clearly be differences in terms of capacity by countries within the region
to deal with such issues, caused in part by relative economic disparity, but such is
also likely to be the case in other regional contexts. However, in terms of counter-
terrorism, South-East Asian governments have made great efforts to address this
problem1. Thus, the key achievements in mutual cooperation, which are summarised
in this report, could act as a generic model for those regions in which real difficulties
are experienced.
                                                     
1 For example, the efforts of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Cambodia in counter-terrorism activities have been noted by the Australian Government
in ‘Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia’,
www.dfat.gov.au/ publications/terrorism
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Law Enforcement Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region by Department,
Agency or regional body
Attorney-General’s Department (A-G’s)
The Attorney-General's Department serves the people of Australia by providing
essential expert support to the Government in the maintenance and improvement of
Australia's system of law and justice.
The Attorney-General’s (A-Gs) Department established a Pacific Transnational
Criminal Intelligence Network.
A-G’s introduced:
i) A South Pacific section to provide advice and assistance on strategic, governance
and legislative issues in the region to combat terrorism and transnational organised
crime and will assist Pacific Island countries to implement the Honiara and Nasonini
Declarations.
The South Pacific section will also support non-police Australian officials operating
in Papua New Guinea (PNG) within the law and justice sector under the Enhanced
Cooperation Program (ECP). Signed on 30 June 2004, the ECP will operate as a
five-year package of assistance supporting, inter alia, the areas of policing and law
and justice.
ii) The Financial Intelligence Support Team (FIST) to provide legal and strategic
policy advice to Pacific Islands countries to implement international money
laundering obligations and to ensure that existing and proposed Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs) are provided with the skills necessary to tackle emerging
financial crimes.
Australian Federal Police (AFP)
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) enforces Commonwealth criminal law, and
protects Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas.
The AFP is Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative,
and the chief source of advice to the Australian Government on policing issues.
In April, 2004 the AFP signed a protocol with Philippines law enforcement
authorities to launch a $3.65 million project to help build the country's counter-
terrorism capacity through improving Philippines law enforcement agencies in
intelligence sharing, bomb investigation techniques and forensics.
To date 208 Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers, along with 94 personnel from
eight regional countries, make up the 302-member Participating Police Force (PPF)
currently operating in Solomon Islands under the auspices of the Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The PPF has 302 members from
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru and the Cook
Islands.
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As a result of cooperative efforts between the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP)
and the PPF:
• 3,730 illegal weapons and 306,851 rounds of ammunition have been seized or
surrendered.
• 3,316 people have been arrested and charged with 4,788 offences.
• Internal investigations into the professional standards of the Royal Solomon
Islands Police (RSIP) have resulted in 71 arrests, 375 criminal charges being laid
and the removal of over 400 people from the RSIP.
• 17 outposts have been established in the provinces in a concerted effort to
prevent crime across Solomon Islands and prosecute criminal activities.
• Security & guarding has provided personal protection to key political figures as
well as essential security around government infrastructure, the temporary court,
remand facilities and Rove Prison.
Achievements of RAMSI to date include:
• The establishment of the RSIP Protection Unit.
• Development of management training for senior police officers.
• Placement of advisors throughout the justice system to strengthen the country's
ability to deal with the high volume of arrests being made.
• Completion of a new high security prison in Honiara and a strengthened prison
service.
• The development of crime prevention initiatives in schools and within the wider
community.
The AFP has been allocated $766.3 million over five years (from 2003-04) to
support a comprehensive cooperative program with the Royal PNG Constabulary
(RPNGC) to enhance the capacity of the RPNGC to combat serious crime and bring
perpetrators to justice.
AFP has been allocated $20.3 million over four years (together with $1.1 million for
ASIO) to continue a presence in the Pacific region in general and to contribute to
enhancing good governance through the strengthening of law enforcement capacities
within the region.
The AFP has been allocated $29.6 million over four years (as part of a $38.3 million
initiative over five years) to consolidate the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement
Cooperation (JCLEC). The Centre will be developed as a resource for the entire
Asia-Pacific region in the fight against transnational crime, with a focus on counter-
terrorism. The Centre will strengthen regional cooperation and skills with the AFP
providing active training and close operational assistance in areas including the
management of serious crime (including terrorist offences), financial investigations
and close personal protection.
The JCLEC will develop complementary relations with other relevant regional
bodies working in the areas of law enforcement and counter-terrorism, such as the
South-East Asian Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur and the
International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. In addition, the AFP’s Joint
Counter Terrorism Teams (JCTT) were deployed to Indonesia to assist the
Indonesian National Police on terrorism-related matters under the auspices of the
Jakarta Operations Centre (JOC).
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The Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) has been opened in
Suva which will become the hub of the Pacific Transnational Crime Unit Network
and will manage and coordinate law enforcement intelligence provided by the
Network and regional law enforcement agencies.
The AFP has assisted in the establishment of a Joint People Smuggling Investigation
Team within the Immigration Bureau of the Royal Thai Police which also has a
transnational crime coordination role.
An AFP/Cambodian Joint Transnational Crime Investigation Team provides the
AFP with a framework to facilitate its fight against transnational crime, including
slavery and sexual servitude.
A Transnational Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking Team (TSETT) has been
established, comprising specially trained investigators and analysts, which is
coordinated by the AFP’s Transnational Crime Co-ordination Centre.
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)
The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) is Australia's
anti-money laundering regulator and specialist financial intelligence unit.
AUSTRAC’s additional funding (amounting to $10 million over the next four years)
will finance the following initiatives:
• AUSTRAC will provide expert staff to assist regional Financial Intelligence
Units (FIUs) to enhance their capabilities.
• AUSTRAC will also develop and host training programs for staff and analysts in
FIUs to facilitate analysis, information exchange and compliance with global
AML and counter terrorist financing (CTF) requirements.
• AUSTRAC will develop typologies relating particularly to terrorist financing in
South-East Asia.
AUSTRAC has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with 37 FIUs
including, within the Asia-Pacific region, the Cook Islands, Indonesia, Singapore,
Thailand and Vanuatu.
In the 2003/04 financial year, a project designed to provide long-term technical
assistance to Indonesia’s FIU (PPATK) in developing its capabilities in the receipt,
analysis and dissemination of financial transaction report information, was enhanced
by the allocation of two AUSTRAC officers to PPATK on a full-time basis.
Through the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, AUSTRAC provided desktop
computers to FIUs in Fiji, Palau, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga, enhancing their
capacity to participate in international AML activities.
AUSTRAC will also provide a dedicated officer to develop and deliver financial
analysis training as part of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation.
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AUSTRAC’s focus on the South East Asian and Pacific regions in 2004-05 will
include:
• Increasing the number of exchange instruments with international counterparts
• Responding to requests for information, hosting visits from international
delegations and working with multilateral anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorism fora
• Establishing a technical and information technology assistance program directed
at developing FIUs in South East Asia.
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the premier forum for facilitating
economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.
APEC dealt with terrorism issues in the main. The key priorities for APEC’s Counter
Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) established in February 2003 include:
• the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative to secure and enhance
the flow of goods and people through measures to protect cargo, ships,
international aviation and people in transit;
• halting the financing of terrorism; promoting cyber security; and
• the energy security initiative.
The CTTF aims to cooperate more closely with international organisations such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asia Development Bank, the World
Bank, the UN Counter Terrorism Committee, the Inter-American Committee against
Terrorism and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order, inter
alia, to provide training and assistance and to exchange information.
In August 2003 all APEC Member Economies submitted their APEC Counter-
Terrorism Action Plan (CTAP).
The CTTF continues to work closely with the Finance Ministers' Process to prevent
the financing of terrorism. A seminar to provide legal policy assistance to strengthen
AML/CTF frameworks was held in October 2003.
APEC has also responded to the need to reduce the impact of terrorist attacks on the
region's tourism industry by funding a practical risk management study for
governments and tourist operators.
At the second STAR conference (5-6 March 2004) representatives of all APEC
Member Economies together with senior executives from major private-sector
companies, and officials from international organisations such as the IMO, IMF,
World Bank and Interpol discussed maritime security, air transportation security, the
mobility of people and measures to prevent terrorist financing.
The development of a Regional Movement Alert System (RMAS) will hopefully
allow APEC economies to safeguard their borders from unlawful activities related to
terrorism as well as illegal commercial activities. To this end, the Informal Experts’
Group on Business Mobility implemented a project which will organise training in
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document examination and the detection of fraud, establish standards in the security
of travel documents and develop standardised codes of conduct for immigration
officers.
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) aims to accelerate the
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region.
ASEAN (comprising, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) has implemented several
projects and initiatives in combating transnational crime such as the ASEAN
Workshop on Anti-Money Laundering (July 2003), the ASEAN Workshop on
Combating Arms Smuggling (June 2003) and an ASEAN-China Workshop on Law
Enforcement Cooperation against Transnational Crime (September 2003).
Prospective projects include an ASEAN Workshop on Combating Sea Piracy and an
ASEAN Workshop on Trafficking in Persons, Particularly in Women and Children.
The mechanisms for ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea)
cooperation in counter-terrorism have been initiated.
In July 2004 Australia and ASEAN signed a counter-terrorism declaration which
provided for:
• Enhanced cooperation and liaison among law enforcement and security agencies
in relation to counter-terrorism regimes.
• Continued and improved intelligence and information-sharing on, inter alia,
terrorist financing.
• Strengthening capacity-building efforts through training, education and
consultations.
• Providing assistance on transport security and border and immigration control
challenges.
• Implementing the measures contained, inter alia, in the ARF's Statement on
Cooperative Counter-Terrorism Action on Border Security and the ARF
Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime
Security, respectively.
• Implementing the measures set out in the Co-Chairs' Statement on the Bali
Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, and contributing to follow-
up activities including the two officials' level ad hoc working groups on law
enforcement and legal issues.
• Complying with all binding United Nations resolutions and declarations on
international terrorism, and
• Exploring additional areas of mutual cooperation.
ASEAN police and law enforcement officials have agreed to establish national
counter terrorism task forces to strengthen regional cooperation in counter terrorism
in relation, inter alia, to the examination of witnesses and the searching and seizure
of evidence.
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The following capacity building activities were undertaken:
• Workshop on Combating International Terrorism 20-23 January 2003, Jakarta
• ASEAN Workshop on Counter-Terrorism, 18-20 August 2003, Kuala Lumpur
• Workshop on Counter-Terrorism – Managing Civil Aviation Security in
Turbulent Times, 21-25 July 2003, Singapore
• ASEAN-China Workshop on Law Enforcement Cooperation Against
Transnational Crime, 24-30 August 2003, Beijing
• ASEANAPOL Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Intelligence Analysis, 22-26
September 2003, Singapore
• Foundation Course for Senior Officials in the Theory of Counter Terrorism
Recognition and Multilateral Collaboration, organised by ASEAN and AusAID,
12-13 February 2004, Jakarta
• ASEANAPOL Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Post-Blast Investigation, 16-20
February 2004, Singapore
• ASEANAPOL Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Countermeasures for Explosives
and Suicide Bombers, 22-25 March 2004-11-22
The Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM-CTTC) was held in Manila on 30-31
March 2004 and focused on enhancing transport security.
An ASEAN meeting in Putrajaya on 6 April 2004 discussed the implementation of
the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea
(2002). The Parties agreed to explore, inter alia, combating transnational crime
including, but not limited to, trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at
sea and illegal trafficking in arms.
The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and its
subsidiary body, the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC),
have been implementing the Terrorism Component of the Work Programme to
Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (adopted in
May 2002). The programme outlines six areas of cooperation:
1. information exchange
2. cooperation in legal matters
3. cooperation in law enforcement matters
4. institutional capacity building
5. training
6. extra-regional cooperation
ASEAN immigration authorities have agreed to assist and coordinate with the other
ASEAN law enforcement authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and deter
cross-border terrorism by working towards the establishment of intelligence units in
their respective agencies to tackle trafficking in persons, human smuggling and
terrorism. They have also set up an ASEAN focal point directory for ASEAN
immigration authorities to exchange information.
On 9-10 January 2004 the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime was held in Bangkok.
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Implementation of the following joint undertakings continued:
• Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
Traditional Security Issues and Its Memorandum of Understanding adopted on 4
November 2002 and 10 January 2004, respectively.
• ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, adopted on
28 January 2003
• ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism, signed on 1 August 2002
• ASEAN-India Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, adopted
on 8 October 2003.
• 10th ASEAN Regional Forum held in Phnom Penh in June 2003 issued the ARF
Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security.
Australian Customs Service
The Australian Customs Service (Customs) manages the security and integrity of
Australia's borders.
Key achievements for Customs in regional cooperation in 2003-04 include:
• The signing of bilateral MOUs on customs cooperation with the customs
administrations of Fiji (October 2003), Thailand (December 2003) and PRC
(April 2004); and
• The hosting of formal bilateral talks with the customer administrations of Korea
(October 2003), Japan (April 2004) and Indonesia (May 2004)
Customs also hosted other government delegations from, or sent representatives to
visit, more than 20 countries including, within the Asia-Pacific region, the People’s
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.
In October 2003, the Australian Government donated a marine vessel to the Fiji
Islands Revenue and Customs Authority and Customs provided training to Fiji
Customs staff.
In conjunction with the Department of Transport and Regional Services Customs
delivered training on the new maritime security regime in Indonesia, the Philippines,
Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam.
One staff member has been based in Port Moresby since February 2004 working
with Papua New Guinea (PNG) Customs to develop a long-term capacity building
plan in areas such as border security and integrity.
Customs signed an MOU with Indonesian Customs on 5 March 2003 and signed a
cooperative framework agreement with Japan on 27 June 2003.
The Oceania Customs Organisation conference was held in the Cook Islands in April
2003 and focussed on security and capacity building
Customs assisted other Customs administrations with integrity issues including:
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Delivery of integrity-related technical assistance to PNG:
• Assisting PNG Customs service to draft a Code of Conduct and Ethics
• Organising an APEC operational risk management workshop in November 2002
at which 14 member economies increased skill levels in targeting, profiling,
operational intelligence, operational risk management and change management
• Co-chairing a meeting of the WCO Regional Integrity Working Group in
Malaysia. A key outcome included regional endorsement of an Integrity
Development Guide that will be promoted by the WCO, APEC and the Oceania
Customs Organisation.
• Contribution to the WCO revision of the Revised Arusha Declaration – a key
integrity-related agreement.
• Participation in the customs workshop of the Third Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity in the Republic of Korea, in May 2003.
Customs attended the Project PRISM (Precursors Required in Synthetic
Manufacture) Chemical Working Group meeting in the Hague in December 2002
and a similar meeting in Bangkok in June 2003 on the international trade in safrole-
rich oils.
Customs participated in the use of the Customs Asia Pacific Enforcement Reporting
System (CAPERS), a secure Internet site through which Customs administrations
can pass intelligence and information and enhance capacity in areas such as counter-
terrorism and people smuggling.
Intelligence Services
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) gathers information and
produces intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities or
situations that might endanger Australia’s national security.
The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is Australia's overseas intelligence
collection agency whose mission it is to protect and promote Australia's vital
interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services.
The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is Australia's national authority for signals
intelligence and information security.The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
provides all-source intelligence assessment at the national level to support Defence
and Government decision-making and the planning and conduct of Australian
Defence Force operations.
The Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) provides geospatial
intelligence, from imagery and other sources, in support of Australia's defence and
national interests
ASIO and ASIS have received significant new resources and have deepened existing
links and forged new relationships in the Asia-Pacific region. This has led to a
greater pooling of resources and a dramatic increase in the sharing of information.
Australia is also providing counter-terrorism intelligence training and advice to
countries in the Pacific.
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DIO has increased counter-terrorism analytical resources while the DSD has
enhanced its capability to collect signals intelligence against terrorists. DIGO also
maintains a counter-terrorism capability.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has responsibility for
advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally.
In March 2004 discussions were held with China on key security matters including
counter-terrorism.
In August 2004, Australia hosted the first meeting for the Legal Issues Working
Group established at the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism at
which the strengthening of anti-terrorism laws and enhancing cooperative
arrangements in relation to evidence gathering and extradition were discussed.
In the same month, Australia and Thailand held a combined counter-terrorism
exercise (Exercise Wyvern Sun) in Thailand.
In July 2004, the inaugural Regional Special Forces Counter Terrorism Conference
held at Bowral brought together special forces and counter-terrorism experts from
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, PNG, New Zealand, China, India,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan, Brunei, Thailand and the US.
A Joint Ministerial Committee meeting between Australia and Singapore was held in
Singapore in July 2003 and focused on consolidating the cooperation with Singapore
on counter-terrorism.
In August 2003, DFAT organised the second Australia-Indonesia-East Timor
Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Adelaide, an important outcome of which
was the signing of a bilateral MOU with East Timor on counter-terrorism.
Australia has established a network of bilateral counter-terrorism arrangements:
India MOU August 2003
Thailand  MOU October 2002
Philippines MOU March 2003
PNG MOU December 2003
Fiji MOU March 2003
East Timor MOU August 2003
Indonesia MOU February 2002
Malaysia  MOU August 2002
Cambodia  MOU June 2003
Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism July 2003
These MOUs set out a framework for bilateral cooperation between law
enforcement, intelligence and defence officials as well as other relevant agencies,
such as customs and immigration.
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The Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in February 2004 resolved
to enhance regional cooperation on counter-terrorism and identified steps to further
strengthen and consolidate regional efforts in the areas of law enforcement,
information sharing and legal frameworks.
The Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism chaired the International Counter-Terrorism
Coordination Group which worked on a whole of government basis to ensure
effective international counter-terrorism cooperation between Australian agencies
across a full range of activities.
DFAT supported AusAID and AFP efforts to obtain East Timorese Government
approval for a major bilateral policing project. The project will upgrade training and
management capacity-building in East Timor’s police force.
An MOU in February 2004 between Australia and Nauru facilitated the provision by
the Australian Government of a Finance Secretary and Police Commissioner to
Nauru with the requisite powers to improve finance and law and order management.
A Treaty based on this MOU was concluded in May 2004.
In October 2003 a $20 million package of new anti-trafficking in persons measures
was announced and in June 2004 a Government Action Plan to Eradicate Trafficking
in Persons was launched.
An MOU between Australia and Thailand covering the Asia Regional Cooperation
to Combat People Trafficking Project was signed in December 2003. An Agreement
on Bilateral Cooperation between Thailand and Australia was signed in July 2004
and covers issues relating to security and law enforcement.
Also in December 2003, an agreement was signed between Australia and Cambodia
to provide assistance to Cambodia in its fight against people trafficking.
In June 2004, the Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues co-chaired, with her
Indonesian counterpart, a Bali process senior officials’ meeting in Brisbane at which
delegates from 47 countries agreed on a future program of work including greater
focus on trafficking in persons, child sex tourism, law enforcement and border
controls, intelligence sharing on smugglers and traffickers and mutual assistance and
extradition relationships.
Department of Immigration, Migration and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)
The Department of Immigration, Migration and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) has
responsibility, inter alia, for immigration control, ethnic affairs and indigenous
affairs.
DIMIA’s work with governments, particularly in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East
regions, and engagement with international organisations, led to:
• Action to detect and prevent people smuggling and trafficking, including the use
of prosecution, the use of return and the strengthening of the management of
borders and,
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• Assistance in regional capacity building in relation, inter alia, to:
 Information and intelligence sharing
 Inter-agency cooperation
 Verification of the identity and nationality of travellers
 Enhanced understanding of the issues involved in returning illegal
immigrants
 Investment in over 20 Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern countries
including the establishment of document examination laboratories and
the provision of technical assistance and equipment and training in, for
example, the detection of document fraud.
 Continued financial support in Indonesia as a transit country for persons
engaged in illegal travel to Australia.
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance
Mutual Legal Assistance
Mutual assistance by Australia is provided under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act 1987. In relation to the Asia-Pacific region, Australia has mutual
assistance treaties and agreements with:
• Republic of Korea (Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Korea on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters)
• Republic of the Philippines (Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of the
Philippines on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters)
• Republic of Indonesia (Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters) and
• Hong Kong (Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the
Government of Hong Kong concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters).
Pursuant to these treaties and agreements, Australia also has the following
regulations:
• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Hong Kong) Regulations 1999
• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Republic of Indonesia) Regulations 1999
• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Republic of Korea) Regulations 1993
• Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Republic of the Philippines) Regulations
1993
Extradition
Australia’s extradition arrangements are contained within the Extradition Act 1988
and its attendant Regulations. In terms of extradition arrangements with countries in
the Asia-Pacific region the following Regulations apply:
• Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Regulations 1998
• Extradition (Transnational Organised Crime) Regulations 2004
• Extradition (Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances)
Regulations 1998
• Extradition (Kingdom of Cambodia) Regulations 2003
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• Extradition (Republic of Fiji) Regulations 1991
• Extradition (Japan) Regulations 1988
• Extradition (Republic of the Marshall Islands) Regulations 1993
• Extradition (Thailand) Regulations 1991
• Extradition (Republic of the Philippines) Regulations 1988
• Extradition (Republic of Indonesia) Regulations 1994
• Extradition (Republic of Korea) Regulations 1991
• Extradition (Hong Kong) Regulations 1997
Issues
The Asia-Pacific region contains a number of developing nation states, many of
which share, to a greater or lesser degree, a range of economic, social and political
problems. These include ongoing issues such as the need for economic reform,
restructuring of state-owned enterprises and reform of the financial and judicial
sector in terms both of its infrastructure and oversight. In addition, further work is
required in the criminal justice sector including further law enforcement cooperation
and the reduction and control of corrupt practices.
As evidenced in this report, the Australian Government continues to play a
prominent and leading role in helping to achieve and maintain the changes necessary
to ensure the increasing and long-term stability of the Asia-Pacific region of which it
is a part. AusAID (2003) has noted that ‘[t]he causes of lawlessness in the Pacific are
rooted in a complex interplay of factors, including social and political
transformation, unemployment, ongoing demographic change and the breakdown of
traditional structures’. Its assistance as part of a multi-lateral endeavour in the
Solomon Islands, for example, is indicative of best practice in this regard. Prior to
the introduction of RAMSI (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands) in
July 2003, the Solomon Islands were beset with a range of problems including non-
functioning hospitals, schools and public service, ethnic tension, corrupt politicians
and rogue police officers. Since that moment of introduction, as noted above in this
report, a secure environment in terms of basic law and order issues, a functioning
government and economy have all been established. From this strong foundation, the
Solomon Islanders will be best placed to deal with other long-standing issues such as
corruption and institution rebuilding.
In a similar vein, Papua New Guinea faces a number of problems across a range of
sectors including law and order (both policing and justice issues), budgetary
management, border management and security, primary industry governance and
public service management issues. In addition, levels of unemployment, crime
(through the activities of armed criminals known as the “raskols”) and HIV infection
are high and the Economist Intelligence Unit has recently cast Port Moresby as the
worst capital city (from a sample of 130 cities) for expatriates to inhabit. However,
the Australian Government has responded to this situation through a considered and
mutually accepted agreement (the Enhanced Cooperation Program – ECP) which
will provide assistance in financial and public sector management, law and order
including policing and border protection and maintenance of social and economic
infrastructure such as roads, education and health.
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Basic policing issues which might pertain in any country within the region will
include, in relation to Australia’s involvement, the logistics of integrating the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) into the host country’s law enforcement framework,
legal issues, such as the nature and applicability of police powers in the local context
and establishing whether the mode of policing should be more, or less, formal in
structure and approach. It should be recognised, however, that law enforcement
depends upon more than policing efforts. AusAID (2003) argues that ‘[a] key
challenge in the short to medium term is the capacity of law and order institutions to
maintain their impartiality and effectiveness, particularly during periods of crisis and
unrest. Over the longer term, strong police, legal and judicial systems in large part
determine the capacity of countries to combat corruption, achieve growth and attract
foreign investment.’ Effective law enforcement also requires the solution of long-
term, often endemic, economic, social and governance issues. Only by addressing
such issues will consolidation of the initial law enforcement efforts be realised.
In short, the disparate nature of the region and its resources will engender varying
levels of dysfunction. What is important is that regional solutions to regional
problems are understood and tackled through cooperative and well-funded processes.
Sources
Material for this report was drawn, inter alia, from:
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Annual Report 2003-04,
http://www.aseansec.org/ar04.htm
Attorney-General’s Department, Budget 2004-2005, http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/
WWW/rwpattach.nsf/personal/1F8A4F2EE9828571CA256E9100273AE2/$FILE/20
04-2005_AG_PBS_02_Portfolio_Overview.pdf
AusAID 2003, ‘Papua New Guinea and the Pacific – A Development Perspective’,
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/png_pacific_development.pdf
Australian Customs Service, Australian Government, Annual Report 2003-04,
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/CustomsAnnualReport_0304
.pdf
Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2003-04, http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/raw/
Publications/AnnualReports/anrep04/annual_report.pdf
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Annual Report 2003-04,
http://www.asio.gov.au/Publications/Content/AnnualReport03_04/pdf/Unclass%
20Annual%20Report%202003-04.pdf
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Australian
Government, Annual Report 2003-04, http:// www.austrac.gov.au/
annual_report_2003-04/AUSTRAC_Annual_Report0304_ 290904.pdf
Counter-Terrorism Task Force, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrori
sm.html
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Australian
Government, Annual Report 2003-04, http://www.dimia.gov.au/annual_report/
annrep04/index.htm
International Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police
Transnational Crime Unit, Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government
32
Transnational Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking Team (TSETT), Australian
Federal Police
‘Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia’, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Australian Government, http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/
terrorism/index.html
33
Co-operation and Law Enforcement to Counter Organised
Crime in the  Common Market Countries of South America
(MERCOSUL1)
Edmundo Oliveira
Full Professor of Criminal Law of the University of Amazonia
Brazil
Identification of the Theme
The Common Market of South America (MERCOSUL) was founded in 1991 by the
Treaty of Asuncion, comprising of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have associate member
status. The guiding principle behind MERCOSUL is to provide a strategic approach
to address the demand for economic competitiveness in the MERCOSUL region
after the decline of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also established a new
era in international relationships and these new global relationships were also a
motivating factor behind the emergence of MERCOSUL.
MERCOSUL has developed, over the time, strong co-operative political
relationships and integrated economically with the Central American Countries and
North America. Recently it has developed a system of protocols and rules for
communications with Asian and African Countries. The European Union is also
viewed as a prominent partner as it has contributed significantly to the development
of commercial arrangements and agreements for investment2. However, these
positive developments have come at a cost with some evidence of social unrest and a
growing threat from organised crime that exploits a number of opportunities3.
Difficulties for the Administration of Strategies of Co-operation Against Organised
Crime in MERCOSUL
There are a number of difficulties in relation to establishing co-operation within the
MERCOSUL region in relation to organised crime. First; it is difficult to establish a
consistent approach to the problems posed as there is no conceptual vision that
allows for the development of appropriate judicial and legislative measures within
                                                     
1 Mercosul or Mercosur (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur, Portuguese: Mercado Comum
do Sul, English: Southern Common Market) is a trading zone among Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Paraguay, founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later
amended and updated by the 1995 Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free
trade and movement of goods and people, skills and money, between these countries.
2 First Meeting of the Committee of Bi-regional Negotiations European Union - Mercosul.
6 and 7 April, 2001, Buenos Aires, Argentina. This meeting represented the first series of
negotiations between the EU and Mercosul with the purpose of the conclusion of an
Agreement of Inter-regional Association between the EU and Mercosul.
3 See Zaffaroni, Eugenio Raúl (1999). La Globalización y las Actuales Orientaciones de la
Politica Criminal. in Direito e Cidadania. Praia - Cabo Verde, Ano III, no. 8, 1999, pp.
72-76.
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the MERCOSUL region4. Second; a co-ordination of a foreign policy has not yet
been developed and so it is therefore unlikely that MERCOSUL can take advantage
of established international co-operative links in relation to crime prevention and
organised crime5. Third; the increasing challenge of the infiltration and
contamination of the state system by criminal networks and organisations is
apparent6. Fourth; there are no agreements within the MERCOSUL region in
relation to the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime7 that
establish the appropriate punishments for transnational criminal activities and
organised criminal activity within member states. Fifthly; the vulnerability to the
activities of organised crime that include homicides, kidnappings, assaults,
corruption and drug trafficking that results in the flow of inward foreign investment
being less than if the crime situation was not so threatening8. The crime situation
also has adverse effects on tourism. Finally, the living conditions of many people
result in areas of high deprivation where criminal networks demand protection in
order for people to have some level of anti-crime insurance. This creates places
where there is an absence of protection by the state and increased fear for residents
of high levels of crime and violence. Denise Frossard, Judge of the State of Rio de
Janeiro, commented:
“……inequality walks hand in hand with violence: everyone throws stones at it, but
nobody solves the problem" 9.
Forms of Expression of Organised Crime in the MERCOSUL Countries
There are five distinct typologies of organised crime in the MERCOSUL region. The
first type is made up of groups that have clear lines of authority and discipline that
conform to a set of agreed norms. These groups are significantly involved
in:“grilagem de terra” (illegal public property occupation through document
forging), trafficking in drugs, weapons, cigarettes, and human beings. They are also
involved in prostitution, sexual tourism, smuggling, illegal immigration, illicit
transactions through the internet, computer hacking, pornography, piracy, insurance
frauds and falsification of credit cards. A number of these organised groups are
involved in trading core materials for the production of cocaine. The second type of
group are those where the organisational structure is weak, these groups tend to be
involved in assaults, fuel adulteration, kidnappings and hijacking which is on the
                                                     
4 This conclusion comes from the Congress on "The Researcher and the Politician", held
12-15 August, 2002, in Curitiba, Paraná, by the Interdisciplinary Program Economical
Globalization and Rights in Mercosul (GEDIM). In this Congress, line 3 of research had
as its aim to analyse "Organised Crime and its Control in the Mercosul".
5 See Souza, Solnage Mendes (2001). Cooperação Jurídica Penal no Mercosul: Novas
Possibilidades. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Renovar, pp. 111-137.
6 See Beck, Francis Rafael (2004). Perspectivas de Controle ao Crime Organizado e Crítica
à Flexibilização das Garantias. São Paulo, Ibccrim, p. 74-82.
7 Resolution no. 55/25, Annex I, of 11/15/2000, of the United Nations General Assembly,
dealing with the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.
8 The situation is worse than in China, India and the Eastern European countries, according
to Gama, Julio (2004). O Preço da violência. In America Economia. Sao Paulo, ediçao
Brasil, October 2004, pp. 23-26.
9 Frossard, Denise (2001). Somos Todos Reféns. In Revista Isto É. São Paulo, no. 1666,
September 2001, p. 32.
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increase in the MERCOSUL region. The third type of criminal group are those that
are significantly involved in a range of financial crimes which involves tax evasion
and environmental crime.
In the fourth group organised crime is evident by the criminal activity within the
State. This suggests that some public officials are corrupt or dishonest, co-operating
with organised crime. This group also comprises police being associated with
extermination groups. In the fifth group are the terrorist networks and organisations
that take advantage of the impact of terror with extreme violence or threats, to satisfy
ideologies, religious faith, and philosophical or political convictions. This was the
case when two bombs exploded on April 30, 1981, during a concert promoted by the
“Centro Brasil Democrático”, in the Riocentro area, in Rio de Janeiro. This bombing
was an attempt to promote the intensification of the military dictatorship in Brazil.
Procedures to Overcome Organised Crime in the MERCOSUL Region
The links between the countries of MERCOSUL are considerable; this is evidenced
by the number of official reports, multi-lateral meetings and the adoption of
resolutions and protocols. The alliance that has developed within the MERCOSUL
region is dependent on the political will of all participating countries and the
development of trust between them that they will deal with the problems posed by
organised crime, and the sentencing of criminals in ways they have agreed. Set out
below are a number of strategic developments that need to be put in place to aid
multi-lateral participation in relation to the issue of organised crime in the
MERCOSUL region. In Brazil,
1) It is important to create a permanent group to ensure that a Brazilian Public Safety
System for the MERCOSUL region is developed.
2) A database to assist in the exchange of information concerning the activities of
organised crime needs to be put in place.
3) It is also necessary to strengthen inter-regional co-operation, including the union
of Countries in other Continents, in order to exchange experiences and to reflect on
the effectiveness of strategies to enhance public safety within MERCOSUL.
4) It is also necessary to consider forming a MERCOSUL police region with an
integrated police force drawn from member states.
5) It would be appropriate to establish a Center of Operational Support within the
Department of Justice in MERCOSUL in face of the need for protection of the ius
persequendi and thus assist in ensuring proper procedures for the collection and
presentation of evidence in relation to organized crime.
6) It is also important to ensure that corrupt practices are properly dealt with in order
to reduce the impact of organized crime.
7) It is necessary to put in place the proper procedures and protocols to enable
effective policing of the internet.
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8) Within the MERCOSUL region it will be important to regionally ensure that
treaties of extradition are upheld by legal statute.
9) In any agreements between MERCOSUL countries it will be important to ensure
compatibility between the judicial and administrative procedures in relation to the
transfer of unconvicted and convicted prisoners.
10) Mechanisms will need to be put in place in order to demonstrate transparency of
public institutions.
11) It is important to reduce the risks of impunity with the strengthening of
independence, alacrity, and celerity of the Criminal Courts to satisfactorily execute
the duty of the filtering of criminal attitudes
12) It will be necessary to introduce joint approaches across the MERCOSUL region
to protect tourism from criminal networks.
13) The activities of the ‘shadow’ economy will also need to be monitored and
policed in order to prevent it from being manipulated by organised crime.
14) The MERCOSUL countries should consider enhancing border protection through
strategies such as a standardised passport.
15) Universities provide a means by which to develop research and gain further
understanding of the structure and processes of organized crime, such knowledge
will contribute significantly to the development of effective control strategies.
16) In order for the MERCOSUL region to enhance its safety it will need to have a
strong structure at the country and sub-country level.
17) By ensuring greater public safety in the MERCOSUL countries they will find it
easier to develop and put in place the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA).
18) Within MERCOSUL a special procedure of co-operation and joint working under
the auspices of the UN Security Council will need to be established.
19) A First Forum of International Co-operation on the Control of Organised Crime
in the Connections of Productions and Investments in the MERCOSUL should be
organised as soon as possible.
Suggested Procedures to Reduce and Control Organised Crime in the
MERCOSUL region with particular reference to:
a) infiltration of state agencies by criminal networks and organisations;
b) the infiltration of business and commerce and the consequences on
employment, investments and commercial productivity.
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Procedures to Reduce and Control Organised Crime:
a) To ensure that one outcome of the 11th United Nations Congress on Crime
and Crime Prevention is an understanding of the necessity of support from
the United Nations to the  First Forum of International Cooperation on
Organized Crime Control on the Relationship of Productions and
Investments in MERCOSUL; to be held in the City of Foz de Iguaçu, State
of Paraná, Brazil (Brazilian municipality that forms a border with Paraguay
and Argentina) in November 2005.
b) To develop and implement a set of controls that will reduce the activities of
organized crime, in three border cities: City of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil),
Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Ciudad del Puerto Iguazu (Argentina).
Identification of those Criminal Justice Agencies to implement policies
concerned with the reduction of the activities of Organised Crime.
a) the Law Enforcement Departments of the Member Nations and Associates
of MERCOSUL;
b) The city administrations of those cities located on the borders of
MERCOSUL Nations;
c) The experts of the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control,
affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), who are able to offer
important collaboration for the development of the political strategies to
counter organised crime in the MERCOSUL region.
 
The development and implementation of controls to reduce the
activities of organized crime.
 
The development and implementation of a pilot project in the three border
cities of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil), Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Ciudad
del Puerto Iguazu (Argentina).
Timetable for Implementation:
The First Forum of International Co-operation on the Control of Organised
Crime which will take place on the City of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil), during
the period from 23 to 25 November, 2005, according to the agreements
already initiated with the University and the City Hall of Foz do Iguaçu.
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 Final Considerations
There is an increasing concern with organised crime in South America. Very few of
the goals set out in the “Aims of the Millennium”, a series of social actions
established in 2000 by the United Nations, have been met. To end poverty those
objectives set out in “Aims of the Millennium” will need to be accomplished by the
year 2015. In order to achieve these goals it will mean the eradication of famine, the
guarantee of the access for all to drinking water, the reduction of infant mortality and
the expansion of  access to basic education.
The escalation of organized crime in South America has reached an unacceptable
level of activity culminating in the murder of Judges, Public Prosecutors, lawyers,
policemen and journalists. Government in an attempt to tackle the consequences of
organized crime will need to use social indicators to provide the context within
which to institute social reforms in the areas of: education, public safety, the penal
system and the administration of the Courts. Within the commercial framework it
will necessary to improve the conditions for investment.
The 2005 studies of the Caribbean and Latin American Economic Commission
(CEPAL), estimate that 44% of the South American population live under the
poverty line, with less than a dollar a day for survival, without access to drinking
water and proper sewage. Poverty is concentrated in the cities in the shanty towns.,
making the Latin American continent one of the most urbanized zones in the world.
Latin American Governments need an agenda that prioritises a decade of growth in
education to enable Latin American economies to become globally competitive.
Economic globalisation and the ensuing globalisation of crime have not been
matched, maybe for good reason, with a juridical globalization10. Many judicial
systems experience difficulties in sentencing due to a lack of alternatives to prison.
Research sponsored by the International Labor Organization in November 2003,
reveals that in the MERCOSUL region, during the period from 1995 to 1999, the
average age of an offender was 15 to 16 years. However, by 2002 the average age
had fallen to 12 to 13 years. One reason for this may be the recruitment of children
and adolescents by organized crime.
There have been a number of changes and shifts in relation to crime in the
MERCOSUL region, and some of these may be attributable to organised crime.
First, crime became more violent. In 1990, 23% of the criminal offences were
violent and by 2000 this had risen to 35%. We can also see a shift in the patterns of
crime. For example, there has been a shift away from solitary offenders to offenders
committing offences in gangs. In the MERCOSUL region organised criminality
involves activities that are wealth generating, many of their activities penetrate
financial systems undetected and utilize a range of strategies to remain unseen, such
as off shore banking and the use of electronic resources to make financial
transactions. In this respect, it is a problem that the criminal justice system functions
with its basis in the principle of individual responsibility, whereas there is a great
                                                     
10 See Weeramantry, C.G. (1998). Human Rights and Scientific and Technological
Progress. In Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges. Aldershot, Unesco
Publishing, pp. 247-248.
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demand for a reorientation to the effect of coping better with gang activities11. One
consequence is that the serious work of good policemen and good judges suffers
from a lack of impact.
There are serious consequences on society from the activities of organised crime.
There is an increase in violence, the relationship between economic activity by
organised crime and the subsequent flow of investment funds out of a country to
economies that are considered to be better regulated and thus provide safer
investment opportunities. Organised crime networks need to utilize economic
structures in order to launder proceeds and there can develop a complex series of
relationships that, if financial systems are not regulated, results in the state being
complicit in the laundering activities of crime networks12. Consequently if
democratic structures are viewed as being unable to ensure the integrity of financial
systems they might be seriously undermined and vulnerable to more authoritarian
forms of government. Therefore, it is important that the MERCOSUL region is
engaged with the international community to ensure the necessary exchange of
information and the assistance to put in place agreed structures to combat the
activities of organised criminal networks.
                                                     
11 cf. Delmas-Marty, Mireille (2004). Le Droit Pénal Comme Éthique de la Mondialisation.
In Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé. Paris. no. 1, Janvier-Mars,
pp. 2-6.
12 As pointed out by Maia, Rodolfo Tigre (1997). O Estado Desorganizado Contra o Crime
Organizado. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Lúmen Júris, pp. 27-36.
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Enhancing International Law Enforcement Co-operation:
a global overview
Ulrich Kersten
Special Representative of Interpol
to the United Nations
Introduction
Since 11 September 2001, since the attacks in Bali, Casablanca, Djakarta, Madrid,
etc., other terrorist attacks have targeted our communities throughout the world. This
has led national police forces and Interpol to re-focus their resources and has
captured international public attention on an almost daily basis. Whether we live in
Africa, in the Americas, in Asia, in Europe or in the Middle East, there can no longer
be any doubt that terrorism can indeed strike any one of our countries, of our
organizations, anywhere in the world and at any moment.
What we have learned from these terrorist acts is that constant police co-operation is
vital: before, during and after the attacks. We have also realized that by setting up
means of fighting terrorism, we are also creating a framework for fighting all forms
of major trans-national crime.
Over recent years, and drawing on experience gained in the fight against terrorism,
Interpol has undergone a far-reaching change in order to become a genuine,
operational police support organization.
Today, Interpol offers all its 182 member countries essential services in three core
areas:
I-24/7: a global police communications system that is unique; the possibility for law
enforcement agencies to communicate with each other in complete security is the
essential prerequisite for any form of international police co-operation.
a vast range of databases containing essential police information and numerous
analytical services;  once law enforcement agencies are able to communicate with
each other, they must – in order to carry out their investigations or their crime
prevention activities – have a large range of information available. Interpol has
therefore created, and continues to develop, databases on key areas such as
nominals, stolen travel documents, DNA, fingerprints, firearms, etc.
dynamic operational support for police work throughout the world, available around
the clock and 7 days a week; here, Interpol has prioritized the following areas of
crime: the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, all forms of
human trafficking, financial and hi-tech crime, and the apprehension of fugitives.
Other projects have also been developed: to combat child sexual exploitation on the
Internet, traffic in stolen vehicles, traffic in stolen works of art, bio-terrorism,
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training for police forces, disaster victim identification, and co-operation with other
international organizations.
Finally, Interpol makes a system of notices, intended to alert police services
regarding wanted persons, available to its members. The most widely used and best-
known type of these is the red notice, which consists of a request for provisional
arrest with a view to extradition.
Today, therefore, Interpol offers all its 182 members efficient operational tools that
can be implemented worldwide: secure communications (1), access to vital
information (2) and operational assistance and support (3).
These tools have been created in a way that permits a rapid, co-ordinated and
comprehensive response to the threats faced by the international community today.
The potential of these tools is nevertheless underestimated, and there is still not
enough use made of them today.
The implementation of I-24/7, Interpol's global police communications
network
Interpol's I-24/7 global police communications network is recognized as offering
unparalleled, unique possibilities in terms of security, speed, and of transmitting
information required for policing work (messages – images – files – general
information, etc.). By 15 February 2005, 75% of the Interpol community was
connected to the system, i.e. 134 countries. By the end of June 2005, virtually all
member countries will be online. The network's effectiveness in terms of traffic is
already proven: between 2002, when the former X.400 system was still in operation
and the end of 2004, traffic over the Interpol network more than doubled.
The innovative character and the potential of this network also lie in the simplicity of
its operation and the fact that it can be easily deployed in order to provide direct
access at a theatre of operations. In Argentina, for example, several border control
points at the international airports and at the frontiers with Paraguay and Brazil have
been connected. In France, the Interpol network has been deployed in all the
Regional Units of the Criminal Investigation Police Service and will soon be
implemented at the major airports. Around forty countries are currently taking
similar steps.
These developments require that the highest possible level of security must be
considered a priority. The implementation of the new authorization and
authentication system for I-24/7, called "INSYST", now permits Interpol's National
Central Bureaus, i.e. the national police services that constitute the liaison between
the Organization and the country in question, to extend, manage and monitor the use
made by their police services of the tools available via I-24/7 in full security: control
over the type of access granted, of entities with access to the system, and the way the
system is used.
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The Interpol network therefore offers the unique possibility of building up a genuine,
planetary network in terms of secure communications and access to essential police
services and information for investigations – among which the databases are at the
forefront.
The development of the Organization's databases
There is a major interest in having databases available on a global level to provide
support for those actions and investigations carried out by Interpol members and
which today cannot be limited to a national or regional level alone.
Among the various databases developed by Interpol, five of them illustrate current
developments and what remains to be achieved: these concern nominals, stolen
travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, DNA, and fingerprints.
The nominals database
Today, this database contains over 166,000 international criminals (i.e. 33% more
than four years ago), of which 33,000 are fugitives. Searches of this database have
been progressing constantly since 2000, with an extremely marked increase as of
2003. In 2004, some 273,000 searches were carried out. The number of positive
matches, or "hits" from the system is also progressing, by around 270% between
2000 and 2004.
The example of the 310 fugitives arrested during 2004 on Germany's account, in 40
different countries, demonstrates the interest of having records in the Interpol
database and of the effectiveness of the system. To achieve this result, Germany
made 511 requests over this period by means of Interpol notices issued or the
publication of simple Interpol diffusions.
The stolen travel documents database
Launched in June 2002, this database contains around 5,800,000 stolen travel
documents provided by 70 countries as at 15 February 2005.
This database should very rapidly reach several tens of million records. Providing
data for it and using it, as encouraged by Interpol's Secretary General, is now highly
recommended by the highest national political instances, notably in Africa and in
Europe but also by the members of the G8 and by international organizations such as
ICAO and the OSCE. This also grants the database universal recognition.
Nevertheless, and even though the number of searches of the database and of "hits"
(26,511 searches for 226 hits in 2004) have progressed considerably, utilization
remains low. Access to this database has not yet, in fact, been sufficiently de-
centralized to the various control points. It can nevertheless be strikingly effective on
two conditions: that information is provided, and that it is used by a very large
number of agents and officers.
The stolen motor vehicle database
Today, this database contains around 3,200,000 stolen vehicles, i.e. 24% more than
in 2001. Some 84 countries use it regularly. The number of searches on the database
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has increased by over 37% in the last three years, to exceed one million in 2003 for
the first time in the history of Interpol. This progression continued in 2004, with over
1,300,000 searches. The number of hits is also increasing – by over 32% in 4 years
(16,000 in 2004). Over 1,300 stolen vehicles are traced throughout the world each
month thanks to the use of this database.
The example of South Africa is striking, since a total of 1,966 vehicles stolen there
were traced to 38 different countries in 2004. Similarly, and also in 2004, Russia
carried out 224,369 searches of this database and traced 1,141 stolen vehicles in 31
different countries. This illustrates the result obtained by a country within its own
frontiers by consulting the database.
These two examples are a vivid demonstration of the interest in sharing information
on stolen vehicles and of the effectiveness of the database.
The DNA database
By investing in the area of DNA, Interpol's General Secretariat is pursuing a twofold
aim:
• that of having a dynamic, flexible DNA Unit in order to help Interpol member
countries adopt and use DNA analysis
• and that of offering an international database for comparing DNA profiles.
After several years of work, a database has been launched. On 15 February 2005, it
contained around 14,215 DNA profiles and 24 countries contribute information to it.
This database permits reliable comparison of profiles transmitted by the member
countries:
• profiles from crime scenes,
• profiles of persons known to police services,
• profiles from missing persons or bodies to be identified.
On 27 April 2004, the database recorded its first official hit, between a Slovenian
and a Croatian profile.
A second hit was made a few months ago, and can be summarized as follows: on 1
June 2004, Switzerland issued a request to the General Secretariat for a yellow
notice concerning a missing person. The request contained a DNA profile that was
immediately compared in the database. A hit was established with the DNA
contained in a black notice issued in April 2004 at the request of Spain. This
demonstrates that the concept, and the system implemented, function perfectly.
Very shortly (in March 2005), Interpol's DNA database will be directly accessible
via the I-24/7 network. Each country may enter a DNA profile to be instantly
compared with the profiles contained in the database, and will then receive an
immediate response, either positive or negative.
The fingerprints database
The General Secretariat has operated an AFIS database since 2000. It is equipped
with the latest version of the MetaMorpho system, which permits automatic
comparison of fingerprints.
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Unfortunately, it is quite evident that the amount of fingerprints provided for this
database is still insufficient, even though a growth in the number transmitted was
recorded during the first months of 2004.
Today, the database contains over 40,000 fingerprints, but could hold over 300,000.
Of the 182 members of Interpol, and per year:
• 56% transmit no fingerprints
• 36% transmit between 1 and 50
• 8% transmit over 50.
It is therefore essential to achieve progress:
• by multiplying the number of fingerprints sent
• by improving their quality
• by facilitating their transmission, notably by the use of the I-24/7 network
Fingerprints remain one of the most reliable and efficient means of apprehending
criminals, and notably those who use different identities. Here are two such
examples:
In August 2003, a criminal of Gambian origin was questioned regarding narcotics
trafficking in Austria. Interpol Vienna transmitted the subject's fingerprints to the
General Secretariat together with information on him. A comparison in the database
immediately confirmed that this criminal had also been arrested in other countries
(Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany) for other offences and under other
identities.
On 5 June 2004, three men were arrested in Denmark during a seizure of 2 kg of
cocaine. Their identities were verified in the General Secretariat's databases, but the
searches were negative. It was only when the Danish police sent the offenders'
fingerprints to the General Secretariat that the true identity and criminal history of
one of the subjects was discovered. His fingerprints corresponded to those of a man
who was wanted for a murder committed in the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro
in 2002, and who was the subject of a red notice.
In both these examples, the criminals could not have been arrested without the
transmission of fingerprints by the countries concerned.
In this connection, the complementarity of all Interpol's databases should be stressed.
If one considers that 47% of Interpol members do not make regular use of the stolen
vehicle database, that 62% do not yet participate in the stolen travel documents
database, that 56% do not transmit fingerprints, and that 87% do not yet participate
in the DNA database, it is extremely easy to imagine the extent of their potential and
their scope for progression thanks to the introduction of the I-24/7 system.
In addition to those mentioned above, another Interpol database contains
approximately 250,000 digital images that have been circulated via the Internet and
that show acts of sexual abuse committed on 10,000 to 20,000 victims who are still
minors. The system implemented is based on extremely powerful software that
makes it possible to identify matches between victims, between crime scenes, and
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between various images within a single set of photographs. It provides assistance to
the law enforcement services for identifying victims and prevents the duplication of
work by providing information relating to identified victims and to countries
currently carrying out specific investigations.
Operational police support
The Organization has also achieved progress in the area of operational police
support, for it is now capable of reacting and responding, in real time, to the policing
needs expressed by its member countries.
First of all, by the creation of a Command and Co-ordination Centre operating
within the General Secretariat around the clock and every day of the week, in the
four official languages. Fully operational since 1 January 2004, the Command and
Co-ordination Centre plays a major role in three of the Organization's key priority
areas:
• Offering real-time response to urgent requests by member countries
• Co-ordinating the exchange of information
• Assuming crisis management functions.
The first interface between the member countries and the General Secretariat
regarding the exchange of police information, the creation of the Command and Co-
ordination Centre has made it possible:
• to increase the exchange of information sent from the General Secretariat to the
NCBs by over 70%, particularly concerning responses within the framework of
criminal investigations
• to reduce the response time to urgent requests from the countries to less than one
day.
One of the most innovative aspects of the Command and Co-ordination Centre,
however, resides in its capacity for immediate reaction in the case of a major crisis
and its involvement in deploying Incident Response Teams with the aim of
providing assistance to countries, notably those who have suffered terrorist attacks.
Since the end of 2002, the General Secretariat, in agreement with the member
countries in question, has deployed several incident response teams following
terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Uzbekistan, and Bangladesh.
The purpose of these teams and their specific equipment is to provide an entire range
of services such as direct access to the databases, assistance in the area of analysis,
co-ordination in specific areas such as ballistics, or disaster victim identification.
Where needed, the Command and Co-ordination Centre also facilitates the
temporary constitution (for the duration of the crisis) of Crisis Management and
Support (CMS) Group, consisting of General Secretariat staff members but also of
experts provided by the member countries. This Group is then tasked with co-
ordinating all aspects related to managing the crisis, thus acting as an overall,
international platform.
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This was the concept that made it possible to react rapidly and in an extremely pro-
active way to the tsunami disaster and to the requests of the countries concerned.
Interpol deployed incident response teams to Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and
created a Crisis Management and Support Group in order to assist in co-ordinating
disaster victim identification teams from throughout the world and in processing and
comparing ante-mortem and post-mortem information collected in order to permit
the identification of victims.
Another development within operational police support was the creation of the
orange notice: this alerts security services at airports or at any other location
regarding the circulation or dissimulation of disguised or hidden weapons. Fifteen
orange notices were issued during 2004.
Finally, the development of operational police support also includes implementing
targeted programmes and projects in areas of crime defined as priorities, i.e.:
• The fight against terrorism
• The fight against drug trafficking and organized crime
• The fight against all forms of trafficking in human beings
• The fight against financial and hi-tech crime
• The apprehension of fugitives
Preventing acts of terrorism and constantly updating information on them constitutes
one of Interpol's most important activities. The Sub-Directorate for Public Security
and Terrorism continues to gather, store, analyse and diffuse information and details
regarding suspected individuals, groups and their activities. Under the aegis of the
Fusion Group, international or regional projects and programmes are carried out in
South America, Africa, Central Asia, Asia, etc. (Operation Amazon, Operation
Kalkan, Operation Pacific, Operation Passage, etc.). Moreover, work is also carried
out in the areas of the fight against bio-terrorism and of trafficking in radioactive
materials or chemicals.
Interpol continues to intensify co-operation among its member countries and to
encourage the exchange of information concerning the fight against the illicit
production and the trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Projects and programmes are also carried out to fight organized crime and corruption
(Sydrug – Marco – Nomak – Umbrella, etc.).
Interpol remains determined to eradicate sexual abuse and offences of which
children are the victims, and to combat trafficking in women and children. Here,
Interpol's activities during the next few years will focus on gathering information
regarding paedophiles, trafficking in Asian migrants, and the participation of
organized crime in the exploitation of women.
In the area of financial and hi-tech crime, activities will mainly concern financial
fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism, intellectual property crime
and hi-tech crime.
All these activities are aimed at providing Interpol's member countries with tools for
preventing and fighting these forms of crime, by increasing the quantity of
information in the databases, creating lists of suspects, the diffusion of alerts,
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publishing guides, drawing up analytical reports, organizing working groups, etc.,
and ensuring that all this information is available via Interpol's I-24/7
communications network and/or its secure website.
In addition, Interpol carries out numerous other activities with a view to providing
the most effective support possible for apprehending criminals or criminal groups
throughout the world. This includes establishing Interpol notices, cross-referencing
data, the automatic comparison of data from Interpol's criminal documentation
system, a system of country-based file monitoring – all these techniques have been
developed by the appropriate Sub-Directorates.
Furthermore, these techniques are also applied within the framework of research into
perpetrators of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
Finally, the creation of an Interpol office within the United Nations in New York in
October 2004; the Organization's policy of enhancing the capacities of its Sub-
Regional Bureaus in San Salvador, Buenos Aires, Harare, Nairobi, Abidjan, and its
Bangkok Liaison Office; and the setting up of service standards at all the National
Central Bureaus are all factors that strengthen the dynamic operational support that
Interpol is committed to offering its member countries.
Conclusion
Interpol's developments within its three core functions: secure, global police
communication, the databases, and operational police support are complementary
and form a whole. This "whole" converges towards a single objective: that of
achieving security and effectiveness when preventing crime, identifying criminals,
locating them and apprehending them.
Over the last four years, the number of fugitives registered by Interpol diffusions or
notices has increased by 40%, bringing the number of fugitives in the nominals
database to over 33,000.
Over the last four years, the number of terrorists in the Interpol databases per year
has multiplied tenfold, and today over 8,000 names of suspected or convicted
terrorists are accessible around the clock.
Over the last four years, the number of criminals arrested who were the subject of
Interpol wanted information has increased by over 70%, to exceed 2,700 persons
arrested in 2004.
These are all encouraging signs, and yet this is still not enough. In fact, to enhance
international police co-operation and to ensure that the international community can
offer a rapid, co-ordinated and full response to the threat it faces today, three steps
are necessary.
The first of these has already been achieved: Interpol has made an integrated, global
communications system available to its members.
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The I-24/7 communications network now provides the unique opportunity of
building up a genuine, global network in terms of secure communications and access
to services and essential police information for investigations – among which the
databases are at the forefront. With the setting up of this system came the adoption
of the I-24/7 Security Charter. Maintaining a high level of security is an essential
prerequisite for deploying Interpol's new communications system in absolute safety.
By working within the framework defined by the I-24/7 Security Charter, the
Interpol community is also agreeing to apply a set of common principles aimed at
maintaining this high level of security in order to preserve the system's integrity. The
primary objective of the Charter is to ensure that all users are committed to
respecting the minimum recognized security norms and to guarantee to the Interpol
community that these norms are respected. It defines the principles that the entities
connected must follow regarding the network's security, the workstations, the access
to services provided by Interpol, and how these aspects must be managed. The
security-related partnership established between the General Secretariat, the National
Central Bureaus and other authorized users contributes towards guaranteeing a
completely secure environment, which is essential to the success of Interpol's new I-
24/7 system.
Today, accomplishing the second step depends only on greater awareness on the part
of the international community regarding the necessity of enhancing the exchange of
information on an international level.
Interpol has created, and continues to develop, a number of databases that are an
important aspect within international police co-operation. Moreover, the
Organization makes many technical solutions available to its members that facilitate,
for example, the input of information to these databases (direct access, inter-
connection, data transfer).
For all these operations, the Organization acts in accordance with Rules adopted by
the Interpol General Assembly and developed over more than twenty years. These
guarantee the quality of the information (i.e. that it is reliable, up to date, and that it
is examined regularly regarding the necessity of retaining it), the protection of the
information (confidentiality, integrity), and respect for human rights (what is the
ultimate purpose of the processing? is it in proportion to the objectives pursued?
control?). These Rules today consist of the Rules relating to the processing of
information for international police co-operation, the Rules relating to the control of
information and access to Interpol's files, and the Rules relating to access by an
inter-governmental organization to the Interpol telecommunications network and
databases.
Despite the legal guarantees provided by this regulatory framework, the technical
solutions implemented by Interpol's General Secretariat, and the fact that a very
large number of databases now exist, Interpol channels and the Organization's
databases are today under-used by the international community.
Nothing, however, justifies this under-use. The Rules mentioned above, drawn up
with due respect for national sovereignty, adopt the principle that it is the source of
the information that controls the right to access it or use it. In other terms, the source
of an item of information remains the owner of it, and may thus impose restrictions
regarding access to it.
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Enhancing the fight against international crime is impossible without an increase in
the amount of information exchanged: not only on a bilateral or regional level, but
also on an international one. Without such an increase, any analytical work will be
lacking in scope. And unless it is possible to cross-match more information and to
establish links, a number of cases will remain unresolved.
Awareness of the necessity of using the integrated global communications system
made available by Interpol, and which offers a unique weapon for the fight against
international crime, is thus essential. So, in order to achieve the second step, it
should be recommended to the Member States of the United Nations – the vast
majority of whom are also members of Interpol – that all the necessary measures be
undertaken on an administrative, legislative and/or technical level in order to
increase the use made of the information in Interpol's databases.
Of the three steps suggested, the third – that of actually fighting international crime
on an international level – is without doubt the most difficult, for it requires co-
ordination and resources. Since Interpol is the only international criminal police
organization, the best possible use should be made of the institutional structure it
provides.
Article 2 of Interpol's Constitution states that the Organization's aims are:
a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal
police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and
in the spirit of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights";
b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the
prevention and suppression or ordinary law crimes.
Given the scope of the mandate given by the countries represented in Interpol, the
flexibility provided for in paragraph (b), the virtually universal character of the
Organization and the know-how that it has acquired since its creation, Interpol
constitutes the most comprehensive tool to date in order to offer the rapid, co-
ordinated and full response mentioned above to the threat which the international
community must face up to today.
This response, in fact, takes on two aspects:
• Enhancing co-ordination work; the task of the police officers at Interpol's
General Secretariat mainly consists of supplying pertinent information to the
members for the cases they are handling, of establishing links between different
cases, and of putting various members involved in a single case in touch with
one another. To do so, developing the concept of liaison officers and of contact
points, holding conferences on specialized crime areas and holding operational
meetings are all means used by Interpol to favour such co-operation and the
exchange of information between members of the Organization. This effort must
be pursued and enhanced, with the help of the international community.
• Greater support to the countries with the least resources for fighting international
crime; sadly, certain countries do not have the means to fight international crime,
to carry out complex investigations, or to take action against terrorist or
organized crime groups. And yet, as long as these countries lack such resources,
they constitute weak links in the fight against international crime. It is for this
reason that Interpol has placed particular emphasis on ensuring these countries
can access the I-24/7 telecommunications network in the same way as their
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fellow members, and are trained to use it. It is nevertheless still essential that
other initiatives are taken in order for the international community to form a
united front and to demonstrate solidarity in the face of international crime.
The 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice can
thus also be the occasion for a recommendation to the Member States of the United
Nations with a view to making full use of Interpol's potential regarding the
achievement of the three important stages mentioned above. This recommendation is
all the more pertinent since the members of the United Nations – of whom the vast
majority are also members of Interpol – already have access to the services proposed
by the Organization.
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Enhancing International Law Enforcement Co-operation,
including Extradition
Roberto Di Legami
Head of OC Groups Unit
Europol
Introduction and background
In preparation of the participation of Europol to the 11th UN Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice which will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, in April
2005, the aim of this document is to highlight potentials and limits of Europol in the
framework of international police cooperation in Europe.
Europol is the European law enforcement organisation which aims at improving the
effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States in
preventing and combating serious forms of international organised crime falling
under Europol’s mandate1.
The foundation of Europol was foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty on the creation of
the European Union which was signed on 7 February 1992.
Based in The Hague, Europol initiated its activities on 3 January 1994 with a limited
scope of action as EDU – Europol Drugs Unit, being its competencies restricted to
illicit drugs trafficking.
The Europol Convention was signed on 26 July 1995 and was ratified by all Member
States on 1 October 1998. Only as for 1 July 1999 Europol commenced its full
activities, after the implementation procedure was finalised.
Europol’s involvement can be requested when there exist factual indications that a
given OC group is involved and carries out its illicit activities in a trans-national
dimension by affecting two or more Member States of the EU.
This basically means that Europol can enter into action when the following
minimum requirements are met:
1. an OC group operates internationally;
2. the given group affects the Member States of the European Union in a trans-
national dimension (two or more Member States are affected by the criminal
activities carried out);
3. the types of crime fall under Europol mandate.
                                                     
1 Illicit drug trafficking; Illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear substances; Illegal
immigration networks; Illegal car  trafficking; Terrorism; THB including child
pornography; Money counterfeiting and other means of payment; Money laundering;
Crimes against life, personal integrity and freedom; Crimes against property, public
property and fraud; Illicit trading and environmental crimes
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Europol is the European law enforcement organisation which handles criminal
information by applying an intelligence-led policing, which allows for a proactive
approach, as opposed to the investigative-led policing normally carried out by the
law enforcement agencies in the Member States, which normally allows for a
reactive approach.
Analysis is, therefore, the basic instrument used at Europol for this purpose.
Information is not only exchanged but also shared, for the benefit of all the
participants: finally, it is transformed into intelligence (knowledge as processed
information designed for action).
Given that it does not have supranational powers upon the participating states,
Europol operates in a support capacity by providing expertise, best practices,
support and coordination of the investigations carried out by the relevant Member
States.
The mission of Europol is to make a significant contribution to the European
Union’s law enforcement action against organised crime, with an emphasis on
targeting criminal organisations. Taking into account that criminal organisations
very seldom concentrate on a single type of crime, Europol applies a horizontal
approach (criminal organisations are targeted as such, regardless the criminal areas
they are involved in) and a regional approach (by focusing on OC groups
originating from or rooted in a specific region).
The organisation at present consists of about 500 persons, 81 out of which are
Liaison Officers seconded by the Member States and represent various law
enforcement agencies such as police, gendarmerie, border police, immigration
services and customs.
Current status
Europol has been operating now for five and half years. Although it still is a very
young organisation, it is already possible to make an evaluation in order to highlight
its strengths and weaknesses.
Strengths
• Europol is ruled by a Convention and other relevant legal instruments. It owns an
international legal personality and can operate in the international arena based
upon a reliable legal framework. This makes its work legally protected,
acknowledgeable and fully utilisable from the beneficiaries because information
are obtained, utilised and distributed in a systematic way;
• Among the many instruments that have been foreseen to properly tackle
organised crime, the Conclusions of the European Council held in Tampere
(Finland) on 15 and 16 October 1999 have identified several main “milestones”
to be put in place as soon as possible2 and most of them have enhanced the role
of Europol;
                                                     
2 Among them, the establishment of a European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force in
cooperation with Europol, but also the establishment of Joint Investigative Teams, of an
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• Europol is now well known both in Europe and outside due to the constant
participation in high-level international fora, awareness programs, seminars,
meetings and other similar activities as well as by supporting actions both within
the Member States and in some Third Countries;
• The Europol Liaison Officers network has been enlarged considerably also
including the 10 newly accessed MS. Representatives from non MS with which
specific agreements have been signed have been given a liaison office within the
organisation. Europol Liaison Officers have been appointed in the U.S.A. and at
the General Secretariat of Interpol. A significant number of Operational and
Strategic agreements have been concluded with both Third States and Third
Organisations and some others are still under way;
• The flow of information via the Europol Liaison Officers network has
significantly increased. Data provided to Europol for processing within the legal
framework of the Analysys Work Files have reached a considerable
improvement and currently 17 Analysys Work Files are open and ongoing at
Europol. Numerous Target Groups (sub-projects) within the existing Analysis
Work Files have been established, thus allowing a better handling of the
information gathered;
• Apart from the Analysys Work File’s instrument for the handling of data and
information, Europol has recently put in place an Information System (a data-
base) though with still limited functions and still to be updated and enhanced,
and an Index System which allows for the research of entities within all the
Analysis Work Files ongoing at Europol;
• Operational and Strategic Reports are provided on a daily basis to the relevant
Member States upon request or on Europol initiative. Many other informative
documents are delivered constantly for the benefit of the participants. Support is
provided to the Member States in line with the requirements indicated by the
Convention;
• There is not a common concept of Organised Crime within the Member States of
the European Union. Even though, common criteria3 have been established in
order for the Member States of the European Union and some Third Countries to
come into a more concrete and structured mechanism for reporting on Organised
Crime.
Weaknesses
• Europol is rooted under the Third Pillar of the European Union. Judicial and
Police Cooperation in Criminal Matters are dealt within the intergovernmental
dimension. The decision-making process carried out in this “sphere of action”
requires unanimity and this represents a hindrance to the fast changes that should
be applied in this area;
• Many of the recommendations indicated in Tampere still need to be
implemented, and this stands for a clear obstruction to efficient police
cooperation in Europe. Important gaps are present in the field of crime
prevention as well as in the one concerning the legal mutual assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of serious economic crimes. In addition, the
                                                                                                                                        
European Police College, of Eurojust as judicial counterpart of Europol, and specific
strategies in the field of crime prevention and fight against drugs and money laundering.
3 Joint Action (98/733/JHA) on 21 December 1998, based on Enfopol 35 issued by the
Council on 21 April 1997
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establishment of common definitions, incriminations and sanctions for certain
serious crimes still remains pending;
• Although Europol is known in the Member States, a lot should still be done in
order to spread, till the lowest level of the law enforcement structures,
information on how to cooperate jointly in the international arena also taking
advantage of the Europol support capacity;
• Europol should continue signing agreements of an operational and strategic
nature with more Third Countries and Third Organisations. The conclusion of
these agreements will allow for establishing more and more relations with those
legal entities considered vital to properly fight OC groups in a more appropriate
way and possibly accept new Liaison Officers to be appointed at Europol
premises to speed up the communication exchange. The appointment of other
Europol Liaison Officers abroad should be foreseen, especially in those areas
which need particular attention (e.g. Balkans);
• The flow of information which relates to international OC groups acting in a
trans-national dimension, for those crimes falling under Europol’s mandate,
should be further enhanced. Furthermore, inclusion of data exchanged via the
Europol Liaison Officers into the Analytical Work Files in place at Europol
should be always foreseen by the data providers. This could allow for avoiding
to lose data and to better exploit the information;
• The Palermo Convention – which gives for the first time a definition of trans-
national organised crime – and its three additional Protocols4 have not yet been
ratified by all Member States.
Current changes – new challenges
A New Constitution for Europe
On 29 October 2004 the New Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome (Italy).
The venue where the signature took place brings a particular meaning as it mirrors
the historic foundation of the European Communities in 1957. The ratification and
implementation processes of the new European Constitution are crucial and should
now be speeded up as much as possible. Nowadays the rigid “Pillars” structure of
the European Union presents a hindrance to smooth procedures in the decision-
making process. The new Constitution will hopefully avoid these problems as the
“pillars” will disappear; nonetheless, a certain rigidity will continue to apply in the
decision-making system whenever dealing with specific cases of a particular
importance. As a result, police cooperation will remain a politically sensitive issue
and, therefore, protected by some exceptions from the general decision-making
procedure. As a consequence, Member States will continue to exercise a
considerable power and control over specific sensitive areas to such extent that in
some cases, from a practical point of view, the “Third Pillar” will still operate.
                                                     
4 Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and
children; Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air; Protocol against
the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and
ammunition.
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The Constitution represents, therefore, an important step forward also for police
cooperation issues but it must be taken into consideration that a certain unbalance
will continue to exist in this sphere.
Ten new MS joined the EU
New 10 MS have joined the EU in May 2004 and, following the ratification
procedure of the Europol’s Convention, recently became fully-fledged Members of
Europol. According to the requests received, those new MS have joined the Analysis
Work Files they were interested in and became Members of the relevant Analysis
Groups with complete powers.
The new 10 Member States still need to reach the standards of police cooperation
which the “old” 15 Member States have in place even though big efforts have been
already done accordingly. In 2007 two other new states (Romania and Bulgaria) will
join the Union and Europol have to be ready for receiving them in a proper way.
Joint Investigation Teams
The two terms “Joint Investigative Teams” and “Joint Investigation Teams”, seem to
be used alternatively in the legal instruments provided, even though the latter is a
more recent expression. In addition, the term “Joint Teams” is commonly used in
some legal instruments as well, but the small literal distinction doesn’t affect the
basic meaning of the term and it seems clear that all of them relate to the same
technical instrument. J.I.T.s denote basically some actions, well defined and finely
structured, in fighting organised crime in which the main impetus is given by the
multi-agency approach.
Article 30 of the Maastricht Treaty mentions Joint Investigative Teams and this
concept is mirrored by many European Councils and by the Europol Convention.
Point n. 43 of the Conclusion of the Tampere European Council urges for a fast
setting up of this instrument.
Other legal instruments do exist5, but until the ratification process is finalised, its
common effectiveness will not be reached. In the meantime, practical operational
guidelines are being prepared.
                                                     
5 a) The Council Recommendation on 30 November 2000 in respect to Europol’s assistance
to J.I.T.s set up by the MS; b) The Council Framework Decision on J.I.T.s issued on 13
June 2002, which basically contains the same legal provisions indicated in Article 13 of
the EU Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Council Act of 29
May 2000) because the latter has not yet been ratified by the MS; c) The Council Act on
28 November 2002 drawing up a Protocol amending the Europol Convention. A deadline
of June 2004 was given for the implementation of the Council Framework Decision of 13
June 2002. In the interim, the position of the MS in relation to the transposition into
national laws of the obligations imposed by the Framework Decision, is such that in 16
MS the legislation is now in place and is either in force or due to come into force by 30
June 2004, in 7 MS legislation is in the process of passing through the Parliament, whilst
in the remaining 2 legislation is otherwise in progress.
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South Eastern Europe: major threats
As 5 out of the 14 Countries which are usually considered as SEE Countries have
joined the European Union last May (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Hungary and Slovenia), and another 2 will follow in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania),
it appears of crucial importance to make the state-of-play of the current situation in
terms of international judicial and police cooperation, and to understand which are
the possible areas of improvement.
As far as the 7 just mentioned Countries, it must be said that all of them have
seconded to Europol Liaison Officers from the different Police Agencies who ensure
a fast, protected and regular exchange of information to and from Europol, the
quality of which is improving every day.
Unfortunately, however, Europol bases its analysis and investigations on information
provided by European Union’s Member States and other supporting partners, which
do not include the majority of the Balkan countries: therefore, there are only limited
data coming directly from judicial or law enforcement authorities of the remaining
South East Europe countries.
The European Union has a number of tools operating in the region that are relevant
for the fight against organised crime originating from or linked to the Western
Balkans, such as the different police and customs missions managed either by the
European Commission or by the Council. Member States also have various agencies
in place, including various types of Liaison Officers from the immigration/customs/
police services. However, these different instruments developed to address several
policies operate under different chains of command. There is limited coordination at
all levels.
Europol has been authorised and mandated to cooperate with the Western Balkan
countries. Due to deficiencies in the field of personal data protection in these
countries, no agreements have been concluded yet (even though some agreements
are in progress). At present, Europol has no operational relationship with
international organisations or EU police and customs missions in the Western
Balkans.
The role of Europol as a partner for the Western Balkan region should be further
developed. In particular, Europol should be allowed:
• to share regional strategic analysis with the countries of the Western Balkans
region and engage in closer cooperation with those investigative services;
• to conclude operational agreements with relevant international stakeholders in
the fight against organised crime originating from or linked to the Western
Balkans, including the police and customs missions, in order to enable the
exchange of criminal information and intelligence;
• As Europol has not yet concluded operational agreements with the States of the
Region, the Liaison Officers Network should be strengthened in order to fill the
temporary gap before full operational cooperation can be established with each
state or territory of the region;
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• to establish an agreement with the SECI-Centre in Bucharest6, with which
Europol hasn’t been allowed to enter into a cooperation agreement as they lack
the required international legal personality.
Extradition procedures
The progressive elimination of border controls within the EU considerably facilitated
the free movement of persons, also making it easier for criminals to operate trans-
nationally by taking advantage of the different internal legislations.
Mutual assistance in criminal matters is a well-established principle in international
judicial cooperation; it operates when a State is unable to continue with an
investigation or procedure on its own and requires another State’s help. Many legal
instruments have been adopted to facilitate judicial cooperation but mutual
assistance is still not effective enough.
A Council Act was issued by the EU Council of Ministers on 29 May 2000
establishing the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
between the Member States of the European Union. Unfortunately, this important
instrument has not yet been ratified and is therefore not applicable.
Resembling the content of the Amsterdam Treaty, which called for the creation of an
effective area of freedom, security and justice, the European Council held in
Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 devoted, among the others, a special chapter
entitled “A genuine European area of justice”. For this purpose, four major points
were highlighted as achievements goals for the EU institutions in view of a better
access to justice in Europe and a better cooperation in criminal matters:
• Harmonisation of legislation;
• Development of instruments based on the mutual recognition principle of judicial
decisions;
• Improvement of judicial cooperation mechanisms;
• Development of relationships with Foreign Countries.
As far as the principle of recognition of judicial decisions is concerned, important
steps forward have been made as this issue has been considered a “cornerstone” of
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Concretely, this principle allows for a
decision made by a judicial Authority of one Member State to be recognised and
executed in another Member State on the basis of mutual confidence.
The EU has therefore adopted a Council Framework Decision on 13 June 2002
(2002/584/JHA) on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures
between the Member States.
The European Arrest Warrant is designed to replace the current extradition system7,
to simplify the process with strict time limits and a speed up a judge-to-judge
mechanism with normally no ministerial involvement.
                                                     
6 The Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime.
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It applies to all offences, whenever a person is being prosecuted for an offence
punishable by a custodial sentence of over a year or when the person has been
sentenced to a prison term (custodial or detention order) exceeding four months. The
European Arrest Warrant is meant to replace present extradition procedures for
grave crimes and a list of 32 serious offences has been foreseen8; crimes on this list
have to be executed by the arresting State irrespective of whether or not the
definition of the offence is the same, providing that the offence is serious enough
and punished by at least 3 years’ imprisonment in the Member State that has issued
the warrant.
As of 1 July 2004 the Framework Decision was meant to become operational but
some delays occurred. On 1 January 2004 the European Arrest Warrant entered into
force for eight countries9 while the other 7 Member States of the European Union
failed the implementation deadline. In the meantime other 10 Countries have joined
the European Union and should follow the same implementation procedure.
Consequences for Europol
The European Arrest Warrant is a pure instrument for judicial mutual assistance in
criminal matters therefore it applies in the field of international judicial cooperation.
Europol belongs to the dimension of international police cooperation in criminal
matters and the operability of the European Arrest Warrant shouldn’t have an
immediate effect on it. On the other hand both judicial and police cooperation have
strict relationships and affect each other’s sphere of action.
The range of crimes falling under Europol’s mandate surely complies with the
European Arrest Warrant. The procedures to be applied don’t engage anyway
Europol directly; in fact, provision is made for cooperation with the Schengen
Information System and with Interpol, with Eurojust and the European Judicial
Network. Europol’s involvement could be foreseen, at least by making initially use
of the Liaison Officers posted within the structure.
Areas of improvement and recommendations
A proper tackling of OC requires a common action both at political and law
enforcement level. Legislative and judicial strategies on one side should be
developed in parallel and in a consistent manner.
                                                                                                                                        
7 The 1957 European Extradition Convention and the 1978 European Convention on the
suppression of terrorism as regards extradition; the Agreement of 26 May 1989 between
12 MS on simplifying the transmission of extradition requests; the 1995 Convention on
the simplified extradition procedure; the 1996 Convention on extradition; the relevant
provisions of the Schengen agreement.
8 These include being member of a criminal organization, terrorism, trafficking in human
beings, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, corruption, fraud, money
laundering, counterfeiting of money, illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and
explosives, etc.
9 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.
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Possible proposals at political level
• To toughen the implementation of the Tampere conclusions, in particular those
concerning the strengthening of Europol’s role;
• To adopt measures necessary to implement the Council Decision on the common
use of Liaison Officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the
MS, which allows Europol to make use of those Liaison Officers with a
particular emphasis of Western Balkans10;
• To adopt and implement a clear legal instrument concerning Joint Investigative
Teams (JIT), in particular the Council Framework Decision issued on 13 June
2002. This is absolutely crucial and guidelines should be provided on the
relevant role of Europol. A fundamental point should also include the financing
of such teams, preferably with Europol budget, and the use of a common “Model
Agreement” for setting up such an instrument;
• To urge the Accession into the European Union of some Countries of the Balkan
area and to maintain and support the “Stabilisation and Association” Process for
the Western Balkans as the major driving force for political, democratic and
economic reforms in a region which is considered nowadays one of the most
important threats to the stability of Europe and therefore a priority for the EU;
• To continue the process of ratification of the Palermo Convention and its
Protocols by all 25 Member States of the European Union in order to have a
common legal instrument in the fight against trans-national organised crime,
based on the same definition at European Union level;
• To agree on a common definition of Terrorism which, despite the efforts carried
out in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Europe, is still a pending issue;
• To speed up the process of ratification of the European Convention on Cyber
Crime in all the signatory States11 in order to achieve a common operational
platform for the fighting against High Tech Crimes;
• To comply with the content of the “Hague Programme” issued by the Council of
the European Union12 at the end of 2004, especially for some crucial topics dealt
within the chapter on security13.
Possible proposals at law enforcement level
• To make use of the Liaison Officers posted abroad by the Law Enforcement
agencies of the Member States, as an important tool to be exploited in the field
of Police cooperation at international level. In this respect, the attempt to create a
Network among the Liaison Officers posted in the Balkans could be considered
as an example;
                                                     
10 Council Decision (2003/170/JHA) issued on 27 February 2003 on the Common Use of
Liaison Officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States.
11 CETS n. 185, Budapest 23.11.2001. Among the signatory States, only 8 have already
ratified the Convention.
12 Among the most important recommendations, to: a) Design a common strategy to fight
terrorism at a EU level also by making enhanced use of Europol and Eurojust; b)
Intensify practical cooperation between police and customs authorities in the MS and with
Europol; c) Make sure that Eurojust provide Europol of all necessary high quality
information in good time; d) Europol should also be designated by the MS as the central
office of the EU for Euro counterfeiting.
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• To make full use of all those European Union tools operating in the region, that
are relevant to the fight against organised crime originating from or linked to the
Western Balkans, such as the different police and customs missions managed
either by the European Commission or by the Council, and to ensure a proper
coordination at all levels;
• To gain closer co-operation with customs agencies, including access to the
Customs Information System, as tobacco, oil and alcohol smuggling is a very
important area of “business” for organised crime;
• To implement effective information sharing (as opposed to the mere information
exchange) across agencies within a country and across national borders,
particularly when fighting OC and terrorism. Moreover, this sharing should go
beyond traditional Law Enforcement Agencies and should also include national
security and intelligence services;
• To examine the possibility of establishing, with due respect to national legal
requirements, an EU-wide reporting system on pending OC investigations that
would allow Europol and Eurojust to detect and recommend coordination in
overlapping situations;
• To direct more efforts toward suspicious financial transactions, identification of
criminal proceeds and asset seizures, because money is the “backbone” of
organised crime.
Europol’s role
• The experience of Europol in the fight against OC has clearly demonstrated that
the road ahead lies in the multi-agency and horizontal approach, which
ensures that criminal organisations are targeted as such, regardless of the crime
area of involvement.
• To have greater Member States’ commitment in Europol projects and Analysis
Work Files. These should be used as tools for trans-national scale investigations
and Europol should be an instrument at the disposal of investigators, including
public prosecutors;
• To make effective the agreement between Europol and Eurojust on the
cooperation in the fight against trans-national organised crime;
• To continue the signing of operational and strategic agreements with Third States
and Third Organisations in order to reinforce more and more the cooperation
against OC.
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Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in the Asian and
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Introduction
This paper addresses the current situation of judicial cooperation in the Asian and
Pacific region, with special emphasis on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and
mainly focuses on the legal systems and policies of several countries in the region.
The regional arm of the United Nations Secretariat for the Asian and Pacific region
is the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP), located in Bangkok, Thailand. UNESCAP has 53 member states. For
the purpose of this paper, the term the Asian and Pacific region tentatively means
the following 48 member states of UNESCAP:3Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia,
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji,
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati,
Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Korea (the Republic of), Kyrgyztan, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic (the), Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands (the),
Micronesia (Federated State of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines (the), Samoa, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Viet Nam.4
Perhaps very few people, even those who live in this region, may know the
whereabouts of all these 48 countries. However, many people would agree that the
Asian and Pacific region is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms of,
to name a few, ethnic groups, religions, languages, government types, legal systems
and historical backgrounds.
                                                     
1 UNAFEI is one of the Programme Network Institutes (PNIs) affiliated with the United
Nations, established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of
Japan signed on March 15, 1961. The purposes of UNAFEI are the training of personnel,
research in the field of the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, as well as
in the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the treatment of juvenile delinquents. Since
the amendment of the agreement in 1970, the Government of Japan has been assuming all
administrative and financial responsibilities for the activities of UNAFEI.
2 Views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
positions of UNAFEI or the Government of Japan.
3 See General description (www.unescap.org/about/index.asp)
and Members (www.unescap. org/about/member.asp ).
4 France, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will not be included in the Asian
and Pacific region in this paper, although they are member states of UNESCAP.
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Parties to UN Conventions in the Asian and Pacific Region
Region
As indicated in the official background document for this workshop, provisions on
extradition have been included in several international conventions that deal with
specific types of crime, and the best-known two examples are the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(hereinafter referred to as the 1988 Convention) and the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter referred to as the TOC
Convention). The document also states that the sets of provisions included in these
two UN conventions are so extensive that they have been seen to constitute “mini-
treaties” on mutual legal assistance. Thus, it will be sensible to identify the party
states to the conventions in the Asian and Pacific region.
According to the latest information available as of February 18, 2005, 170 states in
the world are parties to the 1988 Convention, and the TOC Convention has 147
signatories and 99 parties.5 Parties and signatories in the region are as follows
(emphasis added to fourteen countries that are parties to both the 1988 Convention
and the TOC Convention):
A. 1988 Convention
35 parties: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei Darussalam, China, Fiji, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.
B. TOC Convention
15 parties: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, China,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Federal State
of Micronesia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Tajikistan, Turkey,
and Uzbekistan.
15 signatories: Cambodia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Nauru, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
Bilateral Extradition treaties and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Between
Countries in the Asian and Pacific Region and their Basic Legal Systems
As an American reference librarian stated in her useful guide about researching
multilateral and bilateral treaties, “finding bilateral treaties where the U.S. [or your
                                                     
5 See Monthly Status of Treaty Adherence [1], 1 January 2005 (www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/treaty_adherence.html) and United Nations Conventions against Transnational
Organized Crime (www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures_ convention.html ).
63
country] is not a signatory is a difficult task and could take a fair amount of time”6
Sometimes the current legal status or scope of a bilateral treaty could be ambiguous
even between possible party states. This is often the case when a state becomes
newly independent or merges with another state.7
An example is a recent dispute between Thailand and Malaysia on whether they
have an enforceable extradition treaty. According to a British news network, “Thai
PM Thaksin Shinawatra told reporters he wanted Malaysia to extradite Abdul
Rahman Ahmad, also known as Chae Kumae Kuteh.”8 Australian radio reported:
Mr. Surakiart [the Thai Foreign Minister] says the two countries have a long-
standing treaty that would allow for his extradition. But the Malaysian Prime
Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, has said the suspect is a Malaysian citizen, and
that the two countries do not have an extradition treaty.9 Apparently the two
governments had softened their stance by early February, 2005. A global television
network of Thailand reported: “Even though Malaysia has an extradition treaty with
Thailand, it depends on Malaysia whether or not it wishes to send its citizen to face
criminal charges in Thailand,” the [Thailand’s Office of the Attorney General’s]
spokesman said.10 In the meantime, Malaysia’s online newspaper reported: Foreign
Minister Surakiart Sathirathai has written two letters to his Malaysian counterpart,
Datuk Syed Hamid Albar…“I will write back to him and thank him for re-affirming
the close relationship between Thailand and Malaysia,” Syed Hamid said…“It is just
a letter which stated Thailand’s interest to have Chae Kumae
extradited.”…Yesterday, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmed Badawi said
the Attorney-General’s Chambers would study whether an extradition treaty ever
existed between Malaysia and Thailand. Abdullah, who is also Internal Security
Minister, said he had not been aware of the existence of any extradition treaty
between the countries, but noted that there was an arrangement during the British
administration of the country that allowed fugitives to be extradited to Thailand. The
Thai Government’s claim for the extradition of Chae Kumae is anchored on its belief
that an agreement between Britain and Thailand in 1911 is still enforceable.11
                                                     
6 See Stefanie Weigmann, International Legal Studies Library at Harvard Law School,
Researching Non-U.S. Treaties, May 15, 2001
(www.llrx.com/features/non_ustreaty.html ).
7 The U.S. Department of State publishes a comprehensive list of treaties and other
international agreements of the United States on record in the Department. The note in the
list under the name of “Vietnam” states: The agreements listed below were in force
between the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam (South Viet-Nam). The status of
these agreements remains under review by the United States. See Treaties in Force
(www.state.gov/s/l/c8455.htm).
8 See Malaysia holds Thailand militant, BBC News world edition, last updated on January
27, 2005 ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4211603.stm).
9 See Thailand to ask Malaysia to hand over suspected militant, online news of ABC Radio
Australia, last updated on February 1, 2005
(www.abc.net.au/ra/news/stories/s1293857.htm).
10 See Thai attorney express concern over Malaysian extradition case, MCOT, last updated
February 4, 2005, (www.mcot.org/print.php?nid=35483).
11 See Thailand moves to end war of words, New Straits Times, February 9, 2005
(www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/Saturday/National/NST32234194.txt/Article/inde
xb_html).
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Identifying all relevant bilateral treaties in the Asian and Pacific region is very
difficult, especially with regard to the many countries in the region that were once
colonized. Instead of endeavouring to achieve this ambitious goal, it might be useful
to give examples by listing bilateral treaties signed and/or ratified by some countries
in the region and touch upon their domestic legal systems and policies, on the basis
of reliable sources accessible to the public or available to the author in his capacity
as a UNAFEI professor. One example is a common law and commonwealth country:
Australia. The other three are generally categorized as civil law countries or
countries primarily influenced by the civil law tradition: China, Japan and Thailand.
A. Australia
The Australian Legal Information Institute has developed and maintained a
comprehensive national Internet database which is supported by the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade and is freely accessible to the public.12 Australia has
concluded numerous treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, mainly with
countries of Western Europe and the Americas. Modern treaties negotiated by
Australia that are found through a search of the database under the subject of
“extradition” or “mutual assistance in criminal matters” and with governments in the
Asian and Pacific region are as follows (emphasis added):
• Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons between the
Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong [1997]
• Extradition Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia [1995]
• Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of the Philippines
[1991]
• Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of Korea [1991]
• Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong
Kong concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters [1999]
• Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters [1999]
• Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Philippines on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters [1993]
• Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Korea on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters [1993]
An outline of Australia’s legal system for extradition and mutual legal assistance is
as follows:13
• Australia’s extradition relations take four forms: bilateral treaties, including
modern treaties negotiated by Australia and treaties inherited from the United
                                                     
12 See Australian Treaties Library (www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/ ).
13 See Report 40 Extradition – a review of Australia’s law and policy, Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, August 2001
(www.aph.gov.au/HOUSE/committee/JSCT/reports/report40/report40.pdf); Inquiry Into
Australia’s Extradition Law, Policy and Practice, Submission by the Attorney-General’s
Department (www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/extradition/agd.pdf); and Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters Manual, The Attorney-General’s Department, July 8,
2002
(www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Criminaljusticehome.nsf/Page/695AEB7823AA0757CA256B
A40012127E?OpenDocument ).
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Kingdom;14 non-treaty relations with Commonwealth countries under the
London Scheme;15 non-treaty relations with non-Commonwealth countries based
on understandings of reciprocity; and extradition provisions in multilateral
treaties on specific classes of crime.
• The Extradition Act 1988 may be applied to countries with which Australia has
no extradition treaty. Although the principal use of non-treaty application of the
Act is to provide for extradition between Australia and other Commonwealth
countries, the Act has also been applied to a small number of non-
Commonwealth countries on a non-treaty basis. Extradition to New Zealand is
governed by a separate regime set out in the Act, on a simple “backing of
warrants” system on substantially the same basis as extradition among the States
and Territories of Australia, in which all decisions are taken by the courts.16
• The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 came into force in 1988.
The Act is administered by the International Branch of the Criminal Law
Division in the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, which performs
the functions of the central authority in respect of all incoming and outgoing
mutual assistance request. Between the passage of the Act and the amendments
introduced in 1996, Australia has undertaken a comprehensive mutual assistance
treaty negotiation programme. Following the amendments, treaty negotiations
will be undertaken only with countries with which Australia has substantial
mutual assistance traffic and where a treaty would significantly facilitate such
traffic, or with countries that require a treaty for their own domestic reasons.
Also following the 1996 amendments, assistance may be granted to a requesting
foreign country with which there is no treaty in force on a reciprocal basis.
B. China
Since 1996, UNAFEI has conducted the Special Seminar for Senior Criminal Justice
Officials of the People’s Republic of China. The 8th Special Seminar was held from
February 24 to March 14, 2003 and its main theme was International Cooperation in
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. One of the Chinese participants on this
seminar was Mr. Guo Jianan, Director of the Institute for Crime Prevention, Ministry
of Justice of China. Director Guo stated in his paper titled Situation, Problems and
Strategies of International Cooperation in Combating Transnational Organized
Crime within the Framework of UN Conventions:
                                                     
14 The above-mentioned Report 40 Extradition states in Appendix D – Australia’s
extradition relations: Australia regards itself as having succeeded to 20 UK extradition
treaties (not counting those which have been displaced by a modern treaty or non-treaty
arrangement) which now cover 25 countries…In many cases it is unclear whether these
countries regard themselves as having an extradition treaty in place with Australia.
15 The above-mentioned Inquiry Into Australia’s Extradition Law states in Executive
Summary: In 1966, the Commonwealth adopted the London Scheme, a non-treaty
arrangement under which members would enact legislation to enable them to extradite to
each other in accordance with agreed principles.
16 The above-mentioned Inquiry into Australia’s Extradition Law states in Background to
Extradition: The reasons for the lesser requirements [for New Zealand] are: the ease and
frequency of travel between Australia and New Zealand; the close economic and political
relationship between Australia and New Zealand; and the shared legal and political
traditions of the two countries.
66
Since adopting its “Open and Reform Policy” in the 80s of last century, China
has also carried such a policy in the area of criminal justice. Its cooperation with
other countries in this regard starts from scratch, develops fast and increases
dramatically. Up to June of 2002, China has signed treaties on judicial assistance
in civil and criminal matters with 18 countries, treaties on judicial assistance in
criminal matters with 9 countries, treaties on extradition with 19 countries and
treaties on transfer of sentenced person [with two countries].
Treaties that are found in his List of countries that signed relevant treaties with
China and with countries in the Asian and Pacific region are as follows17:
1. Treaty on Extradition18
• Uzbekistan (Took effect on September 29, 2002)
• [Republic of] Korea (Took effect on April 12, 2002)
• Thailand (Took effect on March 7, 1999)
• Kazakhstan (Took effect on January 10, 1999)
• Mongolia (Took effect on January 10, 1999)
• Laos (Signed on February 4, 2002)
• Philippines (Signed on October 30, 2001)
• Cambodia (Signed on February 9, 1999
• Kyrgyzstan (Signed on April 27, 1998)
2. Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters19
• Philippines (Took effect on April 28, 2001)
• Indonesia (Took effect on February 28, 2001)
• [Republic of] Korea (Took effect on March 24, 2000)
3. Treaty on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Criminal Matters20
• Laos (Took effect on December 15, 2001)
• Vietnam (Took effect on December 25, 1999)
• Tajikistan (Took effect on September 2, 1998)
                                                     
17 Although this paper relies on a relatively new list of Director Guo, a similar but slightly
different table can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.
See Table on Dates of Signing and Effective Dates of Bilateral Judicial Assistance
Treaties (Updated May 30, 2003) (www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2631/
t39537.htm).
18 As for non-Asian and non-Pacific regions, Chinese treaties on extradition with Ukraine,
Romania, Belarus, Bulgaria and Russia had come into effect by July 2000; and had been
signed with Lithuania, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Tunisia and Peru by June
2002.
19 As for non-Asian and non-Pacific regions, treaties on judicial assistance in criminal
matters with the United States, Bulgaria and Canada had come into effect by March 2001;
and had been signed with Estonia, Tunisia and Colombia by June 2002.
20 As for non-Asian and non-Pacific regions, treaties on judicial assistance in civil and
criminal matters with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Belarus, Cuba, Ukraine, Russia, Romania
and Poland had come into effect by June 1996; and was signed with Lithuania on May 4,
1999.
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• Uzbekistan (Took effect on August 29, 1998)
• Kyrgyzstan (Took effect on September 26, 1997)
• Turkey (Took effect on October 26 1995)
• Kazakhstan (Took effect on July 11, 1995)
• Mongolia (Took effect on October 29, 1990)
As a recent development, the People’s Daily reported: China and Thailand on Friday
[January 21, 2005] exchanged instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the
People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Thailand on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters. The treaty will take effect on Feb. 20. (Emphasis
added).21
An outline of China’s legal system for extradition and mutual legal assistance is as
follows:22
• China launched international judicial assistance in criminal matters when it
signed the civil and criminal judicial assistance treaty with Poland in 1987.
• China enacted the Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2000
which consists of 55 articles and is the most advanced and comprehensive law in
China in the field of international judicial assistance. The Law, bilateral treaties
and multilateral treaties form the legal basis for extradition. China can cooperate
with a foreign state as a matter of comity or mutual benefit even in the absence
of a treaty. The Extradition Law designates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a
contact point with a foreign state.
• China revised the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China in
1996 and added one new article on mutual legal assistance to the Law, namely
Article 17. This article provides: In accordance with the international treaties
concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or on the principle of
mutual benefit, the Chinese judicial authorities and their foreign counterparts
may seek assistance in criminal justice from each other. Although the simple
language of this article enables authorities to interpret it in a flexible manner,
some Chinese officials stated that more comprehensive laws on mutual legal
assistance should be enacted.
C. Japan
The only treaty that Japan has signed with a country in the Asian and Pacific region
is as follows (emphasis added):
• Treaty on Extradition between Japan and the Republic of Korea (Entered into
force June 21, 2002)
                                                     
21 See China, Thailand establish mutual judicial assistance in criminal matters, People’s
Daily Online, updated January 21, 2005 (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/21/
eng 20050121_171503.html).
22 This brief description is based on the papers of Chinese senior officials who participated
in the above-mentioned 8th Special Seminar on international cooperation at UNAFEI in
2003: Mr. Huang Feng, Senior Counselor for the Department of Judicial Assistance and
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice; Mr. Zhu Weide, Senior Judge, Supreme People’s
Court; Mr. Xue Jianxiang, Deputy Chief, Jiangsu Higher People’s Court; Mr.Chen
Jianhua, Assistant Prosecutor, Supreme People’s Prosecution Service; and Mr. Ma.
Hanquan, Director, People’s Prosecution Service of Shanxi Province.
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An outline of Japan’s legal system for extradition and mutual legal assistance is as
follows:
Japan has only two extradition treaties in force: the above-mentioned recent treaty
with the Republic of Korea and the Treaty on Extradition between Japan and the
United States of America which came into effect in 1980. Japan signed its first
mutual legal assistance treaty, namely the Treaty between Japan and the United
States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, on August 5,
2003. This treaty is expected to be in force in the near future after necessary
ratification proceedings.
• Japanese laws allow, even in the absence of a treaty, both the extradition of a
non-national fugitive and the provision of mutual legal assistance, even when
being requested to carry out compulsory measures including search and seizure,
to a requesting state if the state assures reciprocity. Primarily because of such a
flexible legal system, that enables Japan as a requesting state to assure
reciprocity to a foreign state, Japan has not been very active in concluding
extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties23.
• Japan enacted the Law of Extradition with 34 articles which entered into force in
1953 and the latest amendment was made in 1993. A request for extradition is
submitted through diplomatic channels.
• The principal law on an incoming mutual legal assistance request is the Law for
International Assistance in Investigation which entered into force in 1980. The
Law was amended in 2004 in order to implement the obligations under the
newly signed Japan – U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and at the same time
facilitate judicial cooperation with other countries. The Law has 26 articles after
the amendment and includes newly introduced systems or measures regarding
the central authority,24 prisoner transfer for testimony or other purposes and the
certification of business records and so on. This amendment is expected to
facilitate more active treaty negotiation by the Japanese government in the
future.
D. Thailand
The international Affairs Department of the Office of the Attorney General of
Thailand issued the fourth edition of the manual titled Laws related to Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters in March 2002. According to the list in this manual,
Thailand has concluded ten extradition treaties with Asian, European and North
American countries and five treaties on mutual legal assistance with European and
North American countries. Treaties that are found in this list and with countries in
the Asian region are as follows (emphasis added):25
                                                     
23 Perhaps one of the other possible reasons is that Japan has not had substantial extradition
or mutual assistance traffic with foreign states. In spite of above-mentioned flexible legal
system and Japan’s willingness in assisting foreign states, Japan extradited only 14
fugitives in accordance with requests from foreign states in ten years from 1994 to 2003
and received only 225 mutual legal assistance requests in the same period. See Hanzai-
Hakusho (The White Paper on Crime) 2004, Research and Training Institute, Ministry of
Justice.
24 The Minister of Justice will be the central authority and directly receive all incoming
requests for mutual legal assistance, provided that an applicable treaty to which Japan is a
party provides so.
25 As for non-Asian and non-Pacific regions, Thai extradition treaties with the United States,
Belgium and the United Kingdom entered into force on May 17, 1991, January 14, 1936
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• Treaty Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia on
Extradition (Entered into force March 31, 2001)
• Treaty Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh Relating to Extradition (Entered into force March 19, 2001)
• Treaty on Extradition Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic (Entered into force March 1, 2001)
• Treaty on Extradition Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic of
Korea (Entered into force February 15, 2001)
• Treaty Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People’s Republic of China on
Extradition (Entered into force March 7, 2001)26
• Treaty Between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Relating to Extradition (Entered
into force December 7, 1984)
• Treaty Between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia Relating to Extradition (Entered into
force June 18, 1980)
An outline of Thai legal system for extradition and mutual legal assistance is as
follows:27
• Thailand, which is one of the civil law countries, promulgated the Extradition Act
B.E. 2472 in 1929. Unlike “treaty prerequisite countries”, Thailand may
extradite a fugitive even in the absence of a treaty. A request for extradition from
a foreign state, whether or not there is a bilateral extradition treaty, is sent
through diplomatic channels.
• Since the Extradition Act, which has been used for more than seven decades, “is
no longer able to cope with modern concepts and the progress of contemporary
extradition”, the Cabinet “passed a resolution setting up a Special Committee to
review and revise laws related to extradition including the Extradition Act” on
April 1, 1997.28
• Thailand had executed a mutual legal assistance request from a foreign state in
accordance with the “general principle of international law” which includes
comity, reciprocity and “rules of due process” until 1992, when Thailand
promulgated a new and comprehensive law with 42 sections on this matter,
namely the Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters B.E. 2535. Assistance
may be granted to a requesting state even in the absence of a treaty “provided
that such state commits to assist Thailand under the similar manner when
                                                                                                                                        
and March 4, 1911, respectively; and mutual legal assistance treaties with Norway,
France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States had come into force by
September 2000.
26 As stated above, the Treaty between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of
Thailand on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters will take effect on February, 20
2005 (emphasis added).
27 See Sirisak Tiyapan, Expert State Attorney, Legal Counsel Department, Office of the
Attorney General, Thailand, Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Thailand,
Resource Material Series No. 57, Work Product of the 114th International Seminar
“International Cooperation to Combat Transnational Organized Crime – with Special
Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition,” UNAFEI, September 2001
(www.unafei.or.jp/english/ pdf/PDF_rms_all/no57.pdf).
28 According to the above-mentioned mutual legal assistance manual, apparently the
revision of the Extradition Act had not been finalized by March 2002.
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requested.” The Attorney General is designated by the Act as the Central
Authority of mutual legal assistance. A foreign state must submit a request
through diplomatic channels unless it has a mutual legal assistance treaty with
Thailand.
Bilateral Extradition Treaties and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Between
Countries in the Asian and Pacific Region and the United States of
America
The United States has conducted one of the most active campaigns to negotiate
bilateral extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). The
United States had “extradition treaties with about one hundred and eleven (111)
countries”, had “thirty-one (31) MLATs in force”, and had “signed MLATs with
another twenty-three (23) countries” as of early 2000.29 Since the laws of the United
States “require that there be an extradition treaty in force before extradition can take
place”,30 a country that does not have an extradition treaty in force with the United
States will not be granted an extradition request. Although the mutual execution of
letters rogatory is possible under its laws without a treaty on judicial assistance, the
United States has made the negotiation of MLATs in Asia a particular high priority,
in part to maximize its ability to address transnational organized crime problems.31
Treaties that are found in the above-mentioned Treaties in Force of the U.S.
Department of State under the category of “extradition” or “judicial assistance” and
with governments in the Asian and Pacific region are as follows (emphasis added to
seven governments that have both an extradition treaty and a MLAT in force with
the United States):
A. Extradition
• Sri Lanka (Entered into force January 12, 2001)
• [Republic of] Korea (Entered into force December 20, 1999)
• India (Entered into force July 21, 1999)
• Hong Kong (Entered into force January 21, 1998)
• Malaysia (Entered into force June 2, 1997)
• Philippines (Entered into force November 22, 1996)
• Thailand (Entered into force May 17, 1991)
• Turkey (Treaty on extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters;
entered into force January 1, 1981)
• Japan (Entered into force March 26, 1980)
                                                     
29 See John E. Harris, Director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice, International Cooperation in Fighting Transnational
Organized Crime: Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, above-
mentioned Resource Material Series No. 57, UNAFEI. Mr. Harris also stated that “many
other countries have begun active campaigns to negotiate MLATs, too, notably the
Philippines, [the Republic of] Korea, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom”
(emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Id.
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• Kiribati (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom;
entered into force January 21, 1977)
• Tuvalu (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom;
entered into force January 21, 1977)
• Australia (Entered into force May 8, 1976)
• New Zealand (Entered into force December 8, 1970)
• Singapore (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom; entered into force June 24, 1935. Agreement confirming the
continuance in force between the United States and Singapore of the extradition
treaty; entered into force June 10, 1969.)
• Pakistan (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom,
made applicable to India, from March 9, 1942)
• Burma32(Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom;
applicable to Burma from November 1, 1941)
• Nauru (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom;
applicable to Australia, including Nauru, from August 30, 1935)
• Fiji (Extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom;
entered into force June 24, 1935)
B. Judicial Assistance33
• Georgia (Agreement on co-operation in the field of law enforcement; entered into
force June 18, 2001)
• China (Entered into force March 8, 2001)
• Singapore (Agreement concerning the investigation of drug trafficking offences
and the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of drug
trafficking; entered into force February 12, 2001)
• Hong Kong (Entered into force January 21, 2000)
• Australia (Entered into force September 30, 1999)
• [Republic of] Korea (Entered into force May 23, 1997)
• Philippines (Entered into force November 22, 1996)
• Thailand (Entered into force June 10, 1993)
• Turkey (Treaty on extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters;
entered into force January 1, 1981)
Regional Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Among ASEAN Member States
On November 29, 2004, the Ministry of Law of the Republic of Singapore put out a
press release on a newly signed regional mutual legal assistance treaty (emphasis
added):34
                                                     
32 Myanmar is referred to as “Burma” in the documents of the U.S. State Department.
33 For the purpose of this paper, U.S. treaties on judicial assistance will include MLATs both
in the form of treaty and agreement and an agreement in the field of law enforcement
under the category of “judicial assistance”, but exclude agreements on procedures for
mutual assistance in connection with matters relating to specific aircraft corporations.
34 See Press Release on Signing of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, Ministry of Law
(http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/
GOVI-677FJL?OpenDocument).
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1. The Attorney-General Mr. Chan Sek Keong today signed, on behalf of the
Republic of Singapore, a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
amongst countries in this region. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam also signed the Treaty. The signing ceremony
was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur.
2. The Treaty provides for the parties to provide legal assistance in criminal matters
to each other. Such assistance includes the taking of evidence, service of documents
and recovery of proceeds of crime. All assistance rendered under this Treaty would
be subject to the domestic laws of the respective countries. In other words, assistance
will be rendered only if provided for under the domestic laws of a country, and if the
relevant safeguards in those provisions are satisfied.
3. Singapore views this Treaty as an important step in the fight against terrorism and
transnational organized crime. This is the first treaty among ASEAN member states
on legal cooperation, and will form the basis for closer cooperation among our law
enforcement agencies in tackling serious crimes. It facilitates the investigation of
crimes that occurred in Singapore, even where the perpetrators or the proceeds of the
crime are outside Singapore.
4. The Treaty will come into effect later, after ratification by the respective
Governments.
This press release only states that eight ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) member states signed the treaty on that day and does not say anything about
the positions of the remaining two members. However, according to a newspaper
article issued the next day in Singapore, “Thailand and Myanmar were involved in
negotiations and are understood to be considering signing it [the treaty] as well”
(emphasis added).35
ASEAN had annually held the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM).
Apparently this matter had been touched upon in a couple of ASLOM meetings as
one of the legal matters to be discussed. The treaty was “first proposed by Malaysia
at the 8th ASLOM”36 held in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia on or around July 3, 2003, and
at least the Philippines immediately and officially welcomed the proposal.37 After
making this proposal, Malaysia had “initiated and hosted two meetings of like-
minded countries to formulate this Treaty”38 by August 2004, when the 9th ASLOM
Meeting was held in Brunei Darussalam. Apparently the signing ceremony of “the
first treaty among ASEAN member states on legal cooperation” on November 29,
2004 was the result of this relatively new initiative.
                                                     
35 See S’pore signs regional legal assistance pact, the Straits Times, November 30, 2004, at
H2.
36 See Joint Press Statement of the 9th ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM) 23-24
August 2004, Brunei Darussalam (www.aseansec.org/16336).
37 See ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance - Major Contribution to Regional Efforts
to Fight Terrorism, Press Release, Department of Foreign Affairs, the Philippines, July 3,
2003 (www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2003/jul/pr327.htm).
38 See above-mentioned Joint Press Statement of the 9th ASLOM.
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Conclusion
• The Asian and Pacific region, comprising 48 countries, is one of the most diverse
regions in the world and accordingly legal systems and policies regarding
extradition and mutual legal assistance significantly differ between countries.
• Only 14 countries, 29 per cent of all countries in the region, are parties to both
the 1988 Convention and the TOC Convention, because most of the other
countries have not ratified the latter, which was adopted in November 2000.
Although 15 signatories to the TOC Convention are expected to ratify it
relatively soon,39 the remaining countries should be encouraged to sign and
ratify it. The international community, especially the United Nations and its
PNIs, should provide technical assistance to developing countries that are
willing to effectively implement the TOC convention.40
• Since the 1990s a bilateral treaty network, both on extradition and mutual legal
assistance, has been developed in the region. Efforts made by active countries
including Australia, China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand
should be commended and encouraged to continue. The positive role that some
active non-Asian-Pacific countries, including the United States, have played in
the region should also be noted. Although bilateral treaties, by nature, are
negotiated and concluded according to the specific needs of the states in
question, such treaties facilitate a country in reforming its domestic laws and at
the same time they open the gate for future treaty partners. Bilateral treaty
negotiations also deepen each country’s understanding of the other’s legal
system and practices.
• Since negotiating and updating numerous bilateral treaties requires significant
time, expertise and resources, it may not be feasible to expect all countries in the
region to enter into them in the near future. Regional (multilateral) treaties could
be a possible solution to this problem, provided that respective countries have a
longstanding close relationship, as in the ASEAN example.
• Commonwealth countries in the Asian and Pacific region41 have an existing
scheme for facilitating extradition. These countries should try to reach out to
non-Commonwealth countries. This is especially the case when Commonwealth
countries maintain the “treaty prerequisite” policy in judicial cooperation, since
                                                     
39 For example, the Japanese Cabinet obtained the approval of the Diet, the sole law-making
organ of the State, for the ratification of the TOC Convention in May 2003, and has
submitted a bill to the Diet in order to implement the Convention. The bill is under
consideration by the Diet and hopefully will be passed in the near future.
40 UNAFEI and the UN Center for International Crime Prevention (CICP) jointly organized
a two-day seminar in Osaka, Japan, in August 2002 for senior officials from some 20
countries in the Asian and Pacific region in order to promote the ratification of the TOC
in the region. UNAFEI also conducted an international training course on transnational
organized crime from September 10 to November 2, 2001 in which 11 officials of Japan
and 16 officials from developing countries participated; and ten of them were from the
Asian and Pacific region. See Work Product of the 119th International Training Course,
Resource Material Series No 59 (www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/PublicationsRMS.htm).
41 The Commonwealth is an association of 53 countries. The following 17 Asian and Pacific
region countries are members: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji Islands,
India, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See Members,
Commonwealth Secretariat, February 18, 2005 (www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/
Internal.asp?NodeID =20724).
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it is not feasible if a requesting state is required to negotiate the terms and
conditions of a treaty or an agreement with such countries prior to submitting a
request, especially when the matter is urgent. Australia’s flexible approach in
terms of its non-treaty basis judicial cooperation should be commended and
other countries should be encouraged to take a similar approach.
• In order to maintain a cooperative relationship, judicial cooperation should not be
politicized. If such matters are dealt with from a political point of view, a more
powerful country will often prevail over a less powerful one. It will not be a wise
policy even for most powerful nations, since judicial cooperation will be
successful only when a requested state is willing to cooperate with a requesting
state, and officials will be unwilling to cooperate when they are forced to do so.
It seems that Malaysia and Thailand handled the above-mentioned sensitive
extradition case in a very wise manner by ending the political dispute at the
earliest stage possible and allowing the appropriate authorities responsible for
criminal justice matters to negotiate without political interference.
• Treaties and domestic laws always leave room for interpretation and many
matters arising in practice are not explicitly set forth. Close and friendly
communications on a daily basis between designated authorities of countries are
indispensable in finding the most constructive solution. The system of a central
authority, seen in many mutual legal assistance treaties, notably in U.S. MLATs,
is a good practice in this regard. Another possible measure is seconding law
enforcement or judicial experts to foreign countries so that they can discuss
judicial cooperation matters with their foreign counterparts on a face to face
basis.42 The international community, especially the United Nations and its PNIs,
might be able to facilitate such face to face communications among officials in
charge of judicial cooperation.43
                                                     
42 Japan’s public prosecutors are seconded to its Embassies in China, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States to deal with legal matters, including extradition and
mutual legal assistance. The Republic of Korea conducts a similar practice. The recent
success in concluding the Japan – Korea Extradition Treaty was the result of the
significant contributions of successive Korean legal counsellors (prosecutors) working for
their Embassy in Tokyo in facilitating the mutual understanding and cooperation between
the two neighbouring countries.
43 UNAFEI has itself assumed this mission by conducting numerous international courses
and seminars for more than 40 years.
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Extradition Measures
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Extradition can be defined broadly as the surrendering of a fugitive to a requesting
State for the purpose of prosecution or enforcement of a sentence.
Extradition emerged as a tool of judicial and prosecutorial cooperation in the late
1800s. Particularly in the period after World War II, the increase in the number of
extradition agreements was significant.
Basis for Extradition
The basis for extradition can either be a bilateral treaty or agreement between two
sovereign nations, or extradition can be provided on the basis of multilateral treaties.
Bilateral treaties between States are usually not confined to a specific type of crime,
but rather they are limited to offences of a certain seriousness, which is usually
manifested in the punishment offences attract under domestic criminal law of the
contracting states.
Multilateral conventions on extradition have been prepared within the framework of
a range of international organisations, including, in particular, the United Nations.
Provisions on extradition have been included in several international conventions
that deal with specific types of crime, including the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague Convention), the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal
Convention), the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency and the Protocol to that Convention, the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, the Single Convention against Narcotic Drugs, the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations’ and Associated Personnel, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platform
Located on the Continental Shelf, and the Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings.
The two most recent, and perhaps best-known examples are article 6 of the 1988
Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (knows as the Vienna Convention) and article 16 of the 2000 Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention).
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Article 16(1) of the Convention requires State Parties to allow foreign requests for
extradition of persons engaged in organised crime provided the alleged offence is
criminalised in the requesting and in the requested country (“dual criminality”).1
Article 16, which is based on the extradition provisions of the Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, enables Signatories to
seek extradition from other Member States of offenders charged with a Convention
offence, ie participation in an organised criminal group, money laundering or
corruption. Thus, the Convention operates as an extradition treaty in the absence of
other bilateral or multilateral agreements, article 16(4). If the countries involved do
have an existing mutual extradition treaty, the Convention offences “shall be deemed
to be included as an extraditable offence” in this treaty, article 16(3).2
Provisions in these and other international conventions include mechanisms to
enable Signatories to prosecute offenders of transnational organised crime and the
like in their territory or seek extradition of those who are located abroad (the
principle known as ‘aut dedere aut judicare’). In addition, bilateral and multinational
extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), other agreements over
judicial cooperation, and law enforcement memoranda of understanding (MoUs)
have been established to assert jurisdiction and prosecute criminals across
international borders.
The international conventions also allow countries to refuse extradition in a variety
of circumstances, for example, if they have no bilateral extradition with the
requesting country,3 if they suspect, that the person will be prosecuted for reasons of
gender, ethnicity, nationality, race, religion or political opinion,4 or if their domestic
laws prohibit the extradition of their own nationals.5 Extradition can further be
refused in the absence of dual criminality.6 Alternatively, the requested country can
surrender the person under the condition he/she will return to serve the sentence.7
Further, extradition may be refused if the requested country considers the offence
“political” or “military”,8 or if it does not consider the alleged offence sufficiently
serious to warrant extradition and severe penalties.
                                                     
1 For proposals and contributions during the elaboration of art 16 see UN Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Organised Crime, Proposals and
contributions received from Governments, UN Doc A/AC.254/5/Add.20 (11 Feb 2000).
2 See also art 16(6): Countries that use the Convention as a basis for extradition (in lieu of
an extradition treaty) shall recognise the Convention offences as extraditable offences.
3 See, for example, art 16(4) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; art 6(3)
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
4 See, for example, art 16(14) Convention against Transnational Organised Crimel art 6(6)
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Cf
Faiza Patel, “Crime without Frontiers: A Proposal for an International Narcotics Court”
(1989-90) 22 NYU Journal Int’l Law & Politics 709 at 722-723.
5 Cf art 16(7) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Cf M Cherif Bassiouni
& Edward M Wise, Aut Dedere aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite in
International Law (Kluwer, 1995) 10, 62; Faiza Patel, “Crime without Frontiers: A
Proposal for an International Narcotics Court” (1989-90) 22 NYU Journal Int’l Law &
Politics 709 at 721-722.
6 See, for example, art 16(1) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
7 See, for example, art 16(11) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
8 Cf s 7 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). See generally M Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M Wise,
Aut Dedere aut Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute or Extradite in International Law
(Kluwer, 1995) 10-11.
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Domestic Perspectives
At the time of writing (April 2005) Australia was party to 35 bilateral extradition
treaties. Further, special arrangements exist between Australia and all members of
the Commonwealth of Nations and 17 other countries. Moreover, Australia is a
Signatory to 15 international conventions which give rise to extradition obligations.
The most recent additions to the list of bilateral extradition entered into by Australia
is the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of South Africa
which entered into force in 2001.9 Under article 1 of the treaty, “each Contracting
State agrees to extradite to the other, in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, any persons who are wanted for prosecution or the imposition or
enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offence.” For
the purposes of this treaty, under article 2(1) “extraditable offences are offences
however described which are punishable under the laws of both Contracting States
by imprisonment for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe
penalty. Where the request for extradition relates to a person convicted of such an
offence who is wanted for the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment,
extradition shall be granted only if a period of at least six months of such penalty
remains to be served.”
At the national level, international extradition is in most countries governed by
extradition acts or equivalent legislation. In Australia, the Extradition Act 1988
(Cth)10 codifies extradition practice. The Act applies to various countries under a
variety of different extradition relationships. The Act is the Australian
implementation of its extraditions obligation under bilateral and multilateral treaties.
Section 3 states the purpose of the Act:
S 3 Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) Principal objects of Act
The principal objects of this Act are:
(a) to codify the law relating to the extradition of persons from Australia to
extradition countries and New Zealand and, in particular, to provide for
proceedings by which courts may determine whether a person is to be, or is
eligible to be, extradited, without determining the guilt or innocence of the
person of an offence;
(b) to facilitate the making of requests for extradition by Australia to other
countries; and
(c) to enable Australia to carry out its obligations under extradition treaties.
The application of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) is limited to so-called ‘extraditable
offences’ as defined in section 5 of the Act:
extradition offence means:
(a) in relation to a country other than Australia—an offence against a law of
the country:
                                                     
9 2001 ATS 19.
10 No 4 of 1988 (as amended).
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(i) for which the maximum penalty is death or imprisonment, or other
deprivation of liberty, for a period of not less than 12 months; or
(ii) if the offence does not carry a penalty under the law of the country—the
conduct constituting which is, under an extradition treaty in relation to the
country, required to be treated as an offence for which the surrender of
persons is permitted by the country and Australia; or
(b) in relation to Australia or a part of Australia—an offence against a law of
Australia, or a law in force in the part of Australia, for which the
maximum penalty is death or imprisonment, or other deprivation of
liberty, for a period of not less than 12 months.
Most notably, extradition offences are only those which attract a minimum penalty
of 12 months imprisonment (formerly referred to as felonies) unless the exception in
subparagraph (ii) applies.
Part II of the Act, sections 12 to 27 set out the regulations for extradition requests
made by Australia to other countries. Part III, sections 27 to 39 of the Extradition
Act 1988 (Cth) contains specific provisions which apply for extradition to New
Zealand. The remaining part, Part IV, sections 40-53 of the Act deal with extradition
to Australia from other countries.
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APPENDIX A
Article 16 Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
Extradition
1. This article shall apply to the offences covered by this Convention or in cases
where an offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), involves an
organized criminal group and the person who is the subject of the request for
extradition is located in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the
offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both
the requesting State Party and the requested State Party.
2. If the request for extradition includes several separate serious crimes, some of
which are not covered by this article, the requested State Party may apply this article
also in respect of the latter offences.
3. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included
as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties.
States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
4. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no
extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in
respect of any offence to which this article applies.
5. States Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall:
(a) At the time of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval of
or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations
whether they will take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on
extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and
(b) If they do not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on
extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition with other
States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.
6. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences
between themselves.
7. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the domestic law of
the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia,
conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the
grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition.
8. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite
extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in
respect of any offence to which this article applies.
9. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the
requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant
and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take a person whose
80
extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other
appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at extradition proceedings.
10. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not
extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on
the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party
seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take
their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any
other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that State Party. The States
Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and
evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution.
11. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or
otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will
be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or
proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought and that
State Party and the State Party seeking the extradition of the person agree with this
option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, such conditional extradition
or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 10
of this article.
12. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the
person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the requested Party shall, if
its domestic law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law,
upon application of the requesting Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence
that has been imposed under the domestic law of the requesting Party or the
remainder thereof.
13. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection
with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and
guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party in the territory of which
that person is present.
14. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the
request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on
account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s
position for any one of these reasons.
15. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground that the
offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
16. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where appropriate,
consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample opportunity to
present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation.
17. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or
arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.
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Introduction and Background
In this paper Southern Africa is used to refer to the region that consists of the 13
member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).1 The
paper attempts to elucidate some of the challenges facing the sub-region in the area
of law enforcement co-operation, including extradition. An attempt is also made to
highlight some of the initiatives that have been taken by governments in the sub-
region to address the challenges.
The SADC is part of several regional groupings in Africa that, in accordance with
the principles laid down in the Lagos Plan and the Abuja Treaty in 1991, is one of
the building blocks for the establishment of an African Economic Community. It
covers more than 9 million square kilometres.
In economic terms, the SADC region is underdeveloped. Some of the SADC
member states fall under the category of least developed countries.2 The Community
has meagre resources available to develop effective programmes relating to
education, health or law enforcement. The challenges of underdevelopment are
further aggravated by various factors including the sub-region’s vulnerability to
transnational organised crime. Organised crime groups operating in the region are
known to specialise in motor vehicle theft, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, fraud,
stock theft, illegal trade in precious stones and minerals, money laundering,
poaching and prostitution. Evidence is also emerging of an ever-increasing
involvement of organised crime groups in human trafficking.3 The syndicates are
using the region as a source, transit and destination point for illegal migrants. An
additional debilitating factor in some of the SADC Member States has been
prolonged conflict and wars.4
                                                     
1 SADC member countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Seychelles withdrew from SADC membership in August
2003.
2 Angola, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique and Malawi
3 Eye On Human Trafficking, Issue 2/May 2004
4 Especially in DRC and to a limited extent Angola which has had relative peace since
1992
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Establishment of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation
Organisation
Notwithstanding the complex political, economic and social challenges facing the
sub-region, SADC has achieved considerable success in enhancing law enforcement
co-operation. One of the landmark developments in law enforcement co-operation in
the sub-region is the formation in 1995 of the Southern African Regional Police
Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO). This initiative aimed at improving
law enforcement co-operation between states and co-ordination of strategies against
transnational crime has extended to other regions of the African continent. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, has
established the West African Police Chiefs’ committee through a formal agreement
that has been ratified by the Heads of State of the Member States. The agreement
facilitates the exchange of criminal information, restitution of stolen goods and
police-to-police return of offenders. East African States have a similar sub-regional
law enforcement body known as the East Africa Police Chiefs’ Co-operation
Organisation.5
SARPCCO was established in 1995 at the initiative of the chiefs of police of 11
Southern African countries. These were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
A twelfth country, Mauritius has since joined. The formation of SARPCCO was
primarily motivated by the escalation in cross-border criminal activities in the
region. The objectives of SARPCCO, as set out in its constitution, are as follows:
• The promotion, strengthening and perpetuation of co-operation and the fostering
of joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related
crimes with regional implications;
• The preparation and dissemination of relevant information on criminal activities
when necessary to benefit members in their attempts to contain crime in the
region;
• The regular reviewing of joint crime management strategies with the purpose of
accommodating changing national and regional needs and priorities;
• The efficient operation and management of criminal records and the efficient
joint monitoring of cross border crime by taking full advantage of the
appropriate facilities available from Interpol;
• The making of relevant recommendations to governments of member countries in
relation to matters affecting effective policing in the Southern African region;
and
• The execution of any relevant and appropriate acts and strategies for purposes of
promoting regional police co-operation and collaboration as dictated by regional
circumstances.
The objectives of SARPCCO are pursued through the following structures:
Council of Police Chiefs
The Council of Police Chiefs (CPC) is the supreme body of SARPCCO. It consists
of all Chiefs of Police of Member States. The CPC is responsible for formulating
                                                     
5 EAPCCO members are Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda
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policy on all sub-regional police co-operation matters to ensure the efficient
functioning of all SARPCCO structures and the attainment of the organisation’s
objectives. The CPC fulfils its mandate through issuing directives and prescribing
standard operating procedures. It meets once a year but additional meetings may be
convened under extraordinary circumstances. The CPC chairman is elected among
the police chiefs for a one-year term at the end of which a new chairman is elected
on a rotational basis. The implementation of the decisions taken by the CPC is
subject to the approval of ministers responsible for policing in each of the Member
States. A meeting of the ministers, therefore, follows each annual meeting of the
CPC.
SARPCCO Secretariat
In 1997, Interpol reinforced SARPCCO by establishing an Interpol sub-regional
Bureau for Southern Africa in Harare. The Interpol office also serves as the
secretariat of SARPCCO. The head of Interpol’s Sub-regional Bureau for Southern
Africa is also the head of the SARPCCO Secretariat. A desk has been established at
the Bureau to take care of all matters relating to SARPCCO. The desk is manned by
Liaison officers who are responsible for co-ordinating matters relating to cross-
border crime in the sub-region, including the monitoring of crime trends with the
aim of advising police chiefs on crime areas that require attention.
Permanent Co-ordinating Committee
The Permanent Co-ordinating Committee (PCC) consists of heads of the Criminal
Investigation Divisions (CIDs) of all Member States. The PCC is responsible for
formulating strategy to combat crime in the sub-region, creating operational
mechanisms, and dealing with any other matter referred to it by the CPC. The PCC
convenes as often as it deems it necessary. The PCC has been vested with the
authority to create sub-committees or ad hoc task units or even to co-opt heads of
other police components according to particular needs. The PCC is accountable to
the CPC and reports to its annual meeting or as otherwise requested.
Committees, Sub-committees and Task Units
The following permanent subcommittees have been established under Article 7 of
the SARPCCO Constitution:
• The Training Sub-Committee is tasked with the responsibility of identifying
training needs and putting together relevant curricula for the training of Police
officers throughout the sub-region; and
• The Legal Sub-Committee has the task of making recommendations in relation
to legislation, the ratification of international conventions, deportations and the
repatriation of exhibits.
Anti-Terrorism Early Warning Centre for Southern Africa
The Anti-Terrorism Early Warning Centre for Southern Africa was established in
2003. The centre has been created to gather and disseminate police intelligence
about terrorist threats in the sub-region. It focuses on terrorist groups, links between
them, financial and support networks, and factors that may increase the likelihood of
terrorist activity.6
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Multilateral Agreements on Law Enforcement Co-operation in Southern Africa
In an attempt to further improve its capacity to combat cross-border crime,
SARPCCO spearheaded the drafting of a multilateral agreement on law enforcement
co-operation. The initiative resulted in the signing of An Agreement on Co-operation
and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating on 30 September 1997 by
all Member States of SARPCCO, except Mauritius. The Agreement seeks to create
an environment conducive to the development of an advantageous working
relationship between the sub-region’s law enforcement agencies. In particular, it
makes provision for cross-border police operations including search and seizure of
exhibits, tracing and questioning of witnesses. Other instruments concluded by
SADC States to combat cross-border crime include the Protocol on Combating Illicit
Drugs (1996); SADC Protocol on Legal Affairs (2000); SADC Protocol Against
corruption (2001); SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and
other related Materials (2001); SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters (2002); and SADC Protocol on Extradition (2002).
Bilateral Law Enforcement Agreements
In addition to multilateral agreements on law enforcement co-operation, the sub-
region has effective bilateral law enforcement agreements. The South African
Government, for example, has concluded a number of bilateral agreements that have
facilitated the posting of crime liaison officers in Swaziland, Mozambique and
Namibia for the purpose of gathering, managing and coordinating drug and
organised crime related information.7 A bilateral law enforcement agreement signed
in 1992 between South Africa and Mozambique resulted in the commissioning of a
project known as ‘Kosi Bay’. The project involved the deployment of a South
African police unit in the Salamanga Bridge area, fifty kilometres inside
Mozambique for the purpose of combating cross-border crime. The unit has been
highly effective in curbing the smuggling of motor vehicles into Mozambique and
central Africa from South Africa. During its first months of operation, the unit
recovered 134 stolen motor vehicles, and 122 people were arrested. By 2005, the
unit had successfully sealed the hitherto notorious Salamanga Bridge smuggling
route. 8
Law Enforcement Agreements with Non-SADC Member States
Due to the increasing number of criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking,
being committed in the sub-region by transnational organised crime groups from
other parts of the world, SADC member States have recognised the need for law
enforcement cooperation with countries outside the sub-region. The South African
Government, for example, has concluded the following police cooperation
agreements with countries outside the SADC:
• Multilateral police cooperation agreements relating to the combating of drugs and
drug trafficking between South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.
• A memorandum of understanding in respect of the combating of drugs and drug
trafficking concluded with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
                                                     
7 Paper by F.J. Msutu (former Head of Interpol sub-regional Bureau, Harare), presentation
at SADC Regional Conference on responses to organised crime, South Africa, 26
February, 2001(Unpublished)
8 www.iol.co.za
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• General police co-operation agreements with the Russian Federation, France,
Hungary, the People’s Republic of China, Austria, Portugal, Turkey and
Bulgaria.
Confidence-building Measures
One of the immediate challenges facing government in Southern Africa in the early
1990s was the development of measures to build mutual trust among their police
organisations, as well as between police officers. As a result of the anti-colonial
struggle including the fight against minority rule in South Africa that occurred from
1960 to the early 1990s, poor relations and suspicion generally had characterised the
relations between police agencies in the sub-region. During the struggle, the sharing
of information between police organisations was strictly controlled by Governments
operating in an environment where a person could be classified as a criminal or a
freedom fighter depending on which side of the border he or she was located. When
the anti-colonial struggle ended and apartheid in South Africa was abolished in the
early 1990s, governments in the SADC recognised the need to complement the
signing of law enforcement co-operation agreements with programmes designed to
build mutual trust among their law enforcement organisations, as well as between
police officers. The promotion of sports and cultural exchange programmes among
police organisations in the sub-region is one of the confidence-building measures
that SARPCCO has successfully implemented.9
Cross-border Joint Operations
Since the establishment in 1997 of SARPCCO and the Interpol sub-regional Bureau
for Southern Africa, several cross-border joint operations have been conducted by
police organisations in the sub-region. These operations have focused on the most
common transnational crimes in the sub-region, such as motor vehicle theft, drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal dealing in precious stones, and organised crime
in general. Some of the notable joint operations undertaken since the formation of
SARPCCO and the Interpol sub-regional Bureau include the following:10
Operation Voyager 4 (V4)
This operation was undertaken between South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. It was launched at the beginning of 1997 with the objective of addressing
the problem of theft of motor vehicles. During the operation, 1,576 stolen vehicles
were seized and 143 suspects arrested.
Operation Midas
This operation was conducted in 1998 between Lesotho, Mauritius. Swaziland and
South Africa. Its objectives were to address motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking,
firearms smuggling and other transnational crimes. The operation resulted in the
seizure of 76 stolen motor vehicles, 14 firearms, more than 20,000 rounds of
ammunition, 116.94 kilograms of marijuana and the arrest of 22 suspects.
Operation Atlantic
This operation was carried out in 1998, involving Botswana, Namibia and South
Africa. Its aim was to combat motor vehicle theft and other cross-border crimes. The
operation resulted in the seizure of 114 stolen motor vehicles, 11 firearms, 71 rounds
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of ammunition of various calibres, 27.910 kilograms of marijuana and the arrest of
23 suspects.
Operation Sesani
This operation was undertaken between Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe, with technical support from South Africa. Its objective was to
address the problem of transnational organise crime, including motor vehicle theft.
The operation commenced in 1998 and was concluded in 1999. It resulted in the
recovery of 180 stolen motor vehicles, 47 firearms and seizure of over 400 kilograms
of narcotic drugs, and 64 suspects were arrested.
Operation Makhulu
This operation took place in 2000 and covered Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Namibia. South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The operation focused on cross-
border crime including theft of motor vehicle, drug trafficking, and illegal
immigration.
Operation Matokwane
The cultivation and trafficking of cannabis has been and continues to pose a serious
challenge to police organisations in the sub-region. The major trafficking route is
towards South Africa. The main suppliers of cannabis are located in Lesotho,
Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The cultivation in
Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland occurs on a commercial scale. Most of the cannabis
is intended for the European market. SARPCCO has been involved in the collection
of intelligence on the cultivation and trafficking of cannabis. The intelligence is used
by national police organisations to trace suspects and locate and destroy cannabis
crops. During 2001, a regional joint operation, code named Matokwane, was
conducted in Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. More than 6,000 tons of
cannabis were destroyed during the operation.
Operation Mangochi
This is a joint operation on stolen motor vehicles between Botswana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. It was co-ordinated by the Harare Sub-Regional Bureau and
SARPPCCO. The operation was conducted over three phases in 2003. It led to the
recovery of 102 stolen vehicles.
Operation Stone
This is an ongoing intelligence-gathering operation undertaken between Angola,
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. It focuses primarily on collecting and
analysing intelligence on criminal groups involved in smuggling of diamonds and
other precious stones. Evidence has emerged linking diamonds and other precious
stones to a number of conflicts on the African continent. Operation Stone, therefore,
seeks to address both the economic and security implications associated with illicit
trade in precious stones.
Project Baobab-Africa
This is a regional Interpol project covering the whole of Africa. It aims to contribute
to the United Nations efforts to combat terrorism through the collection of
intelligence and identification of active terrorist groups in Africa.
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Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Extradition is widely accepted in the SADC region as an important mechanism for
regional and international law enforcement co-operation. The development of SADC
frameworks for mutual legal assistance and extradition took a piecemeal approach.
The first step in this regard was taken in 1996 when the SADC Member States
signed and adopted the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs. The objectives of this
Protocol were largely influenced by the principles set out in the UN Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). The
Protocol obliges Member States to establish appropriate mechanisms for co-
operation among their law enforcement agencies including the introduction of
effective extradition arrangements to enable extradition in all cases of drug
trafficking and money laundering and introduction of effective mutual legal
assistance in all cases of drug trafficking and money laundering.11
On 7 August 2000 the SADC Member States signed and adopted a Protocol on Legal
Affairs. The Protocol, among others, established the SADC Legal Sector whose
objectives include, among others, the development, as far as possible, of common
strategies and standards dealing with the administration of justice and law
enforcement.
The desire by the Community to develop common strategies and standards on
countering corruption resulted in the signing and adoption by Member States, on 14
August 2001, of the SADC Protocol against Corruption. Article 10(1) of the Protocol
obliges State Parties to “ afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance
by processing requests from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic law,
have the power to investigate or prosecute the acts of corruption described in [the]
Protocol, to obtain evidence and take other necessary action to facilitate legal
proceedings and measures regarding the investigation or prosecution of acts of
corruption.”
The SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related
Matters that was signed and adopted by Member States on 14 August 2001
recognises “ the importance of regional and international co-operation and regional
and international initiatives undertaken to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in,
possession and use of firearms and related materials.” Member States are obliged
under this Protocol to establish appropriate mechanisms for co-operation among law
enforcement agencies of the State Parties including the:
• establishment of direct communication systems to facilitate a free and fast flow
of information among the law enforcement agencies in the Region;
• establishment of an infrastructure to enhance effective law enforcement,
including suitable search and inspection facilities at all designated ports of exit
and entry;
• establishment of national focal contact points within the respective law
enforcement agencies for the rapid information exchange to combat cross-
border firearm trafficking; and
• introduction of effective extradition arrangements.
                                                     
11 See: Article 9 of the Protocol
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Member States adopted a comprehensive arrangement on mutual legal assistance on
3 October 2002. The signing of the SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters occurred against the background of an international environment in
which the issue of organised crime had rapidly moved up on the law enforcement
agendas of both governments and international organisations. The importance
attached by the international community to increased efforts to fight organised crime
is best illustrated by the involvement of more than 120 states in the negotiations that
led to the finalisation in July 2000 of the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime. This Convention, among other matters, provides for
expanded international co-operation and mutual legal assistance. A number of
countries in the SADC have demonstrated political will, commitment and readiness
to join the international community in countering transnational organised crime by
ratifying the United Nations Convention against Organised Crime Convention.
The SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, according to
its preamble, reflects the desire by Member States to extend to each other the widest
possible mutual assistance within the limit of the laws of their respective
jurisdictions. The Protocol provides for the following forms of assistance:
• Locating and identifying persons, property, objects and items;
• Serving documents, including documents seeking the attendance of persons and
providing returns of such service;
• Providing information, documents and records;
• Providing objects and temporary transfer of exhibits;
• Search and seizure;
• Taking evidence or obtaining statements or both;
• Authorizing the presence of persons from the Requesting State at the execution
of requests;
• Ensuring the availability of detained persons to give evidence or to assist in
possible investigations;
• Facilitating the appearance of witnesses or the assistance of persons in
investigations; and
• Taking possible measures for location, restraint, seizure, freezing or forfeiture of
the proceeds of crime.
The SADC Protocol on Extradition
On 3 October 2002, the SADC Heads of state signed the SADC Protocol on
Extradition. The action of the Community was largely influenced, according to the
Protocol’s preamble, by concerns regarding “ the escalation of crime at both national
and transnational levels, and that the increased easy access to free cross border
movement enables offenders to escape arrest, prosecution, conviction and
punishment”.
Legal experts have cited several obstacles to the effective administration of the
extradition process in the sub-region.12 The obstacles include lack of expertise in
extradition matters due to limited training opportunities, lack of a common definition
of extraditable offences, undue delays in surrendering fugitives, prohibitive expenses
                                                     
12 Recommendations of a regional Government Legal Experts Workshop on Extradition and
Mutual Legal Assistance, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004
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associated with extradition, and conflict of extradition laws and practices including
matters relating to the extradition of nationals and the death penalty.
Extraditable Offences
Bilateral and multilateral treaties and other arrangements governing extradition
existed between some SADC Member States before the conclusion of the SADC
Protocol on Extradition. The most commonly applied extradition agreement in the
region is the London Scheme on the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders. The Scheme
regulates extradition between Commonwealth countries. It defines an extraditable
offence as “an offence however described which is punishable in the requesting and
requested country by imprisonment for two years or a greater penalty.” On the other
hand the SADC Protocol defines extraditable offence as offences punishable by
imprisonment for “ a period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty.”
Additionally, domestic legislation on extradition of the SADC states have various
definitions of what constitutes extraditable offences. In an attempt to harmonize the
definition of extraditable offences in the sub-region, article 19 of the SADC Protocol
provides that the provisions of any treaty or bilateral agreement governing
extradition between any two State Parties shall be complementary to the provisions
of the Protocol and shall be construed and applied in harmony with the Protocol. In
the event of any inconsistency, the provisions of the Protocol shall prevail.
Additionally, in determining what constitutes an extraditable offence it shall not
matter whether:
• the laws of the State Parties place the conduct constituting the offence within the
same category of offence or describe the offence by the same terminology; and
• the totality of the conduct alleged against the person whose extradition is sought
shall be taken into account and it shall not matter whether, under the laws of the
State Party, the constituent elements of the offence differ.
The Protocol also provides that an offence is extraditable whether or not the conduct
on which the Requesting State bases its request occurred in the territory over which
it has jurisdiction.13
Mandatory Grounds for Refusal to Extradite
Article 4 of the Protocol provides the following mandatory grounds for refusal to
extradite:
• if the offence for which extradition is requested is of a political nature. An
offence of a political nature under the Protocol does not include any offence in
respect of which the State Parties have assumed an obligation, pursuant to any
multilateral convention, to take prosecutorial action where they do not extradite,
or any other offence that the State Parties have agreed is not an offence of a
political character for the purposes of extradition;
• if the Requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for
extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person
on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political
opinion, sex or status or that the person’s position may be prejudiced for any of
those reasons;
• if the offence for which extradition is requested constitutes an offence under
military law, which is not an offence under ordinary criminal law;
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• if there has been a final judgement rendered against the person in the Requested
State or a third state in respect of the offence for which the person’s extradition
is requested;
• if the person whose extradition is requested has, under the law of either State
Party, become immune from prosecution or punishment for any reason,
including lapse of time or amnesty;
• if the person whose extradition is requested has been, or would be subjected in
the Requesting State to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment or if that person has not received or would not receive the minimum
guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in Article 7 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; and
• if the judgement of the Requesting State has been rendered in absentia and the
convicted person has not had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to
arrange for his or her defence and he or she has not had or will not have the
opportunity to have the case retried in his or her presence.
Optional Grounds for Refusal to Extradite
Article 5 of the Protocol provides the following optional grounds for refusal to
extradite:
• if the person whose extradition is requested is a national of the Requested State.
Where extradition is refused on this ground, the Requested State is obliged, if
the other state so requests, to submit the case to its competent authorities with a
view to taking appropriate action against the person in respect of the offence for
which extradition had been requested;
• if a prosecution in respect of the offence for which extradition is requested is
pending in the Requested State against the person whose extradition is
requested;
• if the offence for which extradition is requested carries a death penalty under the
law of the Requesting State, unless that State gives such assurance, as the
Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed
or, if imposed, will not be carried out. Where extradition is refused on this
ground, the Requested State is obliged, if the other state so requests, to submit
the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate action
against the person for the offence for which extradition had been requested;
• if the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside the
territory of either Sate Party and the law of the Requested State does not provide
for jurisdiction over such an offence committed outside its territory on
comparable circumstances;
• if the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded under the laws of the
Requested State as having been committed in whole or in part within that State.
Where extradition is refused on this ground, the Requested State is obliged, if
the other State Party so requests, to submit the case to its competent authorities
with a view to taking appropriate action against the person for the offence for
which extradition had been requested; and
• if the Requested State, while also taking into account the nature of the offence
and of the interest of the Requesting State, considers that, in the circumstances
of the case, the extradition of that person would be incompatible with
humanitarian considerations in view of age, health or other personal
circumstances of that person.
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Extradition of Nationals
Another area that was identified by relevant role players in the region as a source of
problems in respect of implementation of legislation on extradition is the lack of a
common legal position regarding the extradition of nationals. The region is divided
on this issue between countries that allow extradition of nationals and those that do
not. Mozambique, and Angola, for example, have constitutions that prohibit the
extradition of their nationals. On the other hand, South Africa, Swaziland, and
Zimbabwe are among countries that allow the extradition of their nationals.
Death Penalty
Countries in the region have divided views on the death penalty and as a result,
concerns have often been raised where the requested state does not have the death
penalty, either generally or in relation to that particular offence. In South Africa, for
example, the decision in the case of Mohamed and Another V. President of South
Africa and Six Others makes it clear that because the death penalty has been
determined to be unconstitutional domestically, extradition or deportation to face the
death penalty, without any assurances, is also unconstitutional.14
The SADC Protocol on Extradition addresses the death penalty, under Article 5(c),
as a discretionary ground of refusal to extradite with the possibility of assurances.
Channels of Communication
Requests for extradition within the SADC are usually communicated through the
diplomatic channel. The Protocol on Extradition, however, makes provision for
communication of requests through ‘other channels’. Article 6(1) of the Protocol
provides that a request for extradition, supporting documents and subsequent
communications shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel, directly
between the Ministries of Justice or any other authority designated by the State
Parties. The disadvantage of the diplomatic channel is that it involves a certain
degree of delay. The law enforcement agency investigating a case requiring the
extradition of a suspect refers a request for extradition to its foreign ministry. The
request is then sent to the embassy of the requesting state. The embassy, in turn,
sends the request to the foreign ministry of the requested state that dispatches it to
the ministry of justice that then sends it to the competent law enforcement agency for
execution. The results of the request are sent back to the requesting authority by the
same procedure.
The procedural steps of executing an extradition request also involve a lengthy
process. Most SADC States require that facts of the alleged crime be made available
to the requested state, to determine if there is sufficient evidence for extradition to
proceed. The standard for sufficiency applied is that of the prima facie case. Under
this test, the requested state will require the submission of evidence, which a court
will have to determine whether or not it satisfies the required standard to justify
committal of the person for trial under domestic law, if the case had arisen there. The
requested person has a right to appeal against an adverse court ruling.
In an attempt to simplify the extradition procedure, Article 9 of the Protocol provides
that the requested state, if not precluded by its laws, may grant extradition after
receipt of a request for provisional arrest, provided that the person sought explicitly
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consents, before a competent authority, to be extradited. Additionally, under Article
13 of the Protocol Member States are mandated to arrange for the surrender of a
requested person without undue delay. If circumstances beyond its control prevent
the requested state from surrendering or removing the person to be extradited, the
Protocol requires the requested state to notify the other state and the two State
Parties must mutually decide upon a new date of surrender.
The delays associated with extradition have resulted in the search for simpler and
quicker methods to secure the return of a person to face prosecution or serve a
sentence. Law enforcement agencies in the region often use deportation as
alternative processes to obtain extradition. In some cases, suspects, with the
connivance of the police, have been forcibly brought within the jurisdictions of
countries seeking to bring the suspects to justice in disregard of proper judicial
process. Despite being the quickest methods of surrendering a suspect, deportation
and other unconventional practices of surrendering suspects, have the disadvantage
of being open to legal challenges in the requesting state. Indeed, some jurisdictions
do not recognise deportation as an alternative process to obtain extradition. A case in
point is that of Bennett vs. H.M. Advocate.15 In that case the applicant, who was a
New Zealander residing in South Africa, was wanted for prosecution in the United
Kingdom. After a decision was made not to seek extradition, the police in the United
Kingdom consulted with their counterparts in South Africa. Eventually, Mr. Bennett
was deported from South Africa, with arrangements made by the police for travel
that included a stop in the United Kingdom where he was arrested.
In relation to a challenge to subsequent proceedings, the House of Lords held that:
“Where process of law is available to return an accused through extradition
procedures the courts of the United Kingdom will refuse to try him if he has been
forcibly brought within their jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a
process to which police, prosecutors or other executives authorities have been
knowing parties.”16
Some courts in the SADC region have also entertained applications by surrendered
persons to stay prosecutions that were premised on arguments that they were
illegally extradited. For example, in the South African case of the State vs.
Ebrahimi, a kidnapping from Swaziland to South Africa, it was held that a South
African court has no jurisdiction to try a person abducted from another state, by
agents of the state. 17
Expenses
One of the central issues concerning the execution of extradition requests in the
region is the cost of proceedings arising out of such requests. In most of the
countries in the region, government institutions including the courts and law
enforcement agencies operate in an environment of extreme resource constraints
including critical shortage of fuel and transport. Account must also be taken of the
enormous surface area that is involved in the conduct of law enforcement operations.
Tanzania, for example, covers an area larger than the combined area of Germany,
France and the Netherlands. Foreign requests for assistance in carrying out normal
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operations such as locating and arresting a suspect may easily cause financial
hardships and adversely affect the operations of the government agencies involved.
Due to the financial implications involved, government institutions may naturally be
reluctant to get involved in lengthy and complex extradition proceedings. Under
article 18 of the Protocol matters relating to costs associated with extradition are
dealt with as follows:
• the Requested State is obliged to make all necessary arrangements for and meet
the cost of any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition;
• the Requested State must bear the expenses incurred in its territory or jurisdiction
in the arrest and detention of the person whose extradition is sought, and the
maintenance in custody of the person until that person is surrendered to the
Requesting State;
• if during the execution of a request, it becomes apparent that fulfilment of the
request will entail expenses of an extraordinary nature, the Requested State and
the Requesting State must consult to determine the terms and conditions under
which execution may continue;
• the requesting State must bear the expenses incurred in translation of extradition
documents and conveying the person extradited from the territory of the
Requested State;
• consultations may be held between the Requesting State and the Requested State
for the payment by the Requesting State of extraordinary expenses.
Surrender of Property
One of the fundamental provisions of the Protocol is Article 15, which reflects the
determination of the State Parties to address cross-border transfers of illicitly
acquired assets through the strengthening of regional cooperation in asset recovery.
Article 15(1) provides that all property found in the requested state that has been
acquired as a result of the offence for which extradition is sought should be
surrendered upon request, to the State Party that is granted extradition. The property
may also be surrendered to the requesting state even if the extradition agreed to
cannot be carried out.
Conclusion
While the growth in transnational organised crime is an international phenomenon,
its rapid growth in the SADC region is a matter of serious concern; particularly that
economic deprivation, conflict, and disease are already having a devastating impact
on the population. Governments in the region through the SADC have taken a
number of positive initiatives to deal with the problem of cross-border crime,
including transnational organised crime. The development and adoption of protocols
dealing with extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters as well as
the establishment of SARPCCO forms a firm foundation upon which to build further
blocks for regional and international co-operation for combating transnational crime.
It is also significant that a number of countries in the sub-region have ratified and are
implementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and its
protocols. Several challenges, however still confront law enforcement agencies in
the sub-region. A major challenge for law enforcement agencies in the region,
however, is the problem of inadequate resources for crime prevention. The lack of
appropriate skills including legal expertise in areas such as extradition, frequently
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acts as a barrier to effective and efficient co-operation and exchange of information
between law enforcement agencies in Southern Africa. In this regard, international
bodies such as the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime can play a crucial role
in the provision of international technical co-operation, including research, exchange
of information and training.
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International Criminal Co-operation or Mutual Assistance*
Juan Pablo Glasinovic Vernon
Director
Specialized Unit in International Cooperation and Extraditions
Office of the Public Prosecutor
Chile
Context of the Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile
Throughout history and for over 100 years, Chile’s system of criminal justice has
been of an inquisitional nature, largely as a result of our Spanish heritage. In the
past, all judicial functions were concentrated in the hands of the judge who
investigated cases alone in a secret “summary” investigation without any sort of time
limit, pressed charges and then in the “plenary” phase which was construed as
contradictory tried the case.  The procedure was essentially written, entailed no
provisions to allow for diversity of penalty based on the circumstances of an
individual crime, nor provided an effective institutional structure for the defense of
the accused. In sum, the procedure was not public, did not truly involve opposing
parties, failed to safeguard the right to defense and other rights of the accused and
protect victims and witnesses.
Although for many years Chile sought to revamp its inquisitional system of criminal
justice and replace it with an adversarial one, the magnitude of such sweeping
changes and the resources they required led to continued postponements. It was thus
not until 1997 that the wheels of legislative action began to turn with a view toward
a momentous reform involving changes to the Constitution, the passage of a new
Criminal Procedure Code, modification of an array of legal texts, the creation of new
institutions such as the Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP), the Public Defenders
Office and the new courts - Guarantee and Oral Trial - all of which required
infrastructure and equipment in order to operate effectively.
The criminal procedure reform began to operate in Chile gradually, with the first
phase coming into operation in December 2000. The process will culminate on June
16th of this year 2005 with the roll-out in the Santiago Metropolitan Region.
The overhaul to the way Chile administers justice is undoubtedly the most important
reform the country has undergone in the last 100 years. Moreover, because of the
depth and breadth of the change and the cultural and legal paradigms involved, may
observers have called the transformation revolutionary.
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International Criminal Cooperation or Mutual Assistance
Evolution of this topic under the criminal procedure reform
Despite the complexities inherent to the implementation of the comprehensive
reform described above, it became clear very early on that effectively investigating
and prosecuting transnational crime and criminals would have to rely heavily on
international cooperation and mutual assistance between States. Moreover, the
spillover effect on domestic crime as a result of globalization enhanced the need for
international cooperation. By this we mean the assistance one State lends to another
in securing information or conducting investigative action within its territory with a
view towards initiating an investigation or facilitating a criminal investigation
underway in the petitioning State.
These topics are all the more germane in light of our increasingly interconnected and
interdependent world: obtaining information or evidence located in other nations,
through official channels, that meets the standards of the new procedures and, above
all, within the brief deadlines allotted to investigation under Chile reform, are of the
essence.
That said, however, given the natural evolution and the gradual roll-out in the parts
of Chile where the reform is in effect, an accent was initially placed on bringing
legitimacy to the new system quickly. In part, that meant focusing on the types of
crime with the greatest social visibility, such as burglary, assault, larceny and rape
all of which have a domestic connotation and origin. In practice, the need for
international cooperation and mutual assistance was relegated to a secondary level
during the first few years of the reform.
As the new system came to tackle effectively with the crimes mentioned above,
experience increased and the institution evolved, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(OPP) began focusing on the investigation and prosecution of more complex crimes,
offenses in which transnational aspects are tremendously salient.
This pattern of evolution within the OPP-transitioning from local crimes to other,
more complex transgressions with international connotations – has been repeated in
general terms in all of the regions in which the reform has come into effect.
Obstacles and General Context
Although events themselves have made the need for fluid cooperation with other
countries increasingly indispensable, Chilean culture and legal/institutional practice
have not moved at a parallel pace, thus producing a gap that needs to be closed and
addressed proactively. We believe that the OPP has a key – although not exclusive -
role to play in this arena, given that our office is tasked with investigating and
prosecuting criminal action and, therefore, is most keenly interested in a successful
prosecution. That success often depends on international cooperation.
In effect and speaking solely to the Chilean case - although a similar phenomenon
can be seen across our region - it is clear that the internationalization of the
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administration of justice has not progressed as quickly as other realms in the
globalization process.
For Chilean society, for example, several decades of economic reform and expanded
opportunities in international economics and trade have made globalization a widely
accepted fact of life, whose beneficial effects we reap on a daily basis. We can see
that a similar phenomenon is underway in other spheres, such as culture and the
dissemination of habits, ideas, patterns of behavior and sense of aesthetics around
the world.
Nonetheless, despite the evolution in International Law and the efforts of multilateral
organisms, especially as of the second half of the 20th century, the field of justice
clearly lags behind these disciplines. It appears that the belief among our people and
institutions persists that the administration of justice is inherent to the sovereignty of
states and that, as such, domestic legislation is of an exclusive nature and prevails
above any other norm.
Clearly, that increasingly discreet but still deeply rooted antiquated and self-
sufficient view of justice is not naturally conducive to international cooperation and
mutual assistance in criminal affairs. The key to success thus lies in a change in
mindset and, in that context, the OPP, as a completely new institution in Chilean
history, one that is called to act in on a different stage, will play a crucial role.
In effect, the new criminal system brings protagonism to a new player, the OPP, and
grants it exclusive responsibility for leading criminal investigations. This is thanks to
a constitutional reform effected in 1997 which gives the OPP full autonomy and sets
it forth as one of the State’s flagship institutions.
The reform failed, however, to provide domestic regulations to guide international
assistance systematically within the context of the new procedural setting, including
the OPP.  As a result, the only regulations on international criminal assistance in
Chile have to do with procedures for judicial letters rogatory and a succinct
indication that the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall serve as
liaison institutions for such requests. There are some exceptions, however, for
especially serious transnational offenses such as drug trafficking and money
laundering for which more detailed provisions exist.
This lack of regulation is compounded by the persistence of practices by institutions
that have not yet adapted to the logic and demands of the new criminal procedures.
Their torpor and tenacity is largely due to the fact that the reform has yet to be
implemented in Santiago, the nation’s political, economic and administrative capital.
While from the traditional perspective this context could appear inauspicious for the
OPP in the areas of cooperation and mutual criminal assistance, the lack of specific
regulations is also an opportunity for us, as a new player unfettered by the
formalities of the old system, to generate new, more effective practices and
processes in the realm of international cooperation and mutual assistance.  With a
view toward optimizing criminal prosecution in general and combating transnational
crime in particular, these new procedures will meet the demands of the new criminal
procedures and be in step with the technologies that modern life affords.
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Moreover, the opportunity to generate profound change is facilitated by a wave of
reforms to the administration of justice across our hemisphere, with a common focus
on respect for the rule of law as a fundamental prerequisite for economic
development and the sustainability of democratic governance.
The simultaneous nature of these transformations has led to an active exchange of
experiences in the realm of justice, heated debate, the dissemination and replication
of successful models and practices and, thus, a level of horizontal cooperation
seldom seen in our region.  Although this dynamic process is still very much in the
making, the OPP has become a model and a standard for other reform processes
thanks to the pioneering nature of Chile’s reform and its level of consolidation.  As a
result, in addition to the benefits of personal contacts and a better understanding of
legal cultures around the region, we are also seeing a degree of convergence in our
systems which will undoubtedly facilitate exchange and transnational action by our
legal institutions in the future.
International institutions within the OPP and its response with regard to specific
issues in the area of criminal assistance and cooperation
To better organize and systematize the flow of international cooperation within the
OPP, a specialized unit in “International Cooperation and Extradition” was created
in 2004. The new unit reports directly to the National Prosecutor and is tasked
precisely with facilitating the organization’s investigative efforts when they involve
assistance from other countries and coordinating with other prosecutor’s offices and
prosecutorial institutions to jointly address cases of transnational crime. In addition,
the unit is responsible for providing assistance and follow-up to requests for both
active and passive extradition.
Initially, in order to ascertain the status and needs for international criminal
cooperation and mutual assistance within the OPP, an in-house survey was
conducted in the 12 regions in which the reform is operational. The questionnaire
had two parts.
The first section sought to identify how often international assistance had been
necessary, how often such assistance had been dismissed and the reasons for that
decision. It also asked prosecutors to address the most relevant obstacles they had
found to having investigations conducted abroad and to propose solutions.
The second section focused on cases in which a request for international assistance
had been made, the results of that petition and the way the information was used in
court.
The results and conclusions can be summarized as follows:
a) Although relatively few prosecutors stated the need for international co-operation
in their cases (18.6% of respondents), petitions were on the rise.
b)While in a significant number of cases prosecutors felt they could have benefited
from international assistance, they refrained from requesting it (66% of the total).
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c) In a sizable number of cases, prosecutors reported that they had not moved
forward with the request due to the complexities of the procedure, a lack of
confidence in the foreign officials who would receive the request, limited
expectations for success, the extended time frames needed as compared to the
brevity of the investigative phase and, lastly, a lack of clarity in terms of where to
direct the petition.
Most importantly, the study shows that although there is need for international
criminal assistance in an increasing number of cases, prosecutors are unfamiliar with
the appropriate procedures and legislations involved. This lack of information can
pose a major obstacle if not dealt with in a timely fashion. Paradoxically, the lack of
acquaintance with other systems included procedures in neighboring countries with
which the flow of requests is greatest.
In light of the survey results, growing practical experience within the OPP and
conditions across the region, the OPP has identified a series of problems in the area
of mutual criminal assistance and cooperation. These emerging obstacles are being
addressed by the organization in keeping with the structure and needs of the new
system of criminal justice as follows:
A. Obstacles at the domestic level
As indicated earlier, legislative developments in the area of international cooperation
have been deficient in terms of supplementing the constitutionally-mandated powers
of the OPP. Existing regulations are limited, exceptional and scattered about in
different texts. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the political and legislative
authorities are truly cognizant of the importance and repercussions of this topic in
successfully prosecuting cross-border crime. As such, we do not foresee the issue
becoming a priority in the short term. Viewed alone, the lack of regulation is not
really a problem and could even be perceived as an advantage.  However, when
combined with the logic, practices and concepts of the old system of criminal justice,
it does pose an obstacle. In effect, the lack of definitions and procedural regulation
often hinders the dexterity and speed required by the new system, as people fill the
void with requirements and formalities from the old school that impede rapid action.
For example, we initially found that non-judicial letters rogatory received by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were being sent to the Judiciary, even though their
processing was within the sphere of action of the OPP. After protracted
consideration and subsequent loss of valuable time, the Judiciary remitted them to
the OPP for handling.  While this situation has been ameliorated in some cases, a
systematic procedure has yet to be established.
We are equally concerned by the role of the Foreign Ministry as the official conduit
for these requests and as Central Authority under a series of treaties, as the Ministry
is strapped for resources in light of the bounding increase in requests for assistance
and cooperation to and from Chile, all of which require expedited processing. In
general, we have noted that the preset, short deadlines established under the new
system make current procedures and practices unworkable.
Clearly, then, strengthening the institutions involved in international cooperation is
of the essence. In that context, the Foreign Ministry plays a crucial role, even while
100
prosecutorial agencies may be designated as Central Authorities in cooperation
treaties to make collaboration in criminal matters more expedient and fluid.
How has the OPP grappled with these problems to date?
In light of the absence of regulations on procedures and institutional jurisdiction, the
OPP has encouraged inter-institutional cooperation by forming several task forces
that bring together the primary players in the reform to work toward common criteria
and more expedient channels of communication. In this same vein, a group was
recently created within the OPP to work with a team from the Foreign Ministry.
The OPP has understood that in order to perform its duties effectively and
efficiently, it must have solid inter-institutional ties with a range of agencies,
encourage opportunities for dialogue, and the exchange of information with other
institutions, such as Policía de Investigaciones detective force, Carabineros
uniformed police, INTERPOL, Customs, etc.
It is important to note that it has not been easy to assemble and coordinate the array
of governmental institutions and agencies involved. The task has been all the more
complex because the impetus comes from a newcomer to the nation’s institutional
stage and, as always, any reorganization of this magnitude causes friction and
resistance by the organizations whose functions are curtailed or modified.
B. Obstacles in the international environment
There are multiple obstacles to cooperation in the international sphere.
One obstacle that immediately comes to mind –and was reflected in our in-house
survey – is the tremendous lack of (reciprocal) familiarity with the legislation in
force in other countries, including those with which we have the greatest levels of
criminal interchange, that is, neighboring countries.
The lack of knowledge also encompasses unfamiliarity with relevant institutions and
procedures used in other countries, as well as their legal culture.
This reflects not only the backwardness we suffer in legal affairs in terms of
globalization, but also the dearth of integration among our countries despite our
many similarities and shared roots.
One reason for the deficiency can be found in the institutional instability that has
plagued our nations. Those changes have led to constant variations in regulations
and officials, with the consequent impairment to mutual understanding and
reciprocal ties.
These conditions are compounded by a lack of international instruments in effect in
our countries in the areas of international cooperation and mutual assistance in the
criminal realm and by the fact that many of the agreements that do exist have
become obsolete, as they reflect past times and logics (they refer to crimes that today
are irrelevant or contemplate procedures that are now entirely too slow).  This
hampers fluid contact with our counterparts and noticeably diminishes effectiveness
in these proceedings.
101
It is important to highlight the exceptions to this rather dire scenario, including such
agreements as the Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance, the Vienna
Convention on Drug Trafficking, and the Palermo Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime, all of which have been signed and ratified by Chile and by a
substantive number of nations in the Western hemisphere.  These agreements
address the current needs and obstacles to international cooperation in their
respective fields.
Moreover, the Ibero-American Association of Public Prosecutors (AIMP) brings
together prosecutorial officials from Latin America, Spain and Portugal. The
association has engaged in productive efforts to make criminal assistance more
expedient among participating members.
Lastly, a substantive obstacle to fluid cross-border investigation and prosecution is
the availability of human resources, infrastructure and equipment.
Fortunately, the constitutional reform that created the OPP in Chile was
accompanied by a comprehensive set of measures to allow for its gradual
implementation.
Devised in response to a national policy and a long-coveted aspiration for an
expedient, efficient system of criminal justice, planning for the reform included
participation from an array of sectors (academics, economists, legal experts,
legislators, etc). This made it possible to more accurately identify the full range of
resources that would be required to make the reform a success.
Thus, in addition to considering appropriate pay for the new players and bolstered
remuneration for members of the Judiciary, unprecedented funding was allocated to
training, management, infrastructure and equipment, in the understanding that all of
these aspects are essential to the overall success of the system.
The net result of this investment has been a modern system of criminal justice, at the
forefront of the legal and technological developments of our times.
These conditions, however, are not necessarily reflected in other countries across the
region. The disparity leads to problems in communications, compliance with
deadlines, and in meeting the objectives of cooperation.
How has the OPP grappled with these international challenges?
We have placed a priority on strengthening ties with organizations on our own
continent and, specifically, with our neighbors in South America.
Toward this end, we are working on two complementary lines of action:
a) Strengthening organizations that bring together prosecutorial officials;
b) Direct inter-institutional efforts with neighboring countries.
For example, the OPP joined the Ibero-American Association of Public Prosecutors
(AIMP) and the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) at an early stage, in
the understanding that both serve as outstanding platforms for contact and
opportunities for joint efforts in areas of mutual interest.
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A key topic within the AIMP has been encouraging and facilitating mutual criminal
assistance and cooperation. The agreements signed by the members on that topic, as
noted above, have been increasingly utilized as the basis for petitions and the
granting of assistance.
With a view toward strengthening that line of action and facilitating greater
coordination among its members, National Prosecutor Guillermo Piedrabuena ran for
office in the organization’s most recent round of balloting. He was elected, along
with the Attorney General of Paraguay, to lead the organization for the period
November 2004-November 2006 and to serve as Chair for the period September
2005-November 2006.
At the regional level, the OPP has sought to promote meetings and direct contacts
with its counterparts in neighboring countries in an effort to improve
communication.
A system of internships has been created to allow prosecutors from neighboring
nations to spend time in other countries to bolster awareness of our different systems
and form bonds of trust.
Toward this end, we have sought to forge ties with a variety of cooperation agencies
and multilateral institutions active in the field of justice, including the notable
support of GTZ, the German cooperation agency.
Within the context of the accent on work with our neighbors, the OPP is organizing
the First Meeting of Law Enforcement Officials and Prosecutors from Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Peru for the month of October 2005. The gathering
seeks to share experiences and methods in the work performed by prosecutors and
law enforcement officers – key entities in successful criminal prosecution - and
establish more expedient channels of communication. Moreover, the conference
seeks to provide a mechanism for periodic cooperation and coordination in dealing
with cross-border crime.
Extradition
Extradition is a crucial institution in criminal prosecution cooperation between States
and will continue to be essential under Chile’s new criminal procedure. A long-
standing tradition of extradition on our continent and in Chile specifically as well as
developments in statutory regulations – domestic, international conventions,
international principles - and legal and political practice are all conductive to this
procedure.
We should note that our system places decisions on active and passive extradition
solely in the hands of the Supreme Court, the highest court in Chile. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs serves exclusively as the conduit for requests to and from other
countries. As a result, our procedure is less political and more judicial than those
used in other countries.
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Another important feature of our system is that it does not limit extradition to
countries with which Chile has a treaty in force. Rather, petitions may be granted on
the basis of the principles of International Law, which provides a broad base for
successful extradition petitions.
The Supreme Court has systematically granted extradition on the basis of reciprocity
with the petitioning State. That concept has been interpreted broadly and reflects
elements inherent to the principles of international cooperation. It is important to
note that Chile, unlike most of the countries in the region, does not have legislation
that prohibits the State from extraditing its citizens. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has not shirked from extraditing Chilean nationals, even when the corresponding
treaty allows for that option. It would seem that the Court favours the modern belief
albeit with some reservations-- that international cooperation is the cornerstone of
extradition, thereby moving away from the principle of reciprocity and toward that
of better justice, under which a crime must be judged in the jurisdiction in which it
was committed.
The procedural rules that regulate extradition in the new Code are equally favorable,
as they are set within a completely different procedural system:  one that is
adversarial, oral, public and involves new players with defined, differentiated roles.
These features are present in the extradition process, making it shorter, with greater
presence of the justices and with the OPP serving as the representative of the
petitioning State and the public or private defender assisting the accused. This new
role for the OPP sets us in uniquely good stead in the area of extradition and tasks us
with strengthening it as a tool for international cooperation in criminal prosecution.
The International Cooperation Unit will be responsible for providing assistance in
these cases, seeking to ensure their expedient processing and efficacy.
The freedom allowed under the new system in the submission of evidence as well as
that of the justices to rule based on their knowledge and experience provides greater
flexibility in proving and assessing the events upon which the extradition request is
based. This is particularly important because the circumstances surrounding the
events are often investigated abroad under different procedural rules.
As noted above in the case of criminal assistance, we need to strengthen our
collaboration with the Foreign Ministry to secure the nimbleness required in
these cases in light of the preset, short deadlines under the new system.
In terms of issues on the international stage, we once again see a void of treaties
signed by Chile in this arena. This includes recent treaties that reflect modern trends
and resolve the problems that extradition currently poses.
The dearth is particularly evident for countries outside the Ibero-American region, as
Chile does have extradition treaties in place with most of the latter. Although the
lack of specific agreements does not impede extradition, as noted earlier, it does lead
to greater hurdles and uncertainties.
104
Conclusion
In sum, it is clear that in mutual assistance in criminal affairs and - to a lesser extent
in extradition - both Chile and much of the region are in a time of legal/cultural
transition between an old inquisitorial systems and new adversarial ones.
As in all transitions, many elements are in flux and even in conflict. Nonetheless, the
time is nigh to innovate, adapt, and systematize channels of communication and
procedures to grapple with the pressing needs of international cooperation to combat
the growing phenomenon of transnational crime.
Although the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Chile has played an active role in
this regard, it is clear that without the collaboration and contributions of other
institutions, both domestic and foreign, an integrated system is inconceivable.
Without such cooperation, the plethora of scattered regulations and reciprocal
ignorance will persist, to the detriment of effective criminal prosecution.
The dream of integration has been revered in Latin America for hundreds of years.
Today, thanks to the convergence of profound reforms to the systems used to
administer justice, an opportunity exists to bring it to fruition in an area that not only
affects people’s lives, but is also essential to the economic and democratic
development of our countries.
Half a century ago, Europe confronted a similar situation in terms of diversity of
legislation and imperfect cooperation. Today, those times seem to be anecdotal
bygones in light of the European Union and its joint institutions and common
procedures.
The EU’s success, despite myriad differences and difficulties, is an inspiration to us
in our region and a model to be emulated. The Office of the Public Prosecutor of
Chile is committed to working toward that goal.
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Annex 1
Workshop Programme
Workshop on Enhancing International Law Enforcement Cooperation,
including Extradition Measures
Bangkok 21 April 2005
Workshop moderator: Mr Klas Bergenstrand, Chief of the Security Police, Sweden
Scientific rapporteur: Dr Jay Albanese, Chief of the International Center, National
Institute of Justice, United States
10.00 Opening of the workshop
Keynote address: Mr Kunihiro Horiuchi, Director and
Secretary General of Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, Japan
10.30: First panel discussion: Law enforcement cooperation
Panellists: - Director Masamba Sita, UNAFRI
- Dr Rob McCusker, AIC
- Professor Edmundo Oliveira, University of Amazonas, Brazil
- Mr Ulrich Kersten, Special representative of Interpol to the
United Nations
- Mr Roberto Di Legami, Head of OC Groups Unit, Europol
12.00 –13.00: Statements from the floor
15.00: Second panel discussion : Extradition measures
Panellists: - ProfessorTakafumi Sato, UNAFEI
- Mr Andreas Schloenhardt, University of Brisbane, Australia
- Mr Mukelabai Mukelabai, ISS
- Mr Juan Pablo Glasinovic Vernon, Director, Specialized Unit
in International Cooperation and Extraditions, Public
Prosecutor´s Office, Chile
- Mr Andrew Wells, Senior Legal Adviser, UNODC
16.30-17.30: Statements from the floor
17.30-18.00: Conclusions and recommendations
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Annex 2
Reflections on the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice
Jon Spencer
Director, Anglo-Baltic Applied Criminological Research Unit (ABACRU)
School of Law, University of Manchester,
United Kingdom
Introduction
The process of criminal justice policy making at the international level is complex.
The United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is the most
significant global policy making body that is engaged in identifying and co-
ordinating the key areas of global crime control policy in order to achieve
consistency in relation to such policy making through agreed conventions and
protocols.
In order to achieve this task the United Nations is committed to convening “….every
five years a worldwide congress, so as to provide a forum for discussion of priority
concerns by policy makers, administrators, academicians and other professionals in
the field.” (United Nations 2005a A/CONF.203/INF.)
The idea of the Congress is now deeply embedded in the organizational and policy
making structure of the United Nations and is viewed by many countries as an
important event to attend. The Eleventh Congress, which took place in Bangkok in
2005, is in a tradition that started fifty years ago in Geneva. This lengthy trajectory
places the congresses very firmly as a core element of the United Nations business
and as such it demands a high degree of respect and is perceived by many
participants as ‘being, in itself, a good thing’. Commenting on the Eleventh
Congress the Executive director of the UNODC said:
“Bangkok was a milestone l. Together, Member States considered how the existing
Conventions against Crime and against Corruption are helping them reach domestic
goals in these areas. One point in particular was repeated frequently at the Congress:
the connection between criminal justice, the rule of law, and global security. Today,
we can safely say that all Member States agree that the rule of law is a prerequisite
to peace.” (United Nations 2005b)
However, it is appropriate to consider how effective the Eleventh Congress was in
achieving its aims and whether the aims could have been more effectively achieved
by other means. So, the test is to put the outcome of the Congress alongside the
explicit aims, as published in the information to participants (UN 2005), and to see if
the aims are realized, and if so to what extent.
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The Aims of the Eleventh United Nations Congress
The aims of the Congress are detailed below:
“The United Nations congresses …, as a consultative body of the
programme, shall provide a forum for:
 “(a) the exchange of views between States, intergovernmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations and individual experts
representing various professions and disciplines;
“(b) The exchange of experiences in research, law and policy
development;
“(c) The identification of emerging trends and issues in crime
prevention and criminal justice;
“(d) The provision of advice and comments to the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on selected matters submitted to
it by the Commission;
“(e) The submission of suggestions, for the consideration of the
Commission, regarding possible subjects for the programme of work.”
(United Nations 2005a)
These aims suggest an open and transparent process in relation to policy making and
take account of all groups equally. Furthermore the knowledge of experts who have
a detailed understanding of the issues in relation to their own profession and
discipline is highly valued. The first aim set out above is the keystone upon which
the other aims are supported and bound together. The aims of the Congress are
focused on partnership working at the international level in order to secure a safer
and more equal world.
Consequently the Eleventh Congress embraced the spirit of collaboration by
adopting the Congress theme of: “Synergies and responses: strategic alliances in
crime prevention and criminal justice”. It is within this Congress theme that the
aims are brought together, the idea of countries working together, forging strategic
alliances1. In order to focus the work of the Congress five ‘substantive’ areas were
identified, these were: 1) effective measures to combat transnational organized
crime;2) international cooperation against terrorism and links between terrorism
and other criminal activities in the context of the work of the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime;3) corruption: threats and trends in the twenty-first century; 4)
4) economic and financial crimes: challenges to sustainable development and 5)
making standards work: fifty years of standard-setting in crime prevention and
criminal justice. (United Nations 2005a) In order to further the levels of co-operation
and to deepen the knowledge of participants the Congress was also structured to
provide what were termed ‘workshops’. These six workshops were on the following
areas: 1) enhancing international law enforcement cooperation, including extradition
measures; 2) enhancing criminal justice reform, including restorative justice; 3)
strategies and best practices for crime prevention, in particular in relation to urban
crime and youth at risk; 4) measures to combat terrorism, with reference to the
relevant international conventions and protocols; 5) measures to combat economic
crime, including money-laundering and 6) measures to combat computer-related
crime. These substantive agenda items and six workshops have a degree of
                                                     
1 It might be argued that the area of crime prevention and criminal justice is presented
within the Congress documents as being unproblematic.
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congruence in that the substantive items reflect broad concerns and the workshops
provide a more detailed knowledge in respect of a particular area.
Structure of the Congress
The work of the Eleventh Congress was structured so that after the formal opening
ceremonies the Congress was able to consider each of the substantive items. The
substantive items were scheduled to run over the first four days of the Congress,
allowing approximately two sessions per item. However, from the last session on
day three the first of the workshops commenced. The workshops ran over days four,
five and six. There was a process of informal consultations over days five, six and
seven with the ‘High Level Segment’2 commencing on the sixth day and concluding
on day eight. The Congress concluded on day eight with the formal adoption of the
declaration (United Nations 2005a). The Congress was also required by the General
Assembly of the United Nations to ‘...adopt a single declaration.’ (United Nations
2005a). The conclusion of the Congress in relation to the substantive items and also
the workshops was to inform the final declaration.
In addition to the substantive items and the workshops there were a number of
‘ancillary meetings’. These meetings were organized by Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) and were an attempt to influence delegations in specific areas
of crime prevention and criminal justice policy. The ancillary meetings covered a
range of topics; women’s imprisonment, violence, trafficking in children, criminal
exploitation of women and children and youth violence to name but a few. These
meetings were scheduled to occur simultaneously with the substantive items and the
workshops.
So, the Congress is an event of considerable political activity, diplomatic
engagement and lobbying by the large number of NGOs. Indeed Thomas Mathiesen
(1986) has detailed the ‘political’ activity of the 1985 Congress, identifying five
types of, what he terms, typical Congress behaviour. These types of behaviour were
defined by Mathiesen as norms, these are; the importance norm, that attendance
makes the individual a very important person. The known by everybody norm,
defines behaviour that seeks to impress other Congress attendees that a person is
very well known by the important Congress people thus adding to their own
importance. The show respect to everybody else (regardless what you think of them!
norm), highlights the need to maintain good relationships with all. The unanimity
norm reflects the need to show that the Congress is in agreement what ever the
underlying disagreements, and the my-country-norm reflects the need for the
delegate to put their country before all others. These norms of behaviour were, in
relation to my own observations, still as apparent in 2005 as they were in 1985. This
supports the argument put forward by Mathiesen that there is a ‘culture’ of the
                                                     
2 A ‘High Level Segment’ is an ‘…opportunity to high-level representatives of
Governments to inform the Congress of progress made in their countries in crime
prevention and criminal justice, discuss the experience of their Governments in
undertaking criminal justice reform and exchange views on good and promising practices
in that field. It will also offer an opportunity for high-level representatives to engage in
dialogue and exchange views on the implications of the report of the High-level Panel on
Threats.
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Congress and it appears that this culture is reproduced Congress after Congress.
Whilst, for some, such cultural forms of behaviour may be of assistance in meeting
their countries requirements it is also true to say that the forms of behaviour
normalised by Mathiesen do not allow for flexibility, genuine discussion and the
development of policy in a dynamic process. It rather encourages a bureaucratic
form of policy development and presentation.
The formal structure of the congress is such that it requires countries in the
discussion of the agenda items and in the workshops to give notice of their intention
to speak and having done this the delegations make prepared statements in relation
to the topic area. So, the contribution to the substantive items and the workshops will
primarily have a ‘political perspective’, they may well have been prepared prior to
the Congress and delivered to underscore a political position, to take a position
against one or more other countries with a countervailing point of view or they may
be statements provided to enhance that particular country’s international standing,
for example in relation to issues of human rights. So, crime provides the topic
through which to realise political goals, or contribute to their realisation, and the
Congress provides a forum through which to incrementally develop policy that is
acceptable to the delegations of a sponsoring country. So, we have an event where
there are a number of different agendas being negotiated and resolved.
Patrik Törnudd (1986) also writing about the 1985 Congress raises a number of
important points in relation to the structure and organisation of such events. His
main concerns are those of cost, he sees the Congress as overly expensive, overly
self-important and overly vague in many of the official documents so that no one
could easily take offence. There can be no doubt about the cost, and add what should
be realistic concerns in relation to climate change, it is worth raising the question
whether the expense and the damage to the environment caused by flying four
thousand participants to Bangkok and all the accompanying literature and exhibition
materials is justified by the outcomes? Törnudd does not deny the value of
international meetings, the need for policy makers, experts and politicians to meet
but suggests that perhaps this could be more usefully tested in a smaller forum with
more focus. It is to this question we now turn.
Was it all worth it?
In attempting to answer whether it was all worth it I will use a case study example of
my attempts to track one particular topic through the Congress. The choice of topic
was relatively random in that a number of different areas could have been followed
and I am confident that similar comments would be made in relation to those other
areas. I chose the topic of imprisonment. It is clear that in terms of criminal justice
expenditure it is a significant consumer of resources, there are a range of UN and
Council of Europe conventions and protocols relating to the treatment and
containment of prisoners and the use of imprisonment and treatment of prisoners is
used as a benchmark of how different countries observe the international
requirements in relation to human rights. So, this is an important topic, and one that
stretches beyond the problems associated with the management of prisons and
prisoners.
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Due to the political nature of the topic of imprisonment and the concerns expressed
as to the over use of imprisonment globally the topic also attracts a number of NGOs
and ‘experts’ with the agenda of seeking agreements on the reduction of prison
populations globally. This NGO activity, the link between prison systems and human
rights and the political nature of imprisonment should have meant that this topic was
a central one at the Congress and therefore a good window into the workings of the
Congress. However, the main substantive items of the Congress were not focused on
imprisonment and so the main substantive item where this issue could be negotiated
was within the final item of ‘Making standards work: fifty years of standard-setting
in crime prevention and criminal justice.’ Whilst there was no substantive item in
relation to imprisonment there were a number of related ‘ancillary meetings’ that
focused on the issue of imprisonment. These were organized through a coalition of
NGOs that included Prison Reform International, Howard League for Criminal
Justice, International Centre for Prison Studies (King’s College London) and other
NGOs that focus on the issue of imprisonment. The ancillary meetings are different
to the set pieces of the workshops and the substantive items in that there are no
formal delegations. This means that ‘experts’ are entitled to take the floor and the
debate concerning the topic area is allowed to develop as a dialogue rather than a
venue for countries to make statements. This provides for an open exchange and
debate; however, in following the prison focused ancillary workshops it was clear
that many of the participants were converted to the arguments of the main presenters.
So, the ancillary meetings become a means of publicising a certain position that is
agreed between the meeting presenters. As a consequence of this it is difficult to see
how such proceedings influence the position of delegations that do not attend
because there is little political value in them being present.
Within the prison ancillary meetings it was apparent that there were some
participants who had considerable knowledge of Congress procedures and a detailed
understanding of how to influence the final declaration. Essentially the route to
influencing the final declaration is through one of the substantive items or through
one of the workshops. At the end of the first meeting in relation to prisons it was
suggested that the ancillary meeting scheduled for the following day should be
devoted to strategic thinking in relation to the raising of incarceration as an
important item and its inclusion in the final declaration. At the following prison
based workshop there was an attempt to, what some delegates may define as
‘politicise’ the proceedings, focus on the final declaration; however, these requests
were met with, on the whole, a lack of enthusiasm. This was due to a number of
reasons; first the organisers of the second workshop were not the same as those of
the first day. Consequently they needed to realise their political agenda. Second,
there was a sense of deference to the Congress; that somehow such overt action was
not in accordance with accepted procedure and protocols. The conservatism of the
Congress, its sense of occasion and importance made the taking of overt political
action, that of subverting an ancillary meeting, ‘feel’ too difficult. It was impossible
to ascertain whether this deference to the Congress was through a sense of a too
great risk to disrupt a meeting, a sense of it not being the ‘done thing’ and therefore
the perpetrators would lose political influence or that the occasion itself overrode
any sense of achieving desired outcomes though more confrontational means.
Finally, even though certain participants attempted to raise the issues in the second
meeting that had been raised in the first meeting, and in doing so hoped for a
detailed debate about strategy these attempts were first ignored and then placed
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outside of the ancillary meeting with the chair suggesting a discussion immediately
after the closure of business. The importance of this move was to place such activity
outside of the ‘official’ meetings and to deny the advantage of translation between
potential participants who might have wanted to have achieved an agreement about
imprisonment in the final declaration.
However, this lack of concerted action on prisons did not mean that there was no
attempt to discuss prisons in the final substantive agenda item; ‘Making standards
work: fifty years of standard-setting in crime prevention and criminal justice.’
However, it was clear that a number of NGO participants and ‘experts’ supporting
such NGOs considered that prisons were not a focus of concern for the Congress and
so the issue was sidelined. Some participants viewed this as nothing more than the
roundabouts and swings of criminal justice policy making and were resigned to it not
being a significant item of concern for the Eleventh Congress. Whilst the final
declaration did not mention the issue of prisons at least the issue of prisons was not
lost altogether with the final statement commenting:
“The Congress recommended that the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice give consideration to reviewing the adequacy of standards and
norms in relation to prison management and prisoners.” (United Nations 2005c)
This recommendation was included in the draft declaration, along with a
recommendation for the more extensive use of restorative justice policies, and as
such may not be viewed by those wanting a more far reaching statement as a
successful outcome in relation to the final declaration. The comments of Salvatore
Pennacchio (Observer of the Holy See) were also recorded in the final document
(United Nations 2005c) where he called for a Charter of Fundamental Rights of
Prisoners in which a prisoner’s right to dignity, humane treatment and their
reinsertion into society should be acknowledged and addressed.
The final declaration does little more than re-state the UN position on prisons,
imprisonment and the treatment of offenders. Therefore, in terms of the
decarceration lobby the outcome of the Congress could not be seen to be particularly
successful. Part of the problem is the very structure of the Congress itself that
militates against the ancillary meetings of being of benefit. However, before
considering this in depth it is important to consider the workshops. The workshops
were formal, they required delegations to give notice of their intention to speak and
the chair of the workshop was responsible for providing a report on the proceedings.
Due to the timetabling of the workshops it was not possible to follow more than two
workshops in their entirety (even though six workshops were scheduled) due to the
overlapping of times. Presumably the intention of the workshop was to provide a
forum where experts could deliver short papers on their particular topic and where
delegations could take consideration of the expert advice before making a statement.
Such a structure assumes a coherent framework to each of the workshops so that the
contributions by the experts provide a coherent overview of the topic and informs
the policy making and implementation decisions. However, the structure of the
workshops did not allow for such a coherent approach to the topics. For example,
Workshop One which was focused on International Co-operation in Policing and
Extradition was the combining of two different and complex areas of co-operation.
Due to the fact that the structure of the workshops was the same as that of the
substantive items this resulted in country delegations reading prepared statements.
The outcome of this was that the prepared statements bore little relationship to the
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papers given by the experts, and the experts had no choice than to sit quietly whilst
each delegation read out its prepared statement. So, the question arises, why have
workshops when countries appear to take no account of the expertise available? The
workshops are little more than another forum for the delivery of pre-prepared
statements that are attempting to resolve a range of political agendas that are wider
than the topic under discussion. This was evidenced by the attempt of the Chair of
Workshop One to divide the time equally between International Co-operation in Law
Enforcement and then to focus on extradition. However, nearly every delegation that
took the floor in the first half of the workshop spoke about extradition, even though
they had been asked to confine their comments to co-operation and they were given
the assurance that they would be granted the floor to make a statement concerning
extradition in the second half of the workshop.
So the workshop became subverted by the perceived need of delegations to make
their statements in full and to ensure that what they were attempting to achieve was
maximized. This strategy was also apparent in workshop three; this was focused on
economic crimes and corruption. An attempt by the workshop organisers to provide
a more interactive approach did not succeed in reducing the number of pre-prepared
statements. The structure of the workshops could be seen to be unhelpful. This was,
no doubt, an unintended consequence of the organisation of the Congress. For
example many of the workshops were structured to deal with more than one theme;
so workshop two was Enhancing Criminal Justice Reform, including Restorative
Justice. The question is why was there not a workshop on restorative justice in its
own right? It looks as though the workshops were amalgamated thus creating the
potential for fragmentation and loss of cohesion and coherence.
Finally, the overall structure of the Congress makes it impossible for there to be any
in depth analysis of the topics discussed. The substantive items require country
statements, and it is probably appropriate that these are pre-prepared. In some senses
there is nothing wrong in pre-prepared statements in the substantive items as this
may encourage countries antipathetic to certain conventions and protocols to move
nearer to the accepted UN position. However, the fact that many of the workshops
overlap with one another, that some overlap with substantive items, and that
workshop participants are not in a position to incorporate expert advice into their
statements results in the workshops being nothing more than another stream of
substantive items. The ancillary meeting are situated in the same space as both
substantive items and workshops and so they tend to be outside the parameters of the
attendance for many delegations, especially the smaller delegations who experience
difficulties in attending the substantive and workshop sessions. As one delegate told
me:
“I have no doubt that the ancillary meeting are the most useful and informative, but
we cannot attend those because of the main agenda items and workshops we need
to be involved in.”
Conclusions and Recommendations
Is it possible to evaluate such an event? Perhaps the truth is that for some states it is
invaluable and for others it cannot be missed, for fear of what others might do, but it
has very little value in its own right. So, evaluating such an event will mean that the
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evaluation for some will not take account of the benefits for them and for others it
will be an anodyne evaluation of no real value. However, having acknowledged that
there is the potential for such a difference of view it is my intention to try and
evaluate the event. I do think that one part of it can be evaluated because each
element is a dynamic component of the whole.
There can be no doubt that the Congress is an event with considerable energy,
bringing together policy makers, policy implementers, practitioners, NGO
representatives and academic experts from all over the world. It provides informally
an atmosphere in which people can discuss, debate and share ideas. At this informal
level it is probably a positive event in developing, enhancing, sustaining and creating
networks of criminal justice professionals who are trying to solve a series of difficult
problems that have no real solution. So, the sharing of experience and strategies for
addressing some of the more significant transnational crimes cannot be a bad thing.
It is also a good thing that a forum is provided where those states less inclined to
consider issues of human rights and humanitarian reforms are pushed slowly towards
the goals established by the United Nations. It cannot be denied that all of this comes
at a considerable cost in terms of financial and human time because the Congress is
the end product of many hours of work put in by individuals before it actually meets.
However, for all of this the only real evaluative test is whether the Congress meets it
aims as set out in the Congress documentation. There are five aims, but the first
three are the ones that we are most concerned with in this paper. The first aim is the
exchange of views between States, intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations and individual experts representing various professions
and disciplines;” In some senses this can be said to have been met, but only
partially. There is a considerable exchanging of views within the informal processes
of the Congress yet it is difficult to see that the dynamic represented in this aim, a
synergy between governments, NGOs and experts actually ever takes place formally.
This does not occur because the structure of the Congress prohibits such an
interaction between the different players on the Congress stage. As the comments
above on both the ancillary meetings and workshops suggest there is no real
exchange of views within the formal sessions, many of which have now been
rendered as ‘set pieces’. The ancillary meetings are there to compliment and provide
a forum for NGOs to attempt to influence proceedings, but considering the overlap
of sessions it is difficult to argue that such meetings are influential. The conclusions
of my attempts to look for significant changes in the final declaration on
imprisonment appear to support this assertion that ancillary meetings are of little
influence. Indeed it is true to say that the exchange of expertise is hard to discern as
almost all of the forums for exchange are now controlled set piece environments. So,
the first aim is at best only partially met in the formal proceedings and in terms of
this evaluation the conclusion is that the Congress is not an efficient means to
meeting the first aim.
The second aim is that of ‘the exchange of experiences in research, law and policy
development’. In the formal sessions it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where such
exchanges occur. The country statements are not flexible and open enough to fit this
aim. If anything the country statements tend to be formulaic in that they detail the
country’s concern with the particular issue, detail their attempts via legislation to
address the problem and finish by urging the UN to undertake more action, or at
least maintain their current level of commitment to solving the problem. So, there is
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no forum, not even in the ancillary meeting, to explore the research evidence, to
debate its meaning and to consider the application of research findings to legislation
and policy. This aim is a worthy one and may be achieved in the informal processes
of the Congress but as a formal aim it is difficult to conclude that it is met.
The third aim is ‘The identification of emerging trends and issues in crime
prevention and criminal justice’. Similar comments that have been made about aims
one and two apply here. There is no real forum for such a process to take place. It is
within the workshops that such processes should occur. The workshops should
provide an exchange of views on emerging trends and problems and the
identification of solutions to such crime problems. However, the formal emphasis of
country statements removes the opportunity for debate and engagement with the
more complex issues of crime prevention and control. Furthermore the focus on
delegations within the workshops results in the contribution from experts as being
only cursory because there is no real way in which their expertise informs the policy
decisions of the Congress. Whilst experts may attempt to identify the emerging
trends in their contributions the inclusion of such information does not occur in the
country based statements. In general it appears that the aims are only partially met
by the Congress and that many opportunities pass by unused because of the structure
of the Congress, its sense of importance and therefore lack of real academic debate
and the failure to provide a forum for analysis of problematic issues in relation to
crime and criminal justice.
So what is to be done? There are a number of options, however, assuming that the
informal processes of the Congress and its official business processes ending in a
declaration are not going to be replaced then what has to be done is to restructure the
Congress. Such a restructuring should allow for the exchange of expertise, of ideas,
of research findings and policy implementation practices. It is also necessary to
provide a ‘real’ forum that encourages and stimulates debate to allow countries to
take account of the synergy that exists between participants. It is this failure to
exploit this synergy in the business of the Congress that is the most negative of
processes. It is clear that the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and
Crime and justice has a globally important role to play and its influence in
maintaining human rights, the delivery of justice and proper treatment of offenders
should be maximized.
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